

AL-TAWHĪD

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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

*In the Name of Allah,
the Merciful and the Compassionate*

Editorial

The revolution that triumphed ten years ago on Bahman 22, 1357 (Feb. 11, 1979) in Iran was unlike any other revolution in the world's recent history. It was a revolution inspired by religious faith and led by a religious leader. From the viewpoint of Western scholarship, that which had occurred was hardly understandable. The Islamic Revolution represented a phenomenon that lay beyond the purview of its categories of thought and understanding. The confusion that seized the Western scholarship as a result, is something which is all too apparent throughout the good number of books, articles and analyses about the topic that have come out since the Revolution. The very concepts and intellectual instruments of understanding that the Western scholarship had developed for analyzing different forms of social and political phenomena proved to be hopelessly blunt and ineffective. The failure to understand in this case had an inherent cause, an inbuilt blindness and ignorance. In fact the Revolution would not have come about had this blindness and ignorance not gone as far as they did.

Some saw it as a phenomenon related to a section, large or small, of the Iranian people; some related it to Iran and Shi'ism or confined it to the Middle East or the Islamic world. All such ascriptions may have been partially valid. But they missed the basic truth that the Revolution had causes deeply rooted in the nature of man. It was human nature that had revolted to demolish an artificial system of pseudo-values and false norms and ideals in the shape of the Pahlavi regime and Western influence.

The Revolution represented a release of tremendous human energies that are never tapped in a secular environment. It was as if the flood-gates of heaven had been opened and a thousand waterfalls let loose to wash clean the spirit of a nation and to carry away the filth and corruption of a degenerate system. The Revolution not only brought freedom and independence to a people, but also gave political power and independence to Islam, which had languished in chains for centuries in the dungeons of despotism and tyranny.

The Revolution bore all the signs of an inner renewal, a resurrection, that heralded the beginning of a new era in human history. It opened the doors to a new destiny, not only for the Muslim society but for all mankind. The world would not be the same place again, no matter how much those who have not seen the Light assure themselves that nothing has changed.

Nothing can block the path of this change: neither propaganda nor military aggression; neither an imposed war nor an unjust peace; neither

the power, experience and expertise of its enemies, nor the inexperience and naivety of its supporters; neither the atrocities of its enemies nor the blunders of its friends. In these hours of twilight, between the departing night and the awaited sunrise, what can this light be except the first unmistakable glimmer of an irresistible fulfilment of a cosmic promise:

كَتَبَ اللَّهُ لَأَغْلِبَنَّ أَنَا وَرُسُلِي إِنَّ اللَّهَ قَوِيٌّ عَزِيزٌ ﴿٢١﴾

God has written, 'I shall assuredly be the victor, I and My Messengers.' Surely God is All-strong, All-mighty. (58:21)

وَنُرِيدُ أَنْ نَمُنَّ عَلَى الَّذِينَ اسْتُضِعُوا فِي الْأَرْضِ وَنَجْعَلَهُمْ أَئِمَّةً وَنَجْعَلَهُمُ الْوَارِثِينَ ﴿٥﴾

Yet We desire to be gracious to those that were abased in the earth, and to make them leaders, and to make them the inheritors, and to establish them in the earth....(28:5)

These hours of twilight are also the hours of trial. Some, compelled by the inertia of their dark past, will write their names in the book of the night; they will share the night's fate and go out with its darkness. Some will read the message of the twilight and go forth to meet the day. They will not be unprepared when the Sun rises in its resplendent glory. Others who continue to drowse will be shaken to awakeness by the clamour of the day.

Yet, irrespective of who heeds it, the twilight's call is universal. It is addressed to all the peoples of all the creeds; of the West and the East, of the North and the South. "Wake up and be ready", it seems to say, "Are you not tired of being black and white, yellow and brown, Easterner and Westerner? Isn't it time to be nothing but human? Isn't it time to praise the Lord and to extol the virtues of humanness? Aren't you tired yet of enmity and pride, of greed and lust? Isn't it time to enter the brotherhood of man? Isn't it time to break the idols of power and wealth, of race and colour, and to submit to the Lord of Abraham, of Buddha and Jesus, of Zoroaster and Confucius, of Rama and Nanak, of Moses and Muhammad? Look, regardless of all your enmities and rivalries, your differences and divisions, your various names and labels, how alike you are all in your bankruptcy and wretchedness. O children of the night, who would not separate and part from its evil bosom, spit out its black milk, wash your mouth and nourish yourself with the refreshing mana of the twilight."

Such is the call of the twilight which the people of Iran answered ten years ago. Their cry of 'labbayk' resounded throughout the globe. All of a sudden, they threw away their fear and with it their selfishness,

pettiness and impotence. The renewal of their spirit accompanied a renewal of the covenant with God, that they would worship none except God, submit to none except God and ask for help from none except God. Wasn't this the primary covenant of man with God, now embodied by Islam?

The renewal of this covenant meant the repudiation of everything that was contrary to it. It meant the repudiation of the Western civilization to the extent that it was based on a rejection and denial of God and His sovereignty. It meant the repudiation of the sovereignty of the superpowers and their infernal influence. It called for the unity of the Islamic world and the unity of mankind under the banner of this renewed covenant. It declared that the end of the night was near, the night of the global dominance of *kufr* and *shirk*, the night of the oppression, exploitation and slavery of nations, the night of subjugation of man to man, the night of Satan's *wilāyah* (leadership).

It was no wonder that the Devil and his hordes took this renewal of the covenant as a challenge and a threat. They saw death for themselves in the resurrection of man at the messianic hands of Islam. They launched a campaign of slanderous propaganda against Iran and the Islamic Republic. Economic blockade, political boycott and military aggression were soon to follow. None of these could destroy the determination of the Iranian people to stand by the covenant that they had remade with God. How could they abandon the covenant that is the sole hope of the deliverance of man and the sole guarantee of the perpetuation of human civilization? It were they, not God, who stood in the need of the covenant and stood to be benefited by it. Should they abandon it, some other nation would take their place and carry the torch. Were all humanity to abandon it, God would create another species, another creation, to carry the torch of *tawhīd*. Had not God said in the Qur'an:

يَأْتِيهَا الَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا مِنْ بَرْتَدَّ مِنْكُمْ عَنْ دِينِهِ ۖ فَسَوْفَ يَأْتِي اللَّهُ بِقَوْمٍ يُحِبُّهُمْ وَيُحِبُّونَهُ ۖ أَذِلَّةٍ عَلَى الْمُؤْمِنِينَ أَعِزَّةٍ عَلَى الْكَافِرِينَ يُجَاهِدُونَ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ وَلَا يَخَافُونَ لَوْمَةَ لَائِمٍ ۚ ذَلِكَ فَضْلُ اللَّهِ يُؤْتِيهِ مَنْ يَشَاءُ ۗ وَاللَّهُ وَاسِعٌ عَلِيمٌ ﴿٥٤﴾

O believers, whosoever of you turns from his religion, God will assuredly bring a people He loves, and who love Him, humble towards the believers, stern towards the unbelievers, men who struggle in the path of God, not fearing the reproach of any reproacher. That is God's bounty; He gives it unto whom He will; and God is All-embracing, All-knowing. (5:54)

مَثَلُ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا بِرَبِّهِمْ أَعْمَلُهُمْ كَرَمًا ۖ أَشَدَّتْ بِهِ الرِّيحُ فِي يَوْمٍ عَاصِفٍ لَا يَقْدِرُونَ مِمَّا كَسَبُوا عَلَىٰ شَيْءٍ ۚ ذَٰلِكَ هُوَ الضَّلَالُ الْبَعِيدُ ﴿١٨﴾ ۗ أَلَمْ تَرَ أَنَّ اللَّهَ خَلَقَ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ

بِالْحَقِّ إِنْ شَاءَ يُدْهِبِكُمْ وَيَأْتِ بِخَلْقٍ جَدِيدٍ ﴿١٩﴾ وَمَا ذَلِكَ عَلَى اللَّهِ بِعَزِيزٍ ﴿٢٠﴾

The likeness of those who disbelieve in their Lord: their works are as ashes, whereon the wind blows strong upon a tempestuous day; they have no power over that they have earned — that is far error! Hast thou not seen that God created the heavens and the earth in truth? If He will, He can put you away and bring a new creation; that is surely no great matter for God. (14:18 — 20)

يَا أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ أَنْتُمُ الْفُقَرَاءُ إِلَى اللَّهِ وَاللَّهُ هُوَ الْغَنِيُّ الْحَمِيدُ ﴿١٥﴾ إِنْ شَاءَ يُدْهِبِكُمْ وَيَأْتِ بِخَلْقٍ جَدِيدٍ ﴿١٦﴾ وَمَا ذَلِكَ عَلَى اللَّهِ بِعَزِيزٍ ﴿١٧﴾

O men, you are the ones that have need of God; He is the All-sufficient, the All-laudable. If He will, He can put you away and bring a new creation; that is surely no great matter for God? (35:15 — 17)

The Islamic Revolution that occurred ten years ago in Iran was a major event in the reawakening that extends over the whole Islamic world. Although the effect of the Revolution was to accelerate this process of global awakening, it itself was the effect and not the cause of this process. The climactic success of the Revolution was, it seems, due to certain advantages that were available in Iran due to its specific historical conditions. At other places, such as Afghanistan, Palestine and Lebanon, where those advantages are either unavailable or are available to a lesser extent, the Muslims continue to put up a determined resistance against the aggressive forces of global *kufir*. It is the faith, unity and determination of the people of those countries which will guarantee their ultimate victory.

The Islamic revival carries within it the tremendous resources of a reburgeoning culture that looks forward to healthy growth, blossoming, and fruition, and a splendid future for mankind. It represents the cosmic forces of the renewal of humanity. On the other hand, the Western civilization carries within itself the chronic disease of self-destructiveness. Its mania for power and aggressiveness and its phobia of the equality and dignity of nations, its zest for slavery and for cultivating slaves and its unlimited passion for militarism, its unscrupulous interests and its interventionist instincts, its talent for deceit and its genius for self-deception, and, above all, its moral bankruptcy and its spiritual blindness — all focus on the marvel of a suicidal civilization surviving from year to year and from decade to decade. But for how long can a drunken man walking haphazardly on the edge of a precipice avoid his fate?

As we said, the present is a period of test for the nations, wherein they confront perhaps the last chance to sever their links with a dying

past and to establish ties with the new future of humanity. Let them not be misled by the deceptive hubhub and funereal pageantry of a civilization. Let us hope that many will muster the wisdom to break the unholy covenant with the Devil and to return in time to the primordial covenant with God, the Creator and the Lord of the heavens and the earth:

وَلِلَّهِ مُلْكُ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَاللَّهُ عَلَىٰ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرٌ ﴿١٨٩﴾ إِنَّ فِي خَلْقِ السَّمَوَاتِ
وَالْأَرْضِ وَاخْتِلَافِ اللَّيْلِ وَالنَّهَارِ لَآيَاتٍ لِّأُولِي الْأَلْبَابِ ﴿١٩٠﴾ الَّذِينَ يَذْكُرُونَ اللَّهَ قِيَمًا وَقُعُودًا
وَعَلَىٰ جُنُوبِهِمْ وَيَتَفَكَّرُونَ فِي خَلْقِ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ رَبَّنَا مَا خَلَقْتَ هَذَا بَطْلًا تُسَبِّحُكَ فَقِينَا
عَذَابَ النَّارِ ﴿١٩١﴾ رَبَّنَا إِنَّكَ مَن تَدْخُلِ النَّارَ فَقَدْ أَخْرَجْتَهُ وَمَا لِلظَّالِمِينَ مِنْ أَنْصَارٍ ﴿١٩٢﴾ رَبَّنَا إِنَّا
سَمِعْنَا مُنَادِيًا يُنَادِي لِلْإِيمَانِ أَنْ ءَامِنُوا بِرَبِّكُمْ فَآمَنَّا رَبَّنَا فَاغْفِرْ لَنَا ذُنُوبَنَا وَكَفِّرْ عَنَّا
سَيِّئَاتِنَا وَتَوَقَّنَا مَعَ الْأَبْرَارِ ﴿١٩٣﴾ رَبَّنَا وَءَايَاتِنَا مَا وَعَدْتَنَا عَلَىٰ رُسُلِكَ وَلَا نَخْزِنَا يَوْمَ الْقِيَمَةِ إِنَّكَ لَا
تُخْلِفُ الْعَهْدَ ﴿١٩٤﴾ فَاسْتَجَابَ لَهُمْ رَبُّهُمْ أَنِّي لَا أُضِيعُ عَمَلَ عَمَلٍ مِّنْكُمْ مِنْ ذَكَرٍ أَوْ أُنثَىٰ بَعْضُكُمْ
مِنْ بَعْضٍ فَالَّذِينَ هَاجَرُوا وَأُخْرِجُوا مِنْ دِيَارِهِمْ وَأُودُوا فِي سَبِيلِي وَقَاتَلُوا وَقُتِلُوا لَأُكَفِّرَنَّ
عَنَّهُمْ سَيِّئَاتِهِمْ وَلَأُدْخِلَنَّهُمْ جَنَّاتٍ تَجْرِي مِنْ تَحْتِهَا الْأَنْهَارُ ثَوَابًا مِّنْ عِنْدِ اللَّهِ وَاللَّهُ عِنْدَهُ
حُسْنُ الثَّوَابِ ﴿١٩٥﴾ لَا يَغْرَنَكَ تَقَلُّبُ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا فِي الْبِلَادِ ﴿١٩٦﴾ مَتَّعٌ قَلِيلٌ ثُمَّ مَا لَهُمْ جَهَنَّمَ
وَيَبْسُ الْمِهَادُ ﴿١٩٧﴾ لَكِنَّ الَّذِينَ اتَّقَوْا رَبَّهُمْ لَهُمْ جَنَّاتٌ تَجْرِي مِنْ تَحْتِهَا الْأَنْهَارُ خَالِدِينَ فِيهَا
نَزُلًا مِّنْ عِنْدِ اللَّهِ وَمَا عِنْدَ اللَّهِ خَيْرٌ لِّلْأَبْرَارِ ﴿١٩٨﴾ وَإِنْ مِنْ أَهْلِ الْكِتَابِ لَمَن يُؤْمِنُ بِاللَّهِ وَمَا
أُنزِلَ إِلَيْكُمْ وَمَا أُنزِلَ إِلَيْهِمْ خَشِعِينَ لِلَّهِ لَا يَشْتُرُونَ بِآيَاتِ اللَّهِ ثَمَنًا قَلِيلًا أُولَٰئِكَ لَهُمْ
أَجْرُهُمْ عِنْدَ رَبِّهِمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ سَرِيعُ الْحِسَابِ ﴿١٩٩﴾ يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا اصْبِرُوا وَصَابِرُوا
وَرَابِطُوا وَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ لَعَلَّكُمْ تُفْلِحُونَ ﴿٢٠٠﴾

To God belongs the kingdom of the heavens and of the earth; and God is powerful over everything. Surely in the creation of the heavens and earth and in the alteration of night and day there are signs for men possessed of minds, who remember God, standing and sitting and on their sides, and reflect upon the creation of the heavens and the earth: 'Our Lord, Thou hast not created this in vain. Glory be to Thee! Guard us against the chastisement of the Fire. Our Lord, whomsoever Thou admittest into the Fire, Thou wilt have abased; and the evildoers shall have no helpers. Our Lord, we have heard a caller calling us to belief, saying, "Believe you in your Lord!" And we believe. Our Lord, forgive Thou us our sins and acquit us of our misdeeds, and take us to Thee with the pious. Our Lord, give us that Thou hast promised us by Thy Messengers, and abase us not on the Day of Resurrection; Thou wilt not fail the tryst'.

And their Lord answers them: 'I waste not the labour of any that labours among you, be you male or female — the one of you is from the other. And those who emigrated, and were expelled from their inhabitations, those who suffered hurt in My way, and fought, and were slain — them I shall surely acquit of their evil deeds, and I shall admit them to gardens underneath which rivers flow. A reward from God. And God — with Him is the fairest reward'.

Let the going to and fro of the unbelievers in the cities not delude thee; a little enjoyment, then their refuge is Hell — an evil cradling! But those who fear their Lord — for them shall be gardens underneath which rivers flow, therein dwelling for ever — a hospitality God Himself offers; and that which is with God is better for the pious.

And some there are of the People of the Scriptures who believe in God, and what has been sent down upon you, and what has been sent down unto them, men humble to God, not selling the words of God for a small price; those — their wage is with their Lord; God is swift at the reckoning.

O believers, be patient, and bid one another to be patient, be steadfast; be careful of your duty to God; haply you will prosper. (3:189 — 200)

Tehran,

29 Jamādī al-Thānī, 1409

A Satanic Venture.

On February 14, 1989, following violent protests in India and Pakistan against the publication of *The Satanic Verses* in the U.S., Imam Khomeynī issued a decree ordering the execution of the book's author, Salmān Rushdī. If Rushdī's novel had created an outburst of protest throughout most of the Islamic world, the Imam's decree came as a bolt of lightning that shook the entire world. If the book's blasphemous character had earned its author much notoriety, the decree brought him world infamy.

There was nothing extraordinary about the decree itself, for it handed out a standard sentence for this kind of crime according to Islamic law. Yet the factors of time and place made it an extremely unusual event in contemporary history and gave it a global significance. In a word, the Imam's decree represented a turning point in the developing confrontation between Islam and the West, between the values of faith and the norms of profanity, between the code of Heaven and the conduct of the pagan, between the Sovereignty of God and the sovereignty of the Devil.

As to the Islamic basis of this decree, the fact is that Islam enjoins a measure of respect for things held sacred by people, rightly or wrongly. In verse 6:108, God Almighty forbids Muslims to revile the idols of the polytheists lest they, in turn, should revile God out of ignorance. The objective is to preserve the Name of God in its inviolate glory, perpetually, in society, so that the rays of its inviolable majesty should

continue to guide generations of mankind one after another. The same is true of the sanctity of everything else related to God, and pre-eminently that of His Messengers and apostles. To revile a prophet of God is to defile the springs of human salvation, to poison the minds of men in regard to their Lord, and thus to block the path of human deliverance. Hence the crime of blasphemy is much more injurious than that of manslaughter (الْفِتْنَةُ أَشَدُّ مِنْ الْقَتْلِ), says the Qur'ān), for a man killing another deprives him of his earthly life, which is short and ephemeral, whereas the person who reviles God and His prophets with the purpose of lowering their dignity and reverence in society tries to deprive his fellow human beings of a life of felicity in this world and in the Hereafter, the latter being everlasting and, in fact, the real life which man has been created for. Therefore, the inviolability of God's Name and that of His apostles in society is a primary requirement of the salvation of successive generations. To punish any crime against this inviolate sanctity is to uphold the most basic right of the human being: to know, worship and serve its Lord and Creator. Those who violate Divine sanctities try to separate man from God, to deprive man of his spiritual life by alienating him from the Source of all that is good and beneficial for him, to strip him of his human dignity. For there is no human dignity separate from the dignity and the honour of the Almighty. All dignity and honour is derived from the Absolute and all rights are derived from the right of every creature to grow to the limits of its perfection and to the limits of its capacity endowed to it by the Creator. Blasphemy is therefore, the negation of all rights, all honour, all dignity, all freedom; for what is freedom except the absence of obstruction and restriction in the path of human beings leading to their growth and perfection. The dignity and honour of God and that of His apostles is thus the most basic guarantee for protection of all rights, all freedoms, and all dignities. The Western world would not have descended to the lowest levels of degeneration had it retained the sense to safeguard the honour and dignity of Christ in that society.

Hence the Prophet Muḥammad (S) showed great sensitivity to those who reviled him and his message. He would forgive those who had taken up arms against him and his mission, as he did on the well-known occasion of the conquest of Makkah. But he did not forgive those who reviled him and Islam by circulating nasty jokes and verses. The incident of Ka'b ibn al-'Ashraf is well-known and has been recorded by Muslim and al-Bukhārī as well as Abū Dāwūd, Ibn Sa'd, al-Wāqidī and Ibn Hishām in their books on ḥadīth and history. The Prophet (S) assigned the task of killing Ka'b — a man from the tribe of Ṭayy who circulated verses reviling Islam, the Prophet (S), and his followers — to a group led by Muḥammad ibn Maslamah. Abū 'Afak and 'Aṣmā bint Marwān were killed for a similar reason by Sālim ibn 'Umayr and 'Umayr ibn 'Adī at

the Prophet's behest, as recorded by Ibn Sa'd in his *al-Ṭabaqāt* and al-Wāqidi in his *al-Maghāzī*. Al-Ya'qūbi records that among those whom the Prophet (S) did not grant amnesty on entering Makkah were: Sārah, a slave girl of Banū 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib; Hind bint 'Utbah; Quraybah; and Furtanā, the latter two being slave-women belonging to Abū Khaṭal.

When the opponents came with logic and arguments they were met on the same ground. The Prophet (S) and the Imams (A) argued with atheists and materialists and engaged in rational debates with them. When his enemies took up arms against him the Prophet (S) fought them and forgave them when they surrendered. But he had no answer except death sentence for those who opposed Islam by resorting to reviling and who in their smear campaign followed neither logic nor rational argument, nor observed the bounds of propriety.

The publication of *The Satanic Verses* was also motivated by a similar blind malice, which knows neither logic nor understands the words of reason. The imperialist and Zionist circles in the West have been perturbed deeply by the growing influence of Islam in the West itself. They seem to have seen no alternative to blocking the path of its growing influence except resorting to a total, uncontrolled blasphemous propaganda, reminiscent of the Christian writings of the Middle Ages against Islam. If the malice of the fathers of the Church and the priests was motivated by dogmatic allegiance to a faith and buttressed by their profound ignorance of the Islamic faith and teachings, the malice of the patrons of the ill-fated Salmān Rushdi was motivated by purely pagan interests, which consider culture and religion as an instrument for protection of political and economic vested interests. The docile popular culture of the Western people, the cultural base of imperialism, had to be protected at all costs, even if it should create an uproar in the Islamic world, and put the satellite governments of the Muslim countries in a most disconcerting position (who find themselves in a position in which they dare neither support, nor condemn the Imam's decree). Islam, on its way to becoming gradually a global religion and culture had to be stopped at all cost.

The West's opinion manufacturers had observed the edifice of orientalist scholarship crumble with the rapidly eroding credibility of Western scholarship in this field in the West itself. Moreover, orientalism had limited applicability due to the pseudo-scholarly character of its studies. What was needed was a popular propaganda weapon with a destructive capacity amplified many times by accompanying publicity. A book authored by a well-known novelist that reviled the sanctities of Islam in a manner reminiscent of the defamatory Christian literature of the days of the Crusades, and that, too, written by a born-Muslim would go a long way to establishing emotional hurdles in the path of Islam so far as the Western public was concerned.

A similar, far less serious, job had been entrusted some years ago to V.S. Naipaul, who undertook a cheerless, tiresome journey, "Among the Believers", to come back home and tell the Western people that the so-called Islamic fundamentalists were raw, uncultured, naive and nose-picking fanatics unfamiliar with the civilized ways and the sophistication that Mr. Naipaul and his likes had picked up in the West Indies and England. Mr. Naipaul came back home to tell his gullible readers that there was no cause for worry. The West was the best place. The Westerners were all in all the best kind of people on the face of the globe. Their culture was in apple-pie order, and the wretched "believers" dreaming of an Islamic renaissance, had still a long way to go to becoming decent human beings. Islam and Muslims had nothing to offer to the West or to humanity, despite all the deafening clamour of *Allāhu akbar*, the quixotic toppling of the Shah, and the rabid revolutionary fervour. "Here are a people," declared Mr. Naipaul on his return home, "who have lost their way in the labyrinths of history in their search for the dead glory of a distant past." A people, whose only remedy, perhaps, was mercy-killing, which would relieve them of their dreams, which were as painful for themselves as they were dangerous for others. The good Mr. Naipaul made a splash of his disdain, but he with his illconcealed ignorance of Islam and Islamic history and his meagre knowledge of Iran and the Middle East — almost entirely out of the *Hājī Baba of Iṣfahān* — could hardly be expected to accomplish anything more. Besides his all too plain ignorance of Islam and Muslim history, he was a Hindu by origin. Perhaps his Hindu origin saved him from the fate that awaited the ill-fated *Rūshdī*. Also, perhaps, he was too timid or too well-pleased with his fortune and fame to involve himself in such a risky venture as fell to the lot of *Rūshdī*.

The Western imperialist circles and their Zionist pimps were looking about for a non-Western, non-Christian writer of moderate fame who could be persuaded to take up such a baneful task. He had to be a non-Westerner and non-Christian because the kind of stuff produced in the past by the Church fathers carried little weight with the Western public, who attached little credibility to what a Christian and a Westerner felt or said about Islam. A Muslim name and an Eastern background would carry much weight. The Western public was after all not that much gullible to accept a Christian's criticism of Islam. Moreover, few people read books by theologians and scholars. Had not a great deal of "scholarly" studies been churned out by Orientalists containing hundreds of "damaging" and misleading observations in microscopic detail against Islam, its scripture and its Prophet (S)? Such studies, confined to scholarly and academic circles, had little effectiveness as popular propaganda carrier. Moreover, even educated Westerners were not used

to reading serious stuff. They hardly cared for historical and theological debates. They had little patience for intricate arguments pulled out of such ancient texts as the books of al-Bukhārī and his likes. It had to be a novel, and that too of not a very serious kind, for the greater part of the reading public did not care much for serious literature. Times had not changed much since Ezra Pond deplored that the literary classics did not enjoy any wide circulation in the West. Moreover, the publication of the novel should be accompanied by a ballyhoo about the novel and its contents to arouse even the interest of the old ladies whose reading passions hardly ever crossed the threshold of the *Readers' Digest*.

Perhaps it was the inevitability of an evil fate that made Salmān Rushdī the almost exclusive choice for this Satanic venture. Rushdī was already successful as a writer and as a novelist. He was an Easterner who had grown up in the West and learnt there his literary chores, and, above all, a born Muslim — the best candidate to produce this kind of book, which served the political and cultural aims of imperialism disguised as literature. If he came under an attack from the Islamic world, the Western literary world will leap to his defence. The Western governments, organizations, forums and media would shelter him. Moreover, once the book came out and was blessed by the opinion manufacturers with an aura of literary fame and finesse, the denunciation of Mr. Rushdī by the world's Muslims would boost the book's popularity and sales in the West. If he is attacked and killed, so much the better, for that will further raise the book's readership and fame to new heights. Once the book is on the stalls, a notorious Rushdī will be a greater boost to the book in the West. An assassinated Rushdī will give it an aura of tragedy and heroism. "Here is the man," the opinion manufacturers would cry out, "who gave his life to enlighten the Western public about what a writer of sensibility genuinely felt about his religion. He risked his reputation and life to produce a courageous work of literature. His Titanic courage, his crusade represent another milestone in modern man's struggle for freedom of expression. Although his co-religionists took his life, he gave a revived will and a new courage to his fellow men, the courage to break the centuries-old idols of fanaticism and dogmatic silence that have always been the greatest hurdles in the path of man's unceasing and fearless search for truth and freedom." Thus the opinion manufacturers would turn him into a hero. A dead Rushdī would be a great propaganda asset against Islam in the West. Then the opinion manufacturers would turn to the Muslim world and say: "Look, this was your man. We gave him shelter, education, citizenship and literary fame. If he wrote anything against your sanctities, we are not to be blamed. We protected him to the extent that we could, in keeping with our respect for freedom of

expression and our duty to preserve the lives of our citizens. Now that he is dead, Muslims should have no more any grudge against us.”

Such were the calculations of the imperialists and their Zionist agents. Rushdī, it appears, was impressed into acquiescence by the prowess and assurances of his patrons, and was duped into accepting the assignment for the novel. Everything turned out as foreseen. There were protests in England, India and Pakistan, where the publication of the English novel first attracted attention. The governments of the Islamic countries, as was to be expected, banned the book, thus appearing to have responded fully and adequately to the uproar of protest. Iran, too, was expected to ban the book and denounce the author and consider the matter as finished at that. There were threats against the author that came from some known and unknown Muslim quarters. Everything turned out fine for Rushdī and his publishers and patrons, until the noon of February 14, 1989, when the decree of Imam Khumaynī came, which offset all their calculations. All that they had expected were threats and intimidations that would help the book's publicity without posing serious threat to the life of its author. The sentence of Imam Khumaynī changed the situation almost instantaneously.

The imperialists had either not foreseen this action of the Imam, or had failed to foresee its consequences. The decree instantaneously gave global dimensions to his leadership and united the whole Muslim world in a single gesture behind his leadership. Years of the labour and millions of the petrodollars spent to create suspicion and division amongst Shi'ī and Sunnī Muslims were lost and gone in a moment. The decree proved that times had changed and an awakened Muslim world would not leave the West's challenges unanswered. It would move decisively and bravely to defend the sanctities of the Islamic faith and to remove all hurdles put in its way by the imperialists. To their utmost consternation, Iran led the Muslim world in its confrontation against the West and its pagan values; it no more stood alone as it did during its war with Iraq or during the crisis arising due to the seizure of the U.S. spy den in Tehran. The West was cornered into the unenviable position of defending blasphemy against God, against one of the greatest religious teachers of mankind, and the greatest outrage to the faith and feelings of a billion people of the world in the name of “freedom of expression” and “national sovereignty.”

The opinion manufacturers know well that there is no such thing as the right of freedom to commit crime, and that all freedoms stop where the frontiers of criminal behaviour begin. The dogma of national sovereignty cannot be invoked to defend the most heinous of crimes of an international dimension, a crime against the deepest feeling of a billion people by a paid reviler under the flimsy cover of art and literature.

The West and its leaders should understand once for all that they are helping neither the cause of human rights, nor defending any national sovereignty when they invoke these to justify insult against and outrage upon the profoundest feelings of a billion human beings, as if the Muslim world needs schooling to learn to respect these principles.

The West should once for all abandon its deceptive tricks of justifying aggression in the name of defence of this or that warship or principle. The nearly 300 innocent men, women and children of the Iranian Airbus downed by the U.S. warship on July 2, the families of these martyrs and their countrymen understand well the Western meaning of 'self-defence' and 'the right to self-defence'. They also well understand how much respect the West has for the sovereignty of other nations when it shoots down a civilian aircraft in the national airspace and waters of a country thousands of miles away from the nearest Western country.

They know very well how much the Western leaders respect the sovereignty of nations, as they watch how every day their spies and agents make a sport of the destinies of the nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Once for all, the West and its leaders should end all this nonsense in the name of such false deities as it has made out of man-made principles — to which they themselves show the least amount of respect — to perpetrate all kinds of atrocities against God and His apostles and His creatures in their name. The Muslim world has awakened. The Western man will also awake, as soon as he is able to recognize the ill-favoured face of the Devil concealed behind deceptive masks. The West has indeed created a clamour, and for some time it will enjoy the unity of governmental, judicial, media and literary circles, as well as a large section of its public, in its confrontation with the Islamic world. For some time it will succeed in fooling the Western officialdom, the literary world, and the public that it is defending something valuable and precious in terms of intrinsic human worth.

Yet, we are sure that the game of deceit has gone too far and the thread of Satanic malice against man and God has been stretched too far.

Very soon the Devil's guile will recoil upon him. Let *The Satanic Verses* find its way into every Western home. Sooner or later the Western people will be forced to ask themselves a question: "There have been many religious leaders in the history of mankind; what is the reason that the Prophet Muḥammad (S) and his mission is being subjected to so ruthless, irrational assaults by a pagan world ostensibly so indifferent to religion and religiosity in general?" They will not look for the answer to this question and scores of such other questions in Rushdi's Satanic production. They will not seek the answers to these questions from orientalists or the media men. They will not wait for Mr. President

or Mrs. Prime Minister to supply convincing answers. They will turn instead to the Book brought by this Prophet (S) and seek in there the answers to their questions. We are sure that the time is not far away when the Holy Qur'ān will find its way into every American, English, and French home, to the regret of the opinion manufacturers, who assume that human beings can always be treated as robots and made to act in accordance with the cultural software fed into them.

Iran and the Islamic world confront the West, drunk with its military, political and economic domination, and may face some passing harassment. But the West stands in a dangerous confrontation with God, the Almighty. We said in the editorial above that the Western civilization was racing towards its destruction. We now declare with utmost certainty that the West has never been so close to its destruction and ignominious end than it does today. If there was any occasion for running to safety from the Divine Wrath, the time is now.

It is also the responsibility of all Muslims, and especially the 'ulamā' and intellectuals, irrespective of sect and creed, to stand resolutely by the side of Imām Khumaynī and meet the pagan challenge with courage, awareness and fortitude. We are certain that Islam and Muslims will come out triumphant and all the more dedicated from this encounter. And the Western Satans will have to drink the cup of humiliation and ignominy for their attempt to revile the last and the greatest of all prophets, the best and the most perfect of men, the Seal of Prophethood, the beloved of God and of the true children of Adam, Noah and Abraham, the mercy of the All-merciful unto the worlds, the warner and the bringer of glad tidings, the destroyer of *kufr* and *shirk*, the breaker of the idols fabricated to mislead man from the worship of the one God, the Lamp of Divine Knowledge, the Deliverer of mankind, the Terror of the enemies of God and mankind, the Father of his Ummah, and the most devoted slave of his Lord, Muḥammad ibn 'Abd Allāh, upon whom and whose Family and true Companions be God's perpetual blessings and benedictions and upon whose enemies be God's curse and *la'nah* to the Judgement's Day. *Āmmīn Rabb al-'Ālamīn*.

The West has added injury to insult by standing up to defend Rushdī and condemning the entirely legitimate decree of Imām Khumaynī, which represents an uncontested Islamic command, not the viewpoint of any isolated legal school. By making a big political issue of Rushdī's death sentence, it has committed the biggest political blunder of the century, provoking the wrath and anger of a billion people against itself. The Prophet of Islam (S) is the most revered human being that has ever walked on the surface of this planet. By reviling him (S) and by defending the reviler, Western Europe has earned the deepest hatred and disdain of the world's Muslims, who while they may forget or forgive those who have committed gravest atrocities against their lives and

welfare, will not forgive a reviler of God and His Messenger (S) and those who rise impudently to the reviler's defence.

The judgement of Imām Khumaynī is not merely a symbolic act aimed to defend the sanctities of Islam in a pagan world, it represents the defence of the very notion of sanctity itself, which lies at the heart of all religion. Hence it deserves the support of all genuinely religious people, whether they are Christian or Hindu, Buddhist or Jew. The leaders of the Christian Church should realize that this is not a communal issue, of two communities in a head-on confrontation. The Imam's decree is not a move that should remind them of the Church's inquisition and "witch-burning" of the Middle Ages. For the Church's excesses, which led to the decline of Christianity, were aimed to safeguard its own superstitious and irrational dogmas, not the sanctity of God and that of Christ and other prophets. The Imam's decree, on the contrary, is a determined move to stop the unscrupulous demagogues from eradicating the very notion of sanctity and holiness from human hearts in order to preserve their Satanic domination over the life and faith, the minds and souls of men. The Church stands on a historical juncture where it can prove to the world that it stands with God and the prophets, with the faithful and the pious, and remove the doubt and anxiety from the hearts of the faithful that the Church of Jesus Christ is a willing accomplice of the destructive forces of paganism, tyranny, apostasy and blasphemy. This will be the greatest service that the Church will have done to God, to Christ, and to itself.

*Rajab 15, 1409,
Tehran.*

Forty Hadīth: An Exposition Part 14

by Imām Rūḥullāh al-Mūsawī āl-Khumaynī

Translated from the Persian by A. Q. Qarā'ī

THIRTEENTH ḤADĪTH: On Tawakkul:

بِالسَّنَدِ الْمُتَّصِلِ إِلَى الشَّيْخِ الْجَلِيلِ ثِقَةِ الْإِسْلَامِ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ يَعْقُوبَ بْنِ عِدَّةٍ مِنْ أَصْحَابِنَا عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ خَالِدٍ عَنْ غَيْرِ وَاحِدٍ عَنْ عَلِيِّ بْنِ أَسْبَاطٍ عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ عُمَرَ الْحَلَّالِ، عَنْ عَلِيِّ بْنِ سُوَيْدٍ، عَنْ أَبِي الْحَسَنِ الْأَوَّلِ (ع) قَالَ: سَأَلْتُهُ عَنْ قَوْلِ اللَّهِ عَزَّوَجَلَّ: «وَمَنْ يَتَوَكَّلْ عَلَى اللَّهِ فَهُوَ حَسْبُهُ» فَقَالَ: التَّوَكَّلُ عَلَى اللَّهِ دَرَجَاتٌ مِنْهَا أَنْ تَتَوَكَّلَ عَلَى اللَّهِ فِي أُمُورِكَ كُلِّهَا، فَمَا فَعَلَ بِكَ كُنْتَ عَنْهُ رَاضِيًا، تَعْلَمُ أَنَّهُ لَا يَأْلُوكَ خَيْرًا وَفَضْلًا وَتَعْلَمُ أَنَّ الْحُكْمَ فِي ذَلِكَ لَهُ، فَتَتَوَكَّلْ عَلَى اللَّهِ بِتَفْوِضِ ذَلِكَ إِلَيْهِ وَتُثِقْ بِهِ فِيهَا وَفِي غَيْرِهَا.

...Muḥammad ibn Ya'qūb (al-Kulaynī): from a group of our teachers, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Khālid, from more than one transmitter, from 'Alī ibn Asbāṭ, from Aḥmad ibn 'Umar al-Ḥallāl, from 'Alī ibn Suwayd, from Abū al-Ḥasan al-'Awwal (A). 'Alī ibn Suwayd says: "I asked him concerning the utterance of God Almighty, 'And whoever puts his trust in God, then God suffices him' (65:3). The Imam (A) said: "There are various degrees of trust in God. Of them one is that you should put your trust in God in all your affairs, being well-pleased with whatever God does to you, knowing for certain that He does not cease in His goodness and grace towards you, and that the command therein rests with Him. So put your trust in God, leaving that to Him and relying upon Him in regard to that and everything other than that."¹

Exposition:

Hallāl, with a *shaddah* on the *lām*, means the seller of *ḥill*, oil. Abū al-Ḥasan al-'Awwal is al-'Imām al-Kāẓim (A), and it is he who is meant (in traditions) when just 'Abū al-Ḥasan' is mentioned. Abū al-Ḥasan al-Thānī is al-'Imām al-Riḍā (A) and Abū al-

Ḥasan al-Thālith is al-'Imām al-Hādī (the Tenth Imam). *Tawakkul* literally means, admission of one's inability and reliance on one other than oneself. *اتَكَلْتُ عَلَىٰ فُلَانٍ فِي أَمْرٍ* means, as the lexicographers explain, 'I relied upon him in a certain matter', the word *اتَكَلْتُ* originally being *اوتَكَلْتُ*, which means considering someone sufficient. *بِأَلْوَكٍ*, derived from *أَلَا* and *أَلُوًّا* meaning 'to fail', 'to neglect', 'to refrain'. In the transitive form, some have said, when it requires two *maf'ūl*, the sense of preventing and depriving (*man'*) is assured....

Tawakkul, is something other than *tafwīd*, and the two are different from *ridā* and *wuthūq*, as will be explained later on. We will now explain this noble tradition in a number of sections:

Tawakkul and its Degrees:

Know, that closely related meanings have been ascribed to *tawakkul* by the various definitions proposed by different schools, each according to its own approach. The author of *Manāzil al-sā'rīn* says:

التَّوَكَّلُ كِلَّةُ الْأَمْرِ كِلَّةً إِلَىٰ مَالِكِهِ وَالتَّعْوِيلُ عَلَىٰ وِكَالَتِهِ.

Tawakkul means entrusting all the matters to their Master and relying upon His trusteeship.²

Some 'urafā' have said:

التَّوَكَّلُ طَرْحُ الْبَدَنِ فِي الْعُبُودِيَّةِ وَتَعَلُّقُ الْقَلْبِ بِالرُّبُوبِيَّةِ.

Tawakkul means throwing the body down (as in prostration) in servitude (to God) and attaching the heart to (His) Lordship.

That is, it means using one's bodily powers in obedience to God and refraining from interfering in the matters (of the heart) and consigning it to the Lord. Some others have said:

التَّوَكَّلُ عَلَى اللَّهِ انْقِطَاعُ الْعَبْدِ فِي جَمِيعِ مَا يَأْمَلُهُ مِنَ الْمَخْلُوقِينَ.

Tawakkul upon God means the severance by the servant of all hopes and expectations from the creatures (and attaching them to God).

The meanings mentioned are closely related and there is no need to delve further on the meaning of the word. However, that which should be mentioned is that *tawakkul* has various degrees in accordance with the stations of the devotees. Since the knowledge of these degrees of

tawakkul depends on the knowledge of the various degrees of the devotee's knowledge of their Lord, the Almighty and the Glorious, we cannot avoid discussing them here.

Let it be known to you that one of the esoteric principles of the wayfarers of the Path, without which no progress is possible, is the knowledge of God's Lordship and Mastership and the quality of the sway of the Holy Essence over all affairs. We shall not discuss the theoretical aspect of this issue, for it calls for an examination of questions related to free will and predestination, which is not suitable for these pages. Here, we will only mention the different degrees of the people's knowledge of it.

People are very different in regard to the knowledge of the Lordship of the Sacred Essence of God. The commoners among the monotheists consider God Almighty the Creator of the general essences of things and their elements and substances; but they do not believe in the all-embracing Lordship of God, and consider His authority over things as limited. As a matter of verbal habit they may often declare that God decrees all matters and has power over all things, that nothing can come into existence without His sacred Will. Yet, their actual station is not at a par with their verbal profession, neither in respect of knowledge, nor faith, neither experience nor conviction. This class of people, to which we also belong, have no knowledge of God's Lordship; their faith in *tawḥīd* is deficient and the sovereignty of the Lord is concealed from their sight by the veils of apparent causation. Hence they do not occupy the station of *tawakkul*, which is our concern here, except on the level of mere verbal claim. Accordingly, they do not rely in their worldly affairs on anything except the superficial causes and material factors. If sometimes they turn their attention to God and beseech something of Him, that is either on account of imitation or for reasons of caution; since not only they see no harm in it but allow a possibility of benefit. Thus there is a scent of *tawakkul* in them, although whenever they deem the apparent causal factors as favourable they totally forget God and His efficacy.

Now that which is said regarding *tawakkul*, that it is not opposed to action and effort is quite right and in accordance with reason as well as revelation. But to fail to see God's Lordship and His efficacy and to consider material causes as independent is contrary to *tawakkul*. Although this kind of people are devoid of *tawakkul* in respect to their worldly affairs, they make vigorous claims of *tawakkul* when it comes to the matters of the Hereafter. They justify their sluggishness and

neglect in the matters of acquisition of transcendental knowledge, spiritual development and fulfilment of moral and devotional duties by easy professions of reliance on God and *tawakkul* on His beneficence. With such verbal declarations as 'God is great' and 'My trust lies in God's beneficence' they hope to attain the stations of the Hereafter. However, in regard to worldly matters, they declare, "Effort and endeavour are not contrary to *tawakkul* on God and reliance upon His munificence." This is nothing except one of the guiles of the carnal self and the Devil. For this sort has *tawakkul* on God neither in the matters of the world nor in the affairs of the Hereafter. But since they consider worldly matters as paramount, they put their reliance on material causes, not relying on God and His efficacy. On the other hand, since the affairs of the Hereafter are not important in their eyes and as they have no real faith in the Day of Resurrection and its details, they conjure up pretexts to conceal their neglect. Hence they say, 'God is great', and they declare trust in God and faith in the intercession of the Intercessors, although such professions are nothing but empty verbiage and meaningless oscillations of the tongue.

There is another class of people, who, having been convinced either by reason or revelation, affirm that God Almighty is the sole determiner of matters, the cause of all causes, efficacious in the realm of being, there being no limit to His power and influence. On the level of rational belief, they have *tawakkul* in God; that is the complete grounds of *tawakkul* have been furnished for them by reason and revelation. Hence they consider themselves as *mutawakkil* and are able to supply rational proofs in justification of *tawakkul*, having confirmed rational conviction in all the essential preliminaries of *tawakkul*, which are: God's knowledge of the needs of His creatures; His power and ability to satisfy those needs; His freedom from stinginess; and His Love and mercy for His creatures. On the basis of these, it is necessary to have trust on the Omniscient, Powerful, unrigidly and Merciful Lord, Who takes care to provide whatever is good for His creatures and in their interest, Who does not allow them to remain deprived of what is good for them, even though they themselves should be incapable of distinguishing between that which is beneficial or harmful for them.

This group, although they are *mutawakkil* on the level of rational knowledge, has not yet attained the stage of faith; they are shaky when confronted with the matters of life. There is a conflict between their reason and their heart, in which reason is dominated by the heart which has faith in material causes and is blind to God's power and efficacy.

There is a third group in which the conviction in God's sway over creation has penetrated into the heart, which has firm faith in God's Sovereignty and Mastership over things. The pen of reason has inscribed all the essentials of *tawakkul* on the tablet of their heart. It is they who possess the station of *tawakkul*. But the members of this group also differ from one another in regard to the level and degree of faith, whose highest degree is contentment (*iṭmīnān*) at which the most perfect degree of *tawakkul* appears in their heart. Then, their heart is detached from causation and attached to the Lordship of God, on Whom they rely and in Whom they are content, in accordance with the words of the mystic who defined *tawakkul* as "casting the body away in servitude to God and attaching the heart to His Lordship."

That which was mentioned above holds true in the case when the heart still dwells in the stage of plurality (*kathrat-e af'ālī*) otherwise it leaves behind the station of *tawakkul* to attain to a higher station whose discussion lies outside the scope of this exposition.

Thus, it was seen that *tawakkul* has various stages and degrees, and perhaps the degree of *tawakkul* referred to in the ḥadīth is the one pertaining to the second group, for it mentions knowledge as its preliminary condition. Or perhaps it refers to a degree of *tawakkul* according to some other mode of gradation, for *tawakkul* is amenable to another kind of gradation, as described in relation with the various stages of wayfaring by the experts of mystics knowledge and spiritual discipline, as a gradual gradation from plurality to unity; for absolute extinction (*fanā'-e muṭlaq-e af'ālī*) is not attained instantaneously but gradually. In the first stage, the wayfarer observes unity in his own self and then in all other beings. The stations of *tawakkul*, *riḍā*, *taslīm* and all the other stations are attainable gradually. The wayfarer may at first exercise *tawakkul* in some of his affairs and with respect to hidden and unobservable causes. Then, gradually, his *tawakkul* becomes general, in that it extends from hidden and inner causes to manifest and observable ones and from his own affairs to that of his relatives and associates. Accordingly, it is stated in the holy tradition that one of the degrees of *tawakkul* is trust in God in all one's affairs.

The Difference Between Tawakkul and Riḍā:

Let it be known to you that the station of *riḍā* is different from the station of *tawakkul*, being higher and more luminous. This is because whereas the *mutawakkil* seeks his own good and benefit and entrust his affairs to God considering Him the provider of good, the *raḍī* (one who

has attained the station of *riḍā*) is one who has annihilated his will in the Divine Will, having no more a separate will of his own. When a mystic was asked, “*Mā turīd*” (What is your wish?), he replied, “*Urīd an lā urīd*” (My wish is not to wish at all). What he meant is the station of *riḍā*.

As to the words of the Imam (A) in the ḥadīth, “that you should be well-pleased (*rāḍiyan*) with whatever God does to you,” they do not refer to the station of *riḍā*. Hence, he (A) says thereafter, “Know for certain that whatever He does to you, your good and benefit lies therein.” It appears that the Imams (A) intended to bring about the station of *tawakkul* in the listener. For this he mentions certain preliminaries. First, he (A) says, “Know that He does not cease to be good and benign towards you.” Then he (A) says, “Know that the authority therein lies with Him.” Of course, one who knows that God Almighty has power over everything and that He does not cease to be graceful and benign, he would attain to the station of *tawakkul*, because the two main pillars of *tawakkul* are the same as stated by the Imam (A), although he (A) does not explicitly state the other two or three pillars. After mentioning the explicit and implicit preliminaries — that whatever God Almighty does is welcome because in it lies one’s good and benefit — the preliminaries which guide to the station of *tawakkul*, he (A) draws the conclusion and says: “Then have *tawakkul* on God.”

Tafwīḍ, Tawakkul and Thiqaḥ:

Know that *tafwīḍ* is also different from *tawakkul*, and so also *thiqaḥ* is different from these two. Hence each of the three has been considered a different station on the wayfarer’s path. The Khwājah says:³

التَّفْوِضُ أَلْطَفُ إِشَارَةٍ وَأَوْسَعُ مَعْنَى مِنَ التَّوَكُّلِ، ثُمَّ قَالَ: التَّوَكُّلُ شَعْبَةٌ مِنْهُ.

That is, *tafwīḍ* is subtler and more refined than *tawakkul*, for *tafwīḍ* means that the devotee should see no power and capacity in himself and that he should consider himself ineffectual and regard God as All-effectual. This is not so in *tawakkul*, for the *mutawakkil* makes God his own substitute, one in charge of his affairs, for attaining that which is good and beneficial. *Tafwīḍ* is wider and *tawakkul* is a branch of it, because *tawakkul* is in regard to one’s interests and *tafwīḍ* is in regard to absolutely all the affairs.

Moreover, *tawakkul* does not occur except after the presence of its cause, that is the matter in regard to which the devotee comes to rely upon God. An example of it is the *tawakkul* of the Apostle (S) and his Companions in regard to security from the evil of the idolaters, at the time when they were told:

الَّذِينَ قَالَ لَهُمُ النَّاسُ إِنَّ النَّاسَ قَدِ جَمَعُوا لَكُمْ فَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ فَرَأَاهُمْ إِيمَنًا وَقَالُوا حَسْبُنَا اللَّهُ
وَنِعْمَ الْوَكِيلُ ﴿١٧٣﴾

Those unto whom men said, 'Lo! the people have gathered against you, therefore fear them'. But it increased them in faith and they said, 'God is sufficient for us and an excellent trustee is He'. (3:173)

Tafwīd, however, is mostly antecedent to its referent cause, as indicated by the supplication narrated from the Apostle of God (S):

اللَّهُمَّ إِنِّي أَسَلْتُ نَفْسِي إِلَيْكَ وَأَلْجَأْتُ ظَهْرِي إِلَيْكَ وَفَوَّضْتُ أَمْرِي إِلَيْكَ.

My God, I surrender my self to Thee; I seek refuge with Thee, and I hand over my matter to Thee.

At times *tafwīd* is subsequent to the occurrence of its cause, such as in the case of the *tafwīd* of the believer belonging to the Pharaoh's people (40:44).

The account given above is a condensed translation of the exposition by the famous 'ārif 'Abd al-Razzāq Kāshānī of the words of the perfect 'ārif Khwājah 'Abd Allāh al-'Anṣārī, and that which the Khwājah says is also substantially the same. However, I have reservations about considering *tawakkul* to be a branch of *tafwīd* and there is an obvious lack of rigour in regarding *tafwīd* as being the more general of the two. Also, there is no reason to regard *tawakkul* as being subsequent to the cause, for *tawakkul* can be both antecedent as well as subsequent.

As to the words of the holy tradition, فَتَوَكَّلْ عَلَى اللَّهِ بِتَفْوِضِ ذَلِكَ إِلَيْهِ, possibly, since *tawakkul* is accompanied by viewing oneself as being in charge of one's affairs — because in *tawakkul* one makes God one's *wakīl* in an affair that he deems as pertaining to himself — the Imam (A) wished to lift the questioner from the station of *tawakkul* to that of *tafwīd*, making him understand that God Almighty is not your substitute and deputy in regard to the charge of your affairs; rather, He is the master of His own realm and the Lord of His own kingdom (to which

you and your affairs belong). In *Manāzil al-sā'irīn*, the Khwājah has also pointed out this while discussing the third degree of *tawakkul*.

And as to *thiqah* (reliance), it is different from *tawakkul* and *tafwīd*, as the Khwājah says:

الثِّقَةُ سَوَادُ عَيْنِ التَّوَكُّلِ وَنُقْطَةُ دَائِرَةِ التَّفْوِیْضِ وَسُوَيْدَاءُ قَلْبِ التَّسْلِيمِ.

Thiqah is the eye of *tawakkul*, the (moving) point of the circle of *tafwīd*, and the inmost heart of *taslīm* (surrender).⁴

That is, the three stations cannot be attained without *thiqah*. Rather *thiqah* on God Almighty is the soul of those stations, and the devotee cannot attain them without *thiqah*. This allows us to understand the Imam's allusion to it, after the mention of *tawakkul* and *tafwīd*, when he says: ثِقٌ بِهِ فِيهَا وَفِي غَيْرِهَا

To be continued -- inshā' Allāh

NOTES:

1. *Uṣūl al-Kāfi* (Ākhūndī), ii, 391, ḥadīth 3.
2. Khwājah 'Abd Allāh al-'Anṣārī, *Manāzil al-sā'irīn*.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*

A Selection From Uṣūl al-Kāfi Part 3

THE BOOK OF DIVINITY (Kitāb al-Tawḥīd).

Divinity and Thingness:

عَدَّهُ مِنْ أَصْحَابِنَا، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ خَالِدِ الْبَرْقِيِّ، عَنْ أَبِيهِ، عَنِ النَّضْرِ بْنِ سُوَيْدٍ،
عَنْ يَحْيَى الْحَلَبِيِّ، عَنِ ابْنِ مُسْكَانَ، عَنْ زُرَّارَةَ بْنِ أَعْيَنَ قَالَ: سَمِعْتُ أَبَا عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ يَقُولُ:
إِنَّ اللَّهَ خَلُومٌ خَلَقَهُ وَخَلَقَهُ خَلُومُهُ وَكُلَّ مَا وَقَعَ عَلَيْهِ اسْمُ شَيْءٍ مَا خَلَا اللَّهَ فَهُوَ مَخْلُوقٌ وَاللَّهُ
خَالِقُ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ تَبَارَكَ الَّذِي لَيْسَ كَمِثْلِهِ شَيْءٌ وَهُوَ السَّمِيعُ الْبَصِيرُ.

34/223: A group of our companions, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Khālid al-Barqī, from his father,⁷⁹ from al-Naḍr ibn Suwayd, from Yaḥyā al-Ḥalabī, from Ibn Muskān, from Zurārah ibn A‘yan:

Zurārah says: I heard Abū ‘Abd Allāh (A) say: “Verily, God is separate from all His creatures and His creatures are separate from Him. Everything, except God, that is called a ‘thing’, is a creature, and God is the Creator of all things: ‘Blessed be He; no thing is like Him. He is the All-hearing, the All-seeing.’”(42:10)

God is not Known Except Through Himself:

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ إِسْمَاعِيلَ، عَنِ الْفَضْلِ بْنِ شَادَانَ، عَنْ صَفْوَانَ بْنِ يَحْيَى، عَنْ مَنْصُورِ بْنِ حَازِمٍ،
قَالَ: قُلْتُ لِأَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ: إِنِّي نَاطَرْتُ قَوْمًا فَقُلْتُ لَهُمْ: إِنَّ اللَّهَ جَلَّ جَلَالُهُ أَجَلٌ وَأَعَزُّ وَ
أَكْرَمٌ مِنْ أَنْ يُعْرَفَ بِخَلْقِهِ بَلِ الْعِبَادُ يُعْرَفُونَ بِاللَّهِ، فَقَالَ: رَحِمَكَ اللَّهُ.

35/229: Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘īl, from al-Faḍl ibn Shādhān, from Ṣafwān ibn Yaḥyā, from Mansūr ibn Ḥāzim:⁸⁰

Mansūr ibn Ḥāzim says: I said to Abū ‘Abd Allāh (A): “While debating

with a group, I said to them: ‘Verily God Almighty is too sublime, glorious and noble to be known through His creatures; rather, it is the creatures who are known through Him.’” The Imām said, ‘May God bless you.’

Discussing the Divine Essence:

— عَلِيُّ بْنُ إِبْرَاهِيمَ، عَنْ أَبِيهِ، عَنِ ابْنِ أَبِي عُمَيْرٍ، عَنْ أَبِي أَيُّوبَ، عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ مُسْلِمٍ
قَالَ: قَالَ أَبُو عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ: يَا مُحَمَّدُ إِنَّ النَّاسَ لَا يَزَالُ بِهِمُ الْمَنْطِقُ حَتَّى يَتَكَلَّمُوا فِي اللَّهِ
فَإِذَا سَمِعْتُمْ ذَلِكَ فَقُولُوا: لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ الْوَاحِدُ الَّذِي لَيْسَ كَمِثْلِهِ شَيْءٌ.

36/250: ‘Alī ibn Ibrāhīm, from his father,⁸¹ from Ibn Abī ‘Umayr, from Abū Ayyūb, from Muḥammad ibn Muslim, who said:

Abū ‘Abd Allāh (A) said: “O Muḥammad, people talk about everything so much that they discuss even God. When you hear them doing that, say, “There is no god but Allah, the One, like Whom there is no thing””.

— عِدَّةٌ مِنْ أَصْحَابِنَا عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدَ بْنِ خَالِدٍ، عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ عَبْدِ الْحَمِيدِ، عَنِ
الْعَلَاءِ بْنِ رَزِينٍ عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ مُسْلِمٍ، عَنْ أَبِي جَعْفَرٍ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: إِيَّاكُمْ وَالتَّفَكُّرَ فِي اللَّهِ
وَلَكِنْ إِذَا أَرَدْتُمْ أَنْ تَنْظُرُوا إِلَى عَظَمَتِهِ فَانظُرُوا إِلَى عَظِيمِ خَلْقِهِ.

37/254: A group of our companions, from Ahmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Khālid, from Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd,⁸² from al-‘Alā’ ibn Razīn, from Muḥammad ibn Muslim:

Abū Ja‘far (A) said: “Beware of contemplating over God. If you want to contemplate the glory of God, look at the glory of His creation”.

— عَلِيُّ بْنُ إِبْرَاهِيمَ، عَنْ أَبِيهِ، عَنِ ابْنِ أَبِي عُمَيْرٍ، عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ يَحْيَى الْخَثْعَمِيِّ، عَنْ
عَبْدِ الرَّحْمَنِ بْنِ عَتِيكَ الْقَصِيرِ قَالَ: سَأَلْتُ أَبَا جَعْفَرٍ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ عَنْ شَيْءٍ مِنَ الصِّفَةِ فَرَفَعَ يَدَهُ إِلَى
السَّمَاءِ ثُمَّ قَالَ: تَعَالَى الْجَبَّارُ، تَعَالَى الْجَبَّارُ، مَنْ تَعَاطَى مَا تَمَّ هَلَكٌ.

38/257: ‘Alī ibn Ibrāhīm, from his father, from Ibn Abī ‘Umayr, from Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā al-Khath‘amī,⁸³ from ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn ‘Atik al-Qaṣīr:⁸⁴

‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn ‘Atik says: “I asked Abū Ja‘far (A) something about the Divine Attributes. The Imām raised his hand towards the heaven and said, ‘Exalted is the Almighty. Exalted is the Almighty. One who pursues That which is there, is destroyed.’”

Unauthorized Ascription of an Attribute to God:

— عَلِيُّ بْنُ إِبْرَاهِيمَ، عَنِ الْعَبَّاسِ بْنِ مَعْرُوفٍ، عَنِ ابْنِ أَبِي نَجْرَانَ، عَنْ حَمَّادِ بْنِ عُثْمَانَ، عَنْ عَبْدِ الرَّحِيمِ بْنِ عَتِيكَ الْقَصِيرِ قَالَ: كَتَبْتُ عَلَى يَدَيْ عَبْدِ الْمَلِكِ بْنِ أَعْيَنَ إِلَى أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ: أَنَّ قَوْمًا بِالْعِرَاقِ يَصِفُونَ اللَّهَ بِالصُّورَةِ وَبِالتَّخْطِيطِ فَإِنِ رَأَيْتَ جَعَلَنِي اللَّهُ فِدَاكَ أَنْ تَكْتُبَ إِلَيَّ بِالْمَذْهَبِ الصَّحِيحِ مِنَ التَّوْحِيدِ؟ فَكَتَبَ إِلَيَّ: سَأَلْتَ رَحِمَكَ اللَّهُ عَنِ التَّوْحِيدِ وَمَا ذَهَبَ إِلَيْهِ مَنْ قَبْلَكَ فَتَعَالَى اللَّهُ الَّذِي لَيْسَ كَمِثْلِهِ شَيْءٌ وَهُوَ السَّمِيعُ الْبَصِيرُ، تَعَالَى عَمَّا يَصِفُهُ الْوَاصِفُونَ الْمُشَبِّهُونَ اللَّهَ بِخَلْقِهِ الْمُفْتَرُونَ عَلَى اللَّهِ، فَاعْلَمْ رَحِمَكَ اللَّهُ أَنَّ الْمَذْهَبَ الصَّحِيحَ فِي التَّوْحِيدِ مَا نَزَلَ بِهِ الْقُرْآنُ مِنْ صِفَاتِ اللَّهِ جَلَّ وَعَزَّ فَانْفِ عَنِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى الْبُظْلَانَ، وَالتَّشْبِيهَ فَلَا تَفِي وَلَا تَشْبِيهَ، هُوَ اللَّهُ الثَّابِتُ الْمَوْجُودُ تَعَالَى اللَّهُ عَمَّا يَصِفُهُ الْوَاصِفُونَ وَلَا تَعُدُّوا الْقُرْآنَ فَتَضِلُّوا بَعْدَ الْبَيَانِ.

39/270: 'Alī ibn Ibrāhīm, from al-'Abbās ibn Ma'rūf,⁸⁵ from Ibn Abī Najrān,⁸⁶ from Ḥammād ibn 'Uthmān, from 'Abd al-Raḥīm ibn 'Atik al-Qaṣīr:

'Abd al-Raḥīm ibn 'Atik says: "I wrote a letter to Abū 'Abd Allāh (A), which I sent through 'Abd al-Malik ibn A'yan, informing him about an Iraqi group who attributed form and physiognomy to God. 'May God make me thy ransom,' I wrote, 'write to me the correct doctrine of Divine Unity.' The Imām (A) wrote back to me: 'May God be merciful to you, you have asked me about *tawḥīd* and concerning the belief held by a group over there. Exalted is God, the like of Whom there is no thing, and He is the All-hearing, the All-seeing. God is above what is attributed to Him by the Mushabbihah, who liken God to His creatures and attribute falsehoods to God. May God be merciful to you, know that the correct doctrine of *tawḥīd* is that which has been revealed in the Qur'ān about the Attributes of God, the Almighty, the Glorious. Refrain from negation and similitude in relation to God Almighty: Neither the Attributes are to be negated, nor God is to be likened to anything. He is God, the Abiding Being. Exalted is He far above what the describers attribute to Him. Go not beyond the Qur'ān, or you will stray, after the clear exposition (of the truth has come to you)."

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ إِسْمَاعِيلَ، عَنِ الْفَضْلِ بْنِ شَاذَانَ، عَنِ حَمَّادِ بْنِ عَيْسَى، عَنْ رَبِيعِ بْنِ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ، عَنِ الْفَضِيلِ بْنِ يَسَارٍ قَالَ: سَمِعْتُ أَبَا عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ يَقُولُ: إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يُوصَفُ وَكَيْفَ يُوصَفُ وَقَدْ قَالَ فِي كِتَابِهِ: «وَمَا قَدَرُوا اللَّهَ حَقَّ قَدْرِهِ» فَلَا يُوصَفُ بِقَدْرٍ إِلَّا كَانَ أَعْظَمَ مِنْ ذَلِكَ.

40/280: Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il, from al-Faḍl ibn Shādhān, from Ḥammād ibn

‘Īsā, from Rib‘i ibn ‘Abd Allāh, from al-Fuḍayl ibn Yasār: 87

Al-Fuḍayl ibn Yasār says: “I heard Abū ‘Abd Allāh (A) say: ‘Verily, God cannot be qualified, and how can He be qualified when He has said Himself in His Book: “They measure not God with His true measure” (6:91). Therefore, there is no measure with which He is qualified but that His Glory transcends it.’”

The Attributes of the Essence:

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى، عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ الْحُسَيْنِ، عَنِ ابْنِ أَبِي عُمَيْرٍ، عَنْ هِشَامِ بْنِ سَالِمٍ، عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ مُسْلِمٍ، عَنْ أَبِي جَعْفَرٍ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: سَمِعْتُهُ يَقُولُ: كَانَ اللَّهُ عَزَّوَجَلَّ وَلَا شَيْءَ غَيْرُهُ وَلَمْ يَزَلْ عَالِمًا بِمَا يَكُونُ، فَعِلْمُهُ بِهِ قَبْلَ كَوْنِهِ كَعِلْمِهِ بِهِ بَعْدَ كَوْنِهِ.

41/291: Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā, from Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn, from Ibn Abi ‘Umayr, from Hishām ibn Sālim,⁸⁸ from Muḥammad ibn Muslim:

Muḥammad ibn Muslim says: “I heard Abū Ja‘far (A) say: ‘God, the Almighty and the Glorious, was, and nothing else existed. He has always known that which would be. Thus His knowledge of a thing before it comes into being, is like His knowledge of it after it comes into being.’”

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى، عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ الْحُسَيْنِ، عَنْ صَفْوَانَ بْنِ يَحْيَى، عَنِ الْكَاهِلِيِّ قَالَ: كَتَبْتُ إِلَى أَبِي الْحَسَنِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ: فِي دُعَاءٍ: الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ مُنْتَهَى عِلْمِهِ، فَكَتَبَ إِلَيَّ لَا تَقُولَنَّ مُنْتَهَى عِلْمِهِ فَلَيْسَ لِعِلْمِهِ مُنْتَهَى وَلَكِنْ قُلْ: مُنْتَهَى رِضَاهُ.

42/292: Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā, from Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn, from Ṣafwān ibn Yaḥyā, from al-Kāhili:⁸⁹

Al-Kāhili says, “I wrote to Abū al-Ḥasan (A), praising God with these words: ‘All praise belongs to God, to the utmost limit of His knowledge.’ He wrote back to me, ‘Never say, ‘to the utmost limit of His knowledge’, for there is no limit to His knowledge. Rather say, ‘to the utmost limit of His good pleasure (*riḍā*).’”

Will, a Divine Attribute:

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى الْعَقَّارُ، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ عَيْسَى الْأَشْعَرِيِّ، عَنِ الْحُسَيْنِ بْنِ سَعِيدٍ الْأَهْوَازِيِّ، عَنِ النَّضْرِ بْنِ سُوَيْدٍ، عَنْ عَاصِمِ بْنِ حُمَيْدٍ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ قُلْتُ: لَمْ يَزَلِ اللَّهُ مُرِيدًا؟ قَالَ: إِنَّ الْمُرِيدَ لَا يَكُونُ إِلَّا لِمُرَادٍ مَعَهُ؛ لَمْ يَزَلِ [اللَّهُ] عَالِمًا قَادِرًا ثُمَّ أَرَادَ.

43/298: Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā al-‘Aṭṭār, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Īsā al-‘Ash‘arī, from al-Ḥusayn ibn Sa‘īd al-‘Ahwāzī, from al-Naḍr ibn Suwayd, from ‘Āṣim ibn Ḥumayd:

‘Āṣim ibn Ḥumayd says: “I asked Abū ‘Abd Allāh (A), ‘Has God always been the willer?’ He replied, ‘A willer is never without that which is willed. (Rather), God has always been the Knower and the Powerful, and then He willed.’”

— أَحْمَدُ بْنُ إِدْرِيسَ؛ عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ عَبْدِ الْجَبَّارِ؛ عَنْ صَفْوَانَ بْنِ يَحْيَى قَالَ: قُلْتُ لِأَبِي الْحَسَنِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ: أَخْبِرْنِي عَنِ الْإِرَادَةِ مِنَ اللَّهِ وَمِنَ الْخَلْقِ قَالَ: فَقَالَ: الْإِرَادَةُ مِنَ الْخَلْقِ: الضَّمِيرُ وَمَا يَبْدُو لَهُمْ بَعْدَ ذَلِكَ مِنَ الْفِعْلِ وَأَمَّا مِنَ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى فَاِرَادَتُهُ إِحْدَاثُهُ لَا غَيْرُ ذَلِكَ لِأَنَّهُ لَا يَرَوِي وَلَا يَهْمُ وَلَا يَتَفَكَّرُ وَهَذِهِ الصِّفَاتُ مَنْفِيَةٌ عَنْهُ وَهِيَ صِفَاتُ الْخَلْقِ؛ فَاِرَادَةُ اللَّهِ الْفِعْلُ لَا غَيْرُ ذَلِكَ يَقُولُ لَهُ: كُنْ فَيَكُونُ بِلا لَفْظٍ وَلَا نُطْقٍ بِلِسَانٍ، وَلَا هِمَّةٍ وَلَا تَفَكُّرٍ، وَلَا كَيْفٍ لِذَلِكَ؛ كَمَا أَنَّهُ لَا كَيْفَ لَهُ.

44/230: Aḥmad ibn Idrīs, from Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Jabbār, from Ṣafwān ibn Yaḥyā:

Ṣafwān says, “I said to Abū al-Ḥasan (A), ‘Enlighten me about the will of God and the will of the creatures.’ He said, ‘The will of the creatures is what (first) passes in their minds and then appears afterwards in their actions. But in the case of God Almighty, His willing means His bringing a thing into being and is not something distinct from it. This is because God does not reflect, premeditate or contemplate. These qualities, which are attributes of the creatures, are negated of Him. Therefore, God’s will is His action itself, not something apart from it. (When He wills a thing), He says to it ‘Be’ and it is, without there being any mediation of word, utterance, resolution, or premeditation. That (His will), like His Essence, has no qualification.’”

— عَلِيُّ بْنُ إِبْرَاهِيمَ؛ عَنْ أَبِيهِ، عَنِ ابْنِ أَبِي عُمَيْرٍ؛ عَنْ عُمَرَ بْنِ أَدِيْنَةَ؛ عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ (ع) قَالَ: خَلَقَ اللَّهُ الْمَشِيئَةَ بِنَفْسِهَا ثُمَّ خَلَقَ الْأَشْيَاءَ بِالْمَشِيئَةِ.

45/301: ‘Alī ibn Ibrāhīm, from his father, from Ibn Abī ‘Umayr, from ‘Umar ibn Udhaynah:

Abū ‘Abd Allāh (A) said: “God created the Will (*mashī’ah*) by itself. Then, He created all the things through the Will.”

— عِدَّةٌ مِنْ أَصْحَابِنَا؛ عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدَ بْنِ خَالِدٍ؛ عَنْ أَبِيهِ؛ عَنِ ابْنِ أَبِي عُمَيْرٍ؛ عَنِ ابْنِ أَدِيْنَةَ، عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ مُسْلِمٍ؛ عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: الْمَشِيئَةُ مُخْدَثَةٌ.

46/304: A group of our companions, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Khālid, from his father, from Ibn Abī ‘Umayr, from Ibn Udhaynah, from Muḥammad ibn Muslim:

Abū ‘Abd Allāh (A) said: “The Will is contingent.”

The Meaning of the Names:

— أَحْمَدُ بْنُ إِدْرِيسَ، عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ عَبْدِ الْجَبَّارِ، عَنْ صَفْوَانَ بْنِ يَحْيَى، عَنْ فَضِيلِ بْنِ عُثْمَانَ، عَنِ ابْنِ أَبِي يَعْقُورٍ قَالَ: سَأَلْتُ أَبَا عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ عَنْ قَوْلِ اللَّهِ عَزَّوَجَلَّ: «هُوَ الْأَوَّلُ وَالْآخِرُ»، وَقُلْتُ: أَمَّا الْأَوَّلُ فَقَدْ عَرَفْنَاهُ وَأَمَّا الْآخِرُ فَبَيِّنْ لَنَا تَفْسِيرَهُ، فَقَالَ: إِنَّهُ لَيْسَ شَيْءٌ إِلَّا يَبِيدُ أَوْ يَتَغَيَّرُ أَوْ يَدْخُلُهُ التَّغْيِيرُ وَالزَّوَالُ أَوْ يَنْتَقِلُ مِنْ لَوْنٍ إِلَى لَوْنٍ وَمِنْ هَيْئَةٍ إِلَى هَيْئَةٍ وَمِنْ صِفَةٍ إِلَى صِفَةٍ وَمِنْ زِيَادَةٍ إِلَى نُقْصَانٍ وَمِنْ نُقْصَانٍ إِلَى زِيَادَةٍ إِلَّا رَبَّ الْعَالَمِينَ فَإِنَّهُ لَمْ يَزَلْ وَلَا يَزَالُ بِحَالَةٍ وَاحِدَةٍ، هُوَ الْأَوَّلُ قَبْلَ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ وَهُوَ الْآخِرُ عَلَى مَا لَمْ يَزَلْ وَلَا تَخْتَلِفُ عَلَيْهِ الصِّفَاتُ وَالْأَسْمَاءُ كَمَا تَخْتَلِفُ عَلَى غَيْرِهِ، مِثْلُ الْإِنْسَانِ الَّذِي يَكُونُ تُرَابًا مَرَّةً وَمَرَّةً لَحْمًا وَدَمًا وَمَرَّةً رُفَاتًا وَرَمِيمًا، وَكَالْبُسْرِ الَّذِي يَكُونُ مَرَّةً بَلْحًا وَمَرَّةً بُسْرًا وَمَرَّةً رُطْبًا وَمَرَّةً تَمْرًا، فَتَتَبَدَّلُ عَلَيْهِ الْأَسْمَاءُ وَالصِّفَاتُ وَاللَّهُ جَلَّ وَعَزَّ بِخِلَافِ ذَلِكَ.

47/313: Ahmad ibn Idris, from Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Jabbār, from Ṣafwān ibn Yahyā, from Fuḍayl ibn ‘Uthmān,⁹⁰ from Ibn Abi Ya‘fūr:

Ibn Abi Ya‘fūr says, “I questioned Abū ‘Abd Allāh (A) about the words of God Almighty, ‘He is the First and the Last’(57:3), saying that I understood the meaning of the ‘First’ and I asked him to explain the meaning of ‘the Last’.

“The Imam explained, ‘There is nothing that does not perish or alter, change or decay, or transform from one colour to another, from one shape to another, from one quality to another, from amplitude to deficiency, or from deficiency to amplitude, except the Lord of the Worlds. He alone remains eternally and perpetually in one state. He is the First, before every thing, and the Last, forever. His attributes and epithets do not vary, as they do in the case of others, like man, for instance, who is dust at one time, flesh and blood at another, and decayed bones at another time. Or like the date, which is raw at one time, ripe at another time, fresh at one time and dry at another. With every change the names and attributes of such things vary. In case of God, the Almighty, the Glorious, the matter is opposite of that.’”

— عَلِيُّ بْنُ إِبْرَاهِيمَ، عَنْ أَبِيهِ، عَنِ ابْنِ أَبِي عُمَيْرٍ، عَنِ ابْنِ أَدِيْتَةَ، عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ حُكَيْمٍ، عَنِ مَيْمُونِ بْنِ أَبِي عَمْرٍو قَالَ: سَمِعْتُ أَبَا عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ وَقَدْ سُئِلَ عَنِ الْأَوَّلِ وَالْآخِرِ، فَقَالَ: الْأَوَّلُ لَا عَنِّي أَوَّلَ قَبْلَهُ، وَلَا عَنِّي بَدْءٍ سَبَقَهُ. وَالْآخِرُ لَا عَنِّي نِهَائِيَّةٌ كَمَا يُعْقَلُ مِنْ صِفَةِ الْمَخْلُوقِينَ وَلَكِنْ قَدِيمٌ أَوَّلُ آخِرٍ، لَمْ يَزَلْ وَلَا يَزَالُ بِحَالٍ وَلَا يَتَغَيَّرُ وَلَا يَدْخُلُهُ التَّغْيِيرُ وَلَا يَنْتَقِلُ مِنْ حَالٍ إِلَى حَالٍ، خَالِقٌ

كُلِّ شَيْءٍ.

48/314: 'Alī ibn Ibrāhīm, from his father, from Ibn Abī 'Umayr, from Ibn Udhaynah, from Muḥammad ibn Ḥukaym, from Maymūn al-Bān:⁹¹

Maymūn al-Bān says, "When Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) was asked about the meaning of 'the First and the Last', I heard him reply: 'His being the First means, He was not preceded by any thing: no beginning preceded Him. His being the Last means, His being without an end, as conceived as an attribute of the creatures. He is pre-eternal, the First and the Last, having neither beginning nor end. Coming into being or becoming do not apply to Him. He is the Creator of all the things.'"

Badā':

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ عَيْسَى، عَنِ الْحَجَّالِ، عَنْ أَبِي إِسْحَاقَ تَغْلِبَةَ،
عَنْ زُرَّارَةَ بْنِ أَعْيَنَ، عَنْ أَحَدِهِمَا عَلَيْهِمَا السَّلَامُ قَالَ: مَا عُبِدَ اللَّهُ بِشَيْءٍ يَمِثِلُ الْبَدَاءَ.

49/364: Muhammad ibn Yaḥyā, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Isā, from al-Ḥajjāl,⁹² from Abū Ishāq Tha'labah, from Zurārah ibn A'yan, from one of the two Imāms (al-'Imām al-Bāqir [A] or al-'Imām al-Ṣādiq [A]):

The Imām (A) said: "God has not been worshipped (so profoundly) with anything as with (the belief in the doctrine of) *badā'*."

— وَفِي رِوَايَةِ ابْنِ أَبِي عُمَيْرٍ، عَنْ هِشَامِ بْنِ سَالِمٍ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ مَا عَظَّمَ اللَّهُ
بِمِثْلِ الْبَدَاءِ.

50/365: In another tradition narrated from Ibn Abī 'Umayr, from Hishām ibn Sālim:

Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) said: "God has not been glorified (as fully) as through (the belief in the doctrine of) *badā'*."

— عَلِيُّ بْنُ إِبْرَاهِيمَ، عَنْ أَبِيهِ، عَنِ ابْنِ أَبِي عُمَيْرٍ، عَنْ هِشَامِ بْنِ سَالِمٍ وَحَفْصِ بْنِ الْبَخْتَرِيِّ وَ
غَيْرِهِمَا، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ فِي هَذِهِ الْآيَةِ «يَمْحُو اللَّهُ مَا يَشَاءُ وَيُثَبِّتُ» قَالَ: فَقَالَ:
وَهَلْ يُمْحَى إِلَّا مَا كَانَ ثَابِتًا وَهَلْ يُثَبِّتُ إِلَّا مَا لَمْ يَكُنْ.

51/366: 'Alī ibn Ibrāhīm, from his father, from Ibn Abī 'Umayr, from: Hishām ibn Sālim, Ḥafṣ ibn al-Bakhtari⁹³ and others:

Abū 'Abd Allāh (A), explaining the verse, "God blots out and establishes whatsoever He wills" (13:39), remarked, "Doesn't He blot out something which was established (before)? And doesn't He establish something that which did not exist before?"

— عَلِيٌّ، عَنْ أَبِيهِ، عَنِ ابْنِ أَبِي عُمَيْرٍ، عَنْ هِشَامِ بْنِ سَالِمٍ، عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ مُسْلِمٍ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: مَا بَعَثَ اللَّهُ نَبِيًّا حَتَّى يَأْخُذَ عَلَيْهِ ثَلَاثَ خِصَالٍ: الْإِفْرَارَ لَهُ بِالْعُبُودِيَّةِ وَخَلْعَ الْأَنْدَادِ وَأَنَّ اللَّهَ يُقَدِّمُ مَا يَشَاءُ وَيُؤَخِّرُ مَا يَشَاءُ.

52/367: ‘Alī, from his father, from Ibn Abī ‘Umayr, from Hishām ibn Sālim, from Muḥammad ibn Muslim:

Abū ‘Abd Allāh (A) said: “God did not send any prophet without making a compact with him concerning three attributes: his admission to his own creaturehood, negation of compeers for God, and that God makes antecedent anything that He wants and makes sequent anything that He wants.”

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدٍ، عَنِ ابْنِ فَضَالٍ، عَنِ ابْنِ بُكَيْرٍ، عَنْ زُرَّارَةَ، عَنْ حُمْرَانَ، عَنْ أَبِي جَعْفَرٍ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ: قَالَ: سَأَلْتُهُ، عَنْ قَوْلِ اللَّهِ عَزَّوَجَلَّ: «فَضَىٰ أَجَلًا وَأَجَلٌ مُّسَمًّى عِنْدَهُ» قَالَ هُمَا أَجْلَانِ: أَجَلٌ مَّخْتُومٌ وَأَجَلٌ مَّوْقُوفٌ.

53/368: Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad, from Ibn Faḍḍāl, from Ibn Bukayr, from Zurārah, from Ḥumrān:⁹⁴

Ḥumrān says, “I asked Abū Ja‘far (A) about the words of God Almighty, ‘Then He determined a term, and a term stated is with him’ (6:2). The Imām (A) replied, ‘There are two (kinds of) terms: the certain term and the contingent term.’”

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ إِسْمَاعِيلَ؛ عَنِ الْفَضْلِ بْنِ شَاذَانَ، عَنْ حَمَّادِ بْنِ عَيْسَى، عَنْ رَبِيعِ بْنِ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ؛ عَنِ الْفَضْلِ بْنِ يَسَارٍ قَالَ: سَمِعْتُ أَبَا جَعْفَرٍ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ يَقُولُ: الْعِلْمُ عِلْمَانِ: فَعِلْمٌ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ مَخْزُونٌ لَمْ يَطَّلِعْ عَلَيْهِ أَحَدًا مِنْ خَلْقِهِ وَعِلْمٌ عَلَّمَهُ مَلَائِكَتُهُ وَرُسُلُهُ، فَمَا عَلَّمَهُ مَلَائِكَتُهُ وَرُسُلُهُ فَإِنَّهُ سَيَكُونُ لَا يُكْذِبُ نَفْسَهُ وَلَا مَلَائِكَتَهُ وَلَا رُسُلَهُ وَعِلْمٌ عِنْدَهُ مَخْزُونٌ يُقَدِّمُ مِنْهُ مَا يَشَاءُ وَيُؤَخِّرُ مِنْهُ مَا يَشَاءُ وَ يُثَبِّتُ مَا يَشَاءُ.

54/370: Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘īl, from al-Faḍl ibn Shādhān, from Ḥammād ibn ‘Isā, from Rib‘ī ibn ‘Abd Allāh, from al-Fuḍayl ibn Yasār:

Al-Fuḍayl ibn Yasār says, “I heard Abū Ja‘far (A) say, ‘(God’s) knowledge is of two kinds: (The first kind is) the knowledge that is stored near God, which none of His creatures ever knows. And (the second is) the knowledge which God makes known to His angels and His apostles. What He has made known to His angels and apostles shall come to pass, for He does not falsify Himself or His angels and apostles. But as for the knowledge stored with Him, He makes prior what He wills and posterior what He wills and establishes what He wills.’”

— وَبِهَذَا الْأَسْنَادِ، عَنْ حَمَادٍ؛ عَنْ رَبِيعِي، عَنِ الْفُضَيْلِ قَالَ: سَمِعْتُ أَبَا جَعْفَرٍ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ يَقُولُ: مِنَ الْأُمُورِ أُمُورٌ مَوْفُوقَةٌ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ بِقَدَمِهَا مَا يَشَاءُ وَيُؤَخَّرُ مِنْهَا مَا يَشَاءُ.

55/371: With the same *asnād* from Ḥammād, from Rib'ī, from al-Fuḍayl:

Al-Fuḍayl says: "I heard Abū Ja'far (A) say: 'Among the Divine decrees there are some in a state of suspension with God. Of those, He gives priority and posteriority to whichever He likes.'"

— عِدَّةٌ مِنْ أَصْحَابِنَا، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدَ بْنِ عَيْسَى، عَنِ ابْنِ أَبِي عُمَيْرٍ، عَنْ جَعْفَرِ بْنِ عُثْمَانَ؛ عَنْ سَمَاعَةَ، عَنْ أَبِي بَصِيرٍ؛ وَوَهْبِ بْنِ حَفْصٍ، عَنْ أَبِي بَصِيرٍ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: إِنَّ لِلَّهِ عِلْمَيْنِ: عِلْمٌ مَكْنُونٌ مَخْرُوعٌ، لَا يَعْلَمُهُ إِلَّا هُوَ، مِنْ ذَلِكَ يَكُونُ الْبَدَاءُ وَعِلْمٌ عَلَّمَهُ مَلَائِكَتُهُ وَرُسُلُهُ وَأَنْبِيََاءُهُ فَتَحْنُ نَعْلَمُهُ.

56/372: A group of our companions, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Isā, from Ibn Abī 'Umayr, from Ja'far ibn 'Uthmān,⁹⁴ from Samā'ah, from Abū Baṣīr, and also Wuhayb ibn Ḥafṣ,⁹⁵ from Abū Baṣīr:

Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) said: "God's knowledge is of two kinds: The knowledge which is stored (with God), which is known to none except Him and because of which *badā*' takes place; the (second kind of) knowledge is the one which He has made known to His angels, apostles and prophets, and we possess this knowledge."

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى؛ عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدٍ؛ عَنِ الْحُسَيْنِ بْنِ سَعِيدٍ، عَنِ الْحَسَنِ بْنِ مَجْزُوبٍ، عَنْ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ بْنِ سِنَانَ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: مَا بَدَأَ اللَّهُ فِي شَيْءٍ إِلَّا كَانَ فِي عِلْمِهِ قَبْلَ أَنْ يَبْدُوَ لَهُ.

57/373: Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad, from al-Ḥusayn ibn Sa'id, from al-Ḥasan ibn Maḥbūb, from 'Abd Allāh ibn Sinān:

Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) said: "*Badā*' does not occur to God in a thing but that it is in His knowledge before *badā*'."

— عَنْهُ، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ، عَنِ الْحَسَنِ بْنِ عَلِيِّ بْنِ فَضَالٍ، عَنْ دَاوُدَ بْنِ فَرْقَدٍ، عَنْ عَمْرِو بْنِ عُثْمَانَ الْجُهَنِيِّ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَمْ يَبْدَأْ لَهُ مِنْ جَهْلِ.

58/374: From him, from Aḥmad, from al-Ḥasan bin 'Alī ibn Faḍḍāl, from Dāwūd ibn Farqad, from 'Amr ibn 'Uthmān al-Juhānī:⁹⁶

Abū 'Abd Allāh (A) said: "Verily, *badā*' does not take place for God out of ignorance."

The Seven Stages of Creation:

— عِدَّةٌ مِنْ أَصْحَابِنَا، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدَ بْنِ خَالِدٍ، عَنْ أَبِيهِ؛ وَمُحَمَّدَ بْنِ يَحْيَى، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدَ بْنِ عَيْسَى؛ عَنِ الْحُسَيْنِ بْنِ سَعِيدٍ وَمُحَمَّدَ بْنِ خَالِدٍ جَمِيعاً عَنْ فَضَالَةَ بْنِ أَيُّوبَ، عَنْ مُحَمَّدَ بْنِ عِمَارَةَ؛ عَنْ حَرِيزِ بْنِ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ وَعَبْدِ اللَّهِ بْنِ مُسْكَانَ جَمِيعاً؛ عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ أَنَّهُ قَالَ: لَا يَكُونُ شَيْءٌ فِي الْأَرْضِ وَلَا فِي السَّمَاءِ إِلَّا بِهَذِهِ الْخِصَالِ السَّبْعِ: بِمَشِيئَةٍ وَإِرَادَةٍ وَقَدَرٍ وَقَضَاءٍ وَإِذْنٍ وَكِتَابٍ وَأَجَلٍ، فَمَنْ زَعَمَ أَنَّهُ يَقْدِرُ عَلَى نَقْضِ وَاحِدَةٍ فَقَدْ كَفَرَ.

59/381: A group of our companions, from Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Khalid, from his father, and Muhammad ibn Yahya, from Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn 'Isa, from al-Husayn ibn Sa'id and Muhammad ibn Khalid, both of these from Fadalah ibn Ayyub,⁹⁷ from Muhammad ibn 'Umarah,⁹⁸ from Hariz ibn 'Abd Allah and 'Abd Allah ibn Muskān, both of them from Abū 'Abd Allah:

Abū 'Abd Allah (A) said: "Nothing in the heaven and the earth can ever come into being without these seven characteristics (accompanying them): Intention (*mashī'ah*), Will (*irādah*), Determination (*qadar*), Decision (*qadā*), Permission (*idhn*), Writing (*kitāb*), and Duration (*ajal*). Whoever claims that he can violate any of these seven has disbelieved."

— وَرَوَاهُ عَلِيُّ بْنُ إِبْرَاهِيمَ، عَنْ أَبِيهِ، عَنْ مُحَمَّدَ بْنِ حَفْصِ، عَنْ مُحَمَّدَ بْنِ عِمَارَةَ؛ عَنْ حَرِيزِ بْنِ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ وَابْنِ مُسْكَانَ مِثْلَهُ.

A like tradition has been narrated by 'Alī ibn Ibrāhīm, from his father, from Muhammad ibn Ḥafṣ,⁹⁹ from Muhammad ibn 'Umarah, from Hariz ibn 'Abd Allah and Ibn Muskān.

Intention and Will:

— مُحَمَّدَ بْنَ يَحْيَى، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدَ بْنِ أَبِي نَصْرِ قَالَ: قَالَ أَبُو الْحَسَنِ الرِّضَا عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ اللَّهُ: [يَا] ابْنَ آدَمَ! بِمَشِيئَتِي كُنْتَ أَنْتَ الَّذِي تَشَاءُ لِنَفْسِكَ مَا تَشَاءُ وَبِقُوَّتِي أَذَيْتَ فَرَائِضِي وَبِنِعْمَتِي قَوَيْتَ عَلَيَّ مَعْصِيَتِي؛ جَعَلْتُكَ سَمِيعاً، بَصِيراً، قَوِيّاً، مَا أَصَابَكَ مِنْ حَسَنَةٍ فَمِنَ اللَّهِ، وَمَا أَصَابَكَ مِنْ سَيِّئَةٍ فَمِنَ نَفْسِكَ وَذَلِكَ أَنِّي أَوْلَى بِحَسَنَاتِكَ مِنْكَ وَأَنْتَ أَوْلَى بِسَيِّئَاتِكَ مِنِّي وَذَلِكَ أَنِّي لَا أَسْأَلُ عَمَّا أَفْعَلُ وَهُمْ يُسْأَلُونَ.

60/388: Muhammad ibn Yahya, from Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Abi Nasr:

Abū al-Hasan al-Riḍā (A) said: "God Almighty has said, 'O Son of Adam, it is by My intention that you can will what you will for yourself. It is by My power that you fulfil your duties to Me, and it is by My bounty that I have made you capable of disobeying Me. I made

you capable of hearing and seeing, and I made you strong. Whatever good befalls you is from God and whatever evil strikes you is from yourself. That, because I have a greater share in your good deeds than yourself and you have a greater share in your evil deeds than I. This is the reason why I am not accountable for what I do and they are accountable (for what they do).”

Determinism and Free Will:

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ إِسْمَاعِيلَ، عَنِ الْفَضْلِ بْنِ شَاذَانَ، عَنْ حَمَادِ بْنِ عَيْسَى، عَنْ إِبْرَاهِيمَ بْنِ عُمَرَ الْيَمَانِيِّ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ: قَالَ: إِنَّ اللَّهَ خَلَقَ الْخَلْقَ فَعَلِمَ مَا هُمْ صَائِرُونَ إِلَيْهِ وَأَمْرَهُمْ وَنَهَاهُمْ فَمَا أَمْرُهُمْ بِهِ مِنْ شَيْءٍ فَقَدْ جَعَلَ لَهُمُ السَّبِيلَ إِلَى تَرْكِهِ، وَلَا يَكُونُونَ آخِذِينَ وَلَا تَارِكِينَ إِلَّا بِإِذْنِ اللَّهِ.

61/401: Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘il, from al-Faḍl ibn Shādhān, from Ḥammād ibn ‘Īsā, from Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Umar al-Yamānī: ¹⁰⁰

Abū ‘Abd Allāh (A) said: “Verily, when God created the creation He knew wherefore they are going, and He commanded and prohibited them. He did not command them to (do) a thing without opening a way for them to disobey, and they neither carry it out nor abstain (from obeying His commands) except with the permission of God.”

The Divine Ḥujjah:

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى وَغَيْرُهُ عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدَ بْنِ عَيْسَى، عَنِ الْحُسَيْنِ بْنِ سَعِيدٍ؛ عَنِ ابْنِ أَبِي عُمَيْرٍ، عَنْ جَمِيلِ بْنِ دَرَّاجٍ، عَنِ ابْنِ الظَّيَّارِ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: إِنَّ اللَّهَ اخْتَجَّ عَلَى النَّاسِ بِمَا آتَاهُمْ وَعَرَّفَهُمْ.

62/415: Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā and others, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Īsā, from al-Ḥusayn ibn Sa‘īd, from Ibn Abī ‘Umayr, from Jamīl ibn Darraḥ, from Ibn al-Ṭayyār: ¹⁰²

Abū ‘Abd Allāh (A) said: “God sets forth His *ḥujjah* (claim) against mankind in accordance with what He has given them and made known to them.”

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ إِسْمَاعِيلَ، عَنِ الْفَضْلِ بْنِ شَاذَانَ، عَنِ ابْنِ أَبِي عُمَيْرٍ، عَنْ جَمِيلِ بْنِ دَرَّاجٍ مِثْلَهُ.

A like tradition has been narrated by Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘il, from al-Faḍl ibn Shādhān, from Ibn Abī ‘Umayr, from Jamīl ibn Darraḥ.

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى، عَنْ مُحَمَّدِ بْنِ الْحُسَيْنِ، عَنْ أَبِي شُعَيْبِ الْمَحَامِلِيِّ، عَنْ دُرُسْتِ بْنِ أَبِي

مَنْصُورٍ، عَنْ بُرَيْدِ بْنِ مُعَاوِيَةَ، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: لَيْسَ لِلَّهِ عَلَى خَلْقِهِ أَنْ يَعْرِفُوا وَلِلْخَلْقِ عَلَى اللَّهِ أَنْ يَعْرِفَهُمْ وَلِلَّهِ عَلَى الْخَلْقِ إِذَا عَرَفَهُمْ أَنْ يَقْبَلُوا.

63/422: Muḥammad ibn Yahyā, from Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn, from Abū Shu‘ayb al-Maḥāmili,¹⁰³ from Durust ibn Abī Manṣūr,¹⁰⁴ from Burayd ibn Mu‘awiyah:

Abū ‘Abd Allāh (A) said: “It is not God’s right on His creatures that they should know (Him and His commands). Rather, it is the creatures right upon God that He should make known to them (Himself and His commands). But once God makes known (His commands) to His creatures, then it is His right over the creatures that they should respond with acceptance.”

— عِدَّةٌ مِنْ أَصْحَابِنَا، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدَ بْنِ عَيْسَى، عَنِ الْحَجَّالِ، عَنْ ثَعْلَبَةَ بْنِ مَيْمُونٍ، عَنْ عَبْدِ الْأَعْلَى بْنِ أَعْيَنَ قَالَ: سَأَلْتُ أَبَا عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ مَنْ لَمْ يَعْرِفْ شَيْئًا هَلْ عَلَيْهِ شَيْءٌ؟ قَالَ: لَا.

64/423: A group of our companions, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Isā, from al-Ḥajjāl, from Tha‘labah ibn Maymūn, from ‘Abd al-’A‘lā ibn A‘yan:

‘Abd al-’A‘lā ibn A‘yan says: “I asked Abū ‘Abd Allāh (A) whether one who did not know anything was responsible in any way. ‘No,’ he replied.”

— مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ يَحْيَى، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدَ بْنِ عَيْسَى، عَنِ ابْنِ فَضَالٍ، عَنْ دَاوُدَ بْنِ فَرْقِدٍ، عَنْ أَبِي الْحَسَنِ زَكْرِيَّا بْنِ يَحْيَى، عَنْ أَبِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ قَالَ: مَا حَجَبَ اللَّهُ عَنِ الْعِبَادِ فَهُوَ مَوْضُوعٌ عَنْهُمْ.

65/424: Muḥammad ibn Yahyā, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Isā, from Ibn Faḍḍāl, from Dāwūd ibn Farqad, from Abū al-Ḥasan Zakariyyā ibn Yahyā:¹⁰⁵

Abū ‘Abd Allāh (A) said: “The creatures have no obligation in regard to that which God has concealed from them.”

Guidance is From God:

عِدَّةٌ مِنْ أَصْحَابِنَا، عَنْ أَحْمَدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدَ بْنِ مُحَمَّدٍ، عَنِ ابْنِ فَضَالٍ، عَنْ عَلِيِّ بْنِ عُقْبَةَ، عَنْ أَبِيهِ قَالَ: سَمِعْتُ أَبَا عَبْدِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ يَقُولُ: اجْعَلُوا أَمْرَكُمْ لِلَّهِ وَلَا تَجْعَلُوهُ لِلنَّاسِ فَإِنَّهُ مَا كَانَ لِلَّهِ فَهُوَ لِلَّهِ وَمَا كَانَ لِلنَّاسِ فَلَا يَضَعُهُ إِلَى اللَّهِ وَلَا تَخَاصَمُوا النَّاسَ لِدِينِكُمْ فَإِنَّ الْمُخَاصَمَةَ مُمْرِضَةٌ لِلْقَلْبِ. إِنَّ اللَّهَ تَعَالَى قَالَ لِنَبِيِّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَآلِهِ: «إِنَّكَ لَا تَهْدِي مَنْ أَحْبَبْتَ وَلَكِنَّ اللَّهَ يَهْدِي مَنْ يَشَاءُ»

وَقَالَ: «أَفَأَنْتَ تُكْرِهُ النَّاسَ حَتَّى يَكُونُوا مُؤْمِنِينَ» ذَرُّوا النَّاسَ فَإِنَّ النَّاسَ أَخَذُوا عَنِ النَّاسِ وَإِنَّكُمْ أَخَذْتُمْ عَنِ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَآلِهِ، إِنِّي سَمِعْتُ أَبِي عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ يَقُولُ: إِنَّ اللَّهَ عَزَّوَجَلَّ إِذَا كَتَبَ عَلَى عَبْدٍ أَنْ يَدْخُلَ فِي هَذَا الْأَمْرِ كَانَ أَسْرَعَ إِلَيْهِ مِنَ الظَّيْرِ إِلَى وَكْرِهِ.

66/428: A group of our companions, from Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad, from Ibn Faḍḍāl, from ‘Alī ibn ‘Uqbah, from his father:¹⁰⁶

‘Uqbah says: “I heard Abū ‘Abd Allāh (A) say: ‘Make your affair (Shi‘ism) for the sake of God, not for the sake of the people. That which is done for God’s sake is God’s, and that which is done for the people does not ascend towards God. Quarrel not with the people regarding your faith, for such quarrel sickens the heart. Verily, God Almighty said to His Prophet: “Verily, you cannot guide whomsoever you like, but God guides whomsoever He will” (28:56). And God has also said, “Would you (O Muḥammad) then constrain the people until they become believers?” (10:99). Leave the people alone, since they have received their religion from other people, whereas you have received your religion from the Messenger of God (S). Verily, I once heard my father say, “Verily, when God, the Almighty and the Glorious, decrees that a creature should enter this affair (Shi‘ism), he hastens towards it faster than the bird returning to its nest.””

To be continued — inshā’ Allāh.

NOTES:

79. Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Khālid ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī al-Barqī; 6/VII, VIII, IX (Tr.); Tr386/A139: *thiqah*; N335: *Kāna Muḥammad ḍa‘īfan fī al-ḥadīth, wa kāna adīban ḥasan al-ma‘rifah bi akhbār wa ‘ulūm al-‘Arab*.

80. Abū Ayyūb Mansūr ibn Ḥāzim al-Bajalī; 5/VI, VII, N413/A167: *thiqah, ‘ayn, ṣadūq, min jillat aṣḥābinā wa fuqahā’ihim*.

81. Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm ibn Ḥāshim al-Qummi (d.c.260/873); 7/VII, IX (Tr.); A5: *al-‘arjah qabūl qawlihi; thiqah*, according to ‘Alī ibn Ibrāhīm in his tafsīr and Ibn Ṭāwūs in *Falāḥ al-sā’il, faṣl 19*: see *Rijāl al-Māmaqānī*, vol.1, p.41.

82. Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd ibn Sālim al-‘Aṭṭār: 6/VII, XI (Tr.); N339/A154: *thiqah* (?), the uncertainty on account of an ambiguity in N; mentioned by Ibn Dāwūd in the first part of his work on rijāl regarding the *mamdūhūn*.

83. Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā ibn Salmān (or Sulaymān) al-Khath‘amī al-Kūfī; 5/VI; N359/A158: *thiqah*.

84. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn ‘Atik al-Qaṣīr, 4/V; among the rijāl of ‘Alī ibn Ibrāhīm al-Qummi, see his tafsīr, ii, 379.

85. Abū al-Faḍl al-‘Abbās ibn Ma‘rūf al-Qummi; 7/VIII; N281/Tr382/A118: *thiqah*.

86. Abū al-Faḍl ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Abī Najrān ‘Amr ibn Muslim al-Kūfī; 6/VIII; N235/A114: *thiqah thiqah*.

87. Abū al-Qāsim al-Fuḍayl ibn Yasār al-Nahdī al-Baṣrī; 4/V, VI; N309/Tr132/A132: *thiqah*; according to K238 he is one of those about whose veracity (*taṣḍīq*) there is consensus among Shi'ī scholars.
88. Abū al-Ḥakam Hishām ibn Sālim al-Jawālīqī; 5/VI, VII; N434/A179: *thiqah thiqah*.
89. Abū Muḥammad 'Abd Allāh ibn Yaḥyā al-Kāhili; 5/VI, VII; among the rijāl of Ṣafwān ibn Yaḥyā (*al-Wāfi*, i, 100; viii, 21), al-Bizantī (*al-Mahāsin*, ii, 452) and Ibn Abī 'Umayr (Tf128).
90. Abū Muḥammad al-Fuḍayl (al-Faḍl) ibn 'Uthmān al-Murādī al-Ṣā'igh al-'Anbārī, al-'A'war; 5/VI; N308/A133: *thiqah thiqah*.
91. Mavmūn al-Bān al-Kūfi; 4/IV, V, VI; among the rijāl of Ibn Abī 'Umayr, who has narrated this tradition from him.
92. Aḥmad ibn Sulaymān al-Ḥajjāl; 6/VII: source of *tawthīq* untraced.
93. Ḥafṣ ibn al-Bakhtarī al-Baghdādī; 5/VI, VII; N134/A58: *thiqah*. Also, among the rijāl of Ibn Abī 'Umayr, see N134.
94. Humrān ibn A'yan al-Kūfi, 4/V, VI; among the rijāl of Ṣafwān ibn Yaḥyā (see *Uṣūl al-Kāfi*, *bāb fī anna al-'A'immaḥ biman yashbahūn*, ḥadīth 1).
95. Ja'far ibn 'Uthmān ibn Ziyād al-Rawwāsī, 5/VI; Ibn Abī 'Umayr has narrated from him here; also regarded *thiqah* by al-Kashshī (K372), al-Majlisī (*al-Wajīzah*, p.147) and al-Baḥrānī (see *Rijāl al-Māmaqānī*, i, 218).
96. Wuhayb ibn Ḥafṣ Abū 'Alī al-Jurayrī; 5/VI, VII; N431: *thiqah*; al-Majlisī (*al-Wajīzah*, 168) and al-Baḥrānī (*Rijāl al-Māmaqānī*, iii, 282): *innahū muwaththaq*.
97. 'Amr ibn 'Uthmān al-Juhanī al-Kūfi; 5/V, VI; source of *tawthīq* untraced.
98. Fadālah ibn Ayyūb al-'Azdi; 6/VII; Tr357/A133: *thiqah*; also considered *thiqah* by al-Najāshī as mentioned in *al-Wasā'il*, iii, 553, and *Jāmi' al-ruwāt*, ii, 2 (missing from the published manuscripts of *Rijāl al-Najāshī*).
99. Muḥammad ibn 'Umārah ibn al-'Ash'ath; 6/VIII; source of *tawthīq* untraced.
100. Muḥammad ibn Ḥafṣ ibn 'Amr, Abū Ja'far ibn al-'Umari; 7/0; A153/al-Majlisī (*al-Wajīzah*, 164): *wakīl al-nāḥiyah wa kāna al-'amr yadūr 'alayh*.
101. Ibrāhīm ibn 'Umar al-Yamānī al-Ṣan'ānī; 4/V, VI; N20: *shaykh min aṣḥābinā thiqah*.
102. Ḥamzah ibn Muḥammad al-Ṭayyār al-Kūfi; 5/VI; Ṣafwān ibn Yaḥyā narrates from him in K348.
103. Abū Shu'ayb Ṣāliḥ ibn Khālid al-Maḥāmili; 6/VII; N456/Tr365: *thiqah*.
104. Durust ibn Abī Mansūr al-Wāsiṭī; 5/VI, VII; among the rijāl of 'Alī ibn Ibrāhīm (*Tafsīr al-Qummī*, ii, 402, 423) and Ibn Abī 'Umayr (N162).
105. Zakariyyā ibn Yaḥyā, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Wāsiṭī; 5/VI, VII: N173/A76: *thiqah*.
106. 'Uqbah ibn Khālid al-'Asadī al-Kūfi; 5/VI; among the rijāl of Ibn Qūlawayh (*Kāmil al-ziyārāt*, 26).

Divorce, According to Five Schools of Islamic Law Part 2

by 'Allāmah Muhammad Jawād Maghniyyah

Translated from the Arabic by Mujāhid Husayn

Al-'Iddah:

There is consensus among Muslims about the general necessity of 'iddah. Its basis is the Quran and the Sunnah. As to the Quran, we have the following verse:

وَالْمُطَلَّقَاتُ يَتَرَبَّصْنَ بِأَنْفُسِهِنَّ ثَلَاثَةَ قُرُوءٍ ...

Women who are divorced shall wait, keeping themselves apart, three (monthly) courses.... (2:228)

As to the Sunnah, there is the Prophet's tradition commanding Fāṭimah bint Qays:

إِعْتَدِي فِي بَيْتِ ابْنِ أُمِّ مَكْتُومٍ.

Observe 'iddah in the house of Ibn Umm Maktūm.

They differ, however, regarding: the 'iddah of a wife separated from her husband due to divorce or annulment of marriage; the 'iddah of a widow; the 'iddah of a woman copulated by mistake; the relief of an adulteress (from menses); and the 'iddah of a wife whose husband has disappeared.

Divorcée's 'Iddah:

The five schools concur that a woman divorced before consummation and before the occurrence of valid seclusion has no 'iddah to observe. The Ḥanafī, the Mālikī and the Ḥanbalī schools state: If the husband secludes with her without consummating the marriage and then divorces

her, she will have to observe 'iddah, exactly as if consummation had occurred.

The Imāmiyyah and the Shāfi'is observe: Seclusion has no effect. As mentioned earlier in relation with the distinction between revocable and irrevocable divorce, the Imāmiyyah do not require a menopausal wife with whom coitus has taken place to observe 'iddah. The reasons given by the Imāmiyyah for this opinion were also mentioned earlier.

The 'iddah for every kind of separation between husband and wife, except the one by death, is the 'iddah of divorce, irrespective of its being due to: *khul'*, *li'ān*, annulment due to a defect, dissolution arising from *ridā'* (breast-feeding), or as a result of difference of religion.⁸

Moreover, the schools concur that the 'iddah is *wājib* on a wife divorced after consummation and that the 'iddah will be one of the following kinds:

1. The five schools concur that a pregnant divorcée will observe 'iddah till childbirth, in accordance with the verse:

... وَأُولَاتُ الْأَحْمَالِ أَجَلُهُنَّ أَنْ يَضَعْنَ حَمْلَهُنَّ ...

And as for pregnant women, their term shall end with delivery. (65:4)

If she is pregnant with more than one child, her 'iddah will not terminate until she gives birth to the last of them, as per consensus. The schools differ concerning a miscarriage if the foetus is not completely formed; the Ḥanafī, the Shāfi'i and the Ḥanbalī schools observe: Her 'iddah will not terminate by its detachment. The Imāmi and the Māliki schools state: It will; even if it is a lump of flesh, so far as it is a foetus.

The maximum period of gestation is two years according to the Ḥanafis, four years according to the Shāfi'is and the Ḥanbalis, and five years according to the Mālikis, as mentioned by *al-Fiqh 'alā al-madhāhib al-'arba'ah*. In *al-Mughnī*, it is narrated from Mālik to be four years. Details of this were mentioned in the chapter on marriage.

A pregnant woman cannot menstruate according to the Ḥanafī and the Ḥanbalī schools. The Imāmi, the Shāfi'i and the Māliki schools allow the possibility of its occurrence.

2. She will observe an 'iddah of three lunar months if she is: an adult divorcée who has not yet menstruated or a divorcée who has reached the age of menopause.⁹ This age is seventy years according to the Mālikis, fifty years according to the Ḥanbalis, fifty-five years according to the Ḥanafis, sixty-two years according to the Shāfi'is, and according to the Imāmiyyah fifty for ordinary women and sixty for those of Qurayshī descent.

Regarding a wife copulated with before her completing nine years, the Ḥanafis observe: 'Iddah is *wājib* on her even if she is a child.

The Mālikī and the Shāfi'ī schools state: *'Iddah* is not *wājib* on a minor incapable of intercourse, but *wājib* on one who is capable even if she is under nine. The Imāmi and the Ḥanbalī schools do not consider *'iddah wājib* on a minor under nine years even if she has the capacity for intercourse. (*al-Fiqh 'alā al-madhāhib al-'arba'ah*, vol. 4, discussion on the *'iddah* of a menopausal divorcée).

3. A divorcée over nine who has had monthlies and is neither pregnant nor menopausal has an *'iddah* of three *qurū'*, as per consensus. The Imāmi, the Mālikī and the Shāfi'ī schools have interpreted the word *qara'* to mean purity from menses. Thus, if she is divorced at the last moment of her present period of purity, it will be counted as a part of *'iddah*, which will be completed after two more of such terms of purity. The Ḥanafīs and the Ḥanbalīs interpret the term to mean menstruation. Thus, it is necessary that there be three monthlies after the divorce, and the monthly during which she is divorced is disregarded. (*Majma' al-'anhur*)

If a divorcée undergoing this kind of *'iddah* claims having completed the period, her word will be accepted if the period is sufficient for the completion of *'iddah*. According to the Imāmiyyah, the minimum period required for accepting such a claim is twenty-six days and two 'moments', by supposing that she is divorced at the last moment of her first purity, followed by three days of menses (which is the minimum period) followed by a ten-day purity period (which is the minimum period of purity according to the Imāmiyyah) followed again by three days of menses, then a second ten-day purity followed by menses. The period of *'iddah* comes to an end with the sole recommencement of menses, and the first moment of the third monthly is to make certain the completion of the third period of purity. *Nifās* is similar to menses, in the opinion of the Imāmiyyah. Accordingly, it is possible for an *'iddah* to be completed in twenty-three days, if the wife is divorced immediately after childbirth but before the commencement of *nifās* (in which case the *'iddah* is 23 days, considering a moment of *nifās* followed by ten days of the first purity, followed by three days of menses — which is the minimum period for it — followed by a second ten-day purity).

The minimum period for accepting such a claim by a divorcée is thirty-nine days according to the Ḥanafī school, by supposing his divorcing her at the end of her purity, and supposing again the minimum three-day period of menstruation, followed by a 15-day purity (which is the minimum in the opinion of the Ḥanafīs). Thus, three menses, covering nine days, separated by two periods of purity, making up thirty days, make up a total of thirty-nine.

Maximum Period of 'Iddah:

As mentioned earlier, a mature divorcée who has not yet menstruated will observe a three-month 'iddah, as per consensus. But if she menstruates and then ceases to do so — as a result of her nursing a child or due to some disease — the Ḥanbalī and the Mālikī schools observe: She will observe 'iddah for one complete year. In the later of his two opinions, al-Shāfi'ī has said: Her 'iddah will continue until she menstruates or reaches menopause; after this, she will observe an 'iddah of three months. (*al-Mughnī*, vol. 7, "bāb al-'idad")

The Ḥanafī school is of the opinion that, if she menstruates once and then ceases perpetually due to disease or breast-feeding a child, her 'iddah will not terminate before menopause. Accordingly, the period of 'iddah can extend for more than forty years in the opinion of the Ḥanafī and the Shāfi'ī schools. (*al-Fiqh 'alā al-madhāhib al-'arba'ah*, vol. 4, the discussion on 'iddat al-muṭallaqah idhā kānat min dhawāt al-ḥayḍ).

The Imāmiyyah observe: If menstruation ceases due to some accidental cause the divorcée will observe an 'iddah of three months, similar to a divorcée who has never menstruated. If menses resume after the divorce, she will observe 'iddah for the shorter of the two terms, i.e. three months or three qurū'. This means that if three qurū' are completed before three months, the 'iddah will be over on their completion, and if three months are completed before three qurū', then again the 'iddah will terminate. If she menstruates even a moment before the completion of three months, she will have to wait for nine months, and it will not benefit her if she is later free from menses for a period of three months. After the completion of nine months, if she gives birth before the completion of a year, her 'iddah will terminate, and similarly if she menstruates and completes the periods of purity. But if she neither gives birth nor completes the periods of purity before the end of the year, she will observe an additional 'iddah of three months after completing the nine months. This adds up to a year, which is the maximum period of 'iddah according to the Imāmiyyah.¹⁰

The Widow's 'Iddah:

There is consensus among the schools that the 'iddah of a widow who is not pregnant is four months and ten days, irrespective of her being a major or a minor, her being menopausal or otherwise, and regardless of the consummation of her marriage, in accordance with the verse:

وَالَّذِينَ يَتُوفَوْنَ مِنْكُمْ وَيَذُرُونَ أَزْوَاجًا يَتَرَبِّصْنَ أَنْفُسِهِنَّ أَرْبَعَةَ أَشْهُرٍ وَعَشْرًا ...

And those among you who die and leave behind wives, (these wives) should keep themselves in waiting for four months and ten days. (2:234)

This is the case when she is sure of not being pregnant. But if she has a doubt she is bound to wait until delivery or attainment of certainty that she is not pregnant. This is the opinion of many legists belonging to different schools.

The four Sunni schools state: The 'iddah of a pregnant widow will terminate on delivery, even if it occurs a moment after the husband's death. This permits her to remarrying immediately after giving birth, even if the husband has not yet been buried, as per the verse:

... وَأُولَاتُ الْأَحْمَالِ أَجَلُهُنَّ أَنْ يَضَعْنَ حَمْلَهُنَّ ...

And as for pregnant women, their term shall end with delivery. (65:4)

The Imāmiyyah state: Her 'iddah will be whichever is longer of the two terms, i.e. delivery or four months and ten days. Thus if four months and ten days pass without her giving birth, her 'iddah will continue until childbirth; and if she delivers before the completion of four months and ten days, her 'iddah will be four months and ten days. The Imāmiyyah argue that it is necessary to combine the verse 2:234 *أَجَلُهُنَّ أَنْ يَضَعْنَ حَمْلَهُنَّ.* with the verse 65:4 *يَتَرَبَّصْنَ بِأَنْفُسِهِنَّ أَرْبَعَةَ أَشْهُرٍ وَعَشْرًا.* The former verse has fixed the 'iddah at four months and ten days, and it includes both a pregnant and a non-pregnant wife. The latter verse has stipulated the 'iddah of a pregnant wife to last until childbirth, and it includes both a divorcée and a widow. Thus an incompatibility emerges between the apparent import of the two verses regarding a pregnant widow who delivers before the completion of four months and ten days. In accordance with the latter verse her 'iddah terminates on delivery, and in accordance with the former the 'iddah will not terminate until four months and ten days have been completed. An incompatibility also appears if she does not deliver after the completion of four months and ten days; according to the former verse her 'iddah terminates when four months and ten days are over, and in accordance with the latter the 'iddah will not terminate because she has not yet delivered. The word of the Quran is unequivocal, and it is necessary that parts of it harmonize with one another. Now, if we join the two verses like this,

وَالَّذِينَ يُتَوَقَّؤْنَ مِنْكُمْ وَيَذَرُونَ أَزْوَاجًا يَتَرَبَّصْنَ بِأَنْفُسِهِنَّ أَرْبَعَةَ أَشْهُرٍ وَعَشْرًا ، وَأُولَاتُ الْأَحْمَالِ أَجَلُهُنَّ أَنْ يَضَعْنَ حَمْلَهُنَّ .

the meaning will be that the *'iddah* of a widow who is not pregnant, or is pregnant but delivers within four months and ten days, is four months and ten days; and that of a widow who delivers after four months and ten days is until the time of her delivery.

If someone questions how the Imāmiyyah specify the *'iddah* of a pregnant widow to be the longer of the two terms (delivery or four months and ten days) while the verse *وَأُولَاتُ الْأَحْمَالِ* is explicit that the *'iddah* of a pregnant woman terminates on her giving birth, the Imāmiyyah say: How have the four schools said that the *'iddah* of a pregnant widow is two years, if the gestation period so extends, in spite of the verse *وَالَّذِينَ يُتَوَفَّوْنَ مِنْكُمْ وَيَذُرُونَ أَزْوَاجًا يَتَرَبَّصْنَ بِأَنْفُسِهِنَّ أَرْبَعَةَ أَشْهُرٍ وَعَشْرًا* which is explicit that it is four months and ten days? If the questioner replies: The four schools have done so acting in accordance with the verse *وَأُولَاتُ الْأَحْمَالِ* the Imāmiyyah reply: We have acted in accordance with the verse *وَالَّذِينَ يُتَوَفَّوْنَ*. Therefore it is not possible to apply both the verses except by stipulating the longer of the two terms as *'iddah*.

The schools, excepting the Ḥanafī, concur that *al-ḥidād* is *wājib* on the widow, irrespective of her being major or minor, Muslim or non-Muslim. The Ḥanafis do not consider it *wājib* for a non-Muslim and a minor widow because they are not *mukallaf* (responsible for religious duties).

The meaning of *al-ḥidād* is that the woman mourning her husband's death refrain from every adornment that makes her attractive. Its determination depends on prevailing customs and usage.

The Imāmiyyah observe: The *'iddah* of divorce will commence on the recital of the divorce, irrespective of the husband's presence or absence. The *'iddah* of a widow commences on the news of his death reaching her, if he is away. But if the husband is present and she comes to know of his death after some time, her *'iddah* will commence from the time of his death, as per the predominant opinion among Imāmiyyah legists.

The schools concur that if the husband of a revocable divorcée dies while she is undergoing *'iddah*, she is bound to start anew with a widow's *'iddah* from the time of his death, irrespective of the divorce taking place during the husband's mortal illness or health, because the marital bond between her and the husband has not yet broken. But if the divorce is irrevocable, it will depend. If he divorces her while healthy, she will complete the *'iddah* of divorce and will not have to observe any *'iddah* due to the husband's death, as per consensus, even if the divorce was without her consent. Similar is the case if he divorces her during his mortal illness on her demand. But what if he divorces her during his mortal illness without her demanding it, and then dies before the termination of her *'iddah*? Shall she start the widow's *'iddah*, like a revocable divorcée, or shall she continue to observe the *'iddah* of

divorce?

The Imāmi, the Mālikī and the Shāfi‘ī schools state: She shall continue to observe the *‘iddah* of divorce without changing over to the *‘iddah* of widowhood.

According to the Ḥanafī and the Ḥanbalī schools, she shall change over to the *‘iddah* of widowhood.

In short, a revocable divorcée will start observing the *‘iddah* of widowhood if the divorcer dies before the termination of her *‘iddah* of divorce, and an irrevocable divorcée will continue to observe the *‘iddah* of divorce, as per the concurrence of all the schools except the Ḥanafī and the Ḥanbalī, who exclude an irrevocable divorcée if the divorce takes place during the divorcer’s mortal illness without her consent.

‘Iddah for Intercourse by Mistake:

According to the Imāmiyyah, the *‘iddah* of ‘intercourse by mistake’ is similar to the *‘iddah* of a divorcée. Therefore, if the woman is pregnant, she will observe *‘iddah* until childbirth; if she has menstruated, her *‘iddah* will be three *qurū*, otherwise three months. An ‘intercourse by mistake’ is, according to the Imāmiyyah, one in which the man involved is not liable to penal consequences, irrespective of the woman being one with whom marriage is unlawful (such as wife’s sister or a married woman) or lawful (such as any unmarried woman outside the prohibited degrees of marriage). The view held by the Ḥanbalis is nearly similar to this view, where they observe that every form of sex relations necessitate the observance of *‘iddah*. They do not differ from the Imāmiyyah except in some details, as indicated below on the discussion of the *‘iddah* of a fornicatress.

The Ḥanafis state: *‘Iddah* is *wājib* both as a result of intercourse by mistake or an invalid marriage. *‘Iddah* is not *wājib* if the marriage is void. An example of the ‘mistake’ is a man’s having relations with a sleeping woman thinking her to be his wife. An invalid (*fāsīd*) marriage is one with a woman with whom marriage is lawful but in which some essential conditions remain unfulfilled (such as where a contract has been recited without the presence of witnesses). A void (*bāṭil*) marriage is a contract with a woman belonging to the prohibited degrees of relatives (e.g. sister or aunt). The *‘iddah* for intercourse by mistake according to them is three menstruations if she menstruates, or three months if she is not pregnant. If she is pregnant, the *‘iddah* will continue until childbirth.

The Mālikīs state: She will release herself after three *qurū*; if she does not menstruate, by three months; if pregnant, on childbirth.

Whatever be the case, if a man who has had intercourse by mistake dies, the woman will not observe the *‘iddah* of widowhood, because her

'*iddah* is due to intercourse, not marriage.

The 'Iddah of a Fornicatress:

The Ḥanafī and the Shāfi'ī schools, as well as the majority of Imāmiyyah legists, remark: '*Iddah* is not required for fornication, because the relations have no sanctity. Thus, marriage and intercourse with a fornicatress is lawful, even if she is pregnant. But the Ḥanafīs permit marriage with a woman pregnant through fornication without allowing intercourse with her before her delivery.

The Mālikīs state: Fornication is similar to intercourse by mistake. Thus she will release herself in a period equal to the period of '*iddah* except when she is to undergo the punishment, in which case she will release herself after a single menstruation.

The Ḥanbalīs observe: '*Iddah* is as *wājib* on a fornicatress as on a divorcée (*al-Mughnī*, vol.6 and *Majma' al-'anhur*).

The 'Iddah of a Kitābiyyah:

The schools concur that a *kitābiyyah* (a non-Muslim female adherent of a religion having a scripture) wife of a Muslim will be governed by the laws applicable to a Muslim wife concerning the necessity of '*iddah*, and *al-ḥidād* in an '*iddah* of widowhood. But if she is a wife of a non-Muslim *kitābī*, the Imāmi¹, the Shāfi'ī, the Mālikī and the Ḥanbalī schools consider '*iddah wājib* upon her. But the Shāfi'ī, the Mālikī and the Ḥanbalī schools do not consider *al-ḥidād wājib* for her while observing the '*iddah* of widowhood.

The Ḥanafīs state: A non-Muslim woman married to a non-Muslim does not have an '*iddah*. (*al-Shi'rānī*, *Mīzān*, *bāb al-'idad wa al-'istibrā'*)

Wife of a Missing Husband:

A missing person can be in one of these two situations: First, where his absence is continuous but his whereabouts are known and news about him is received. Here, according to consensus, his wife is not entitled to remarry. The second situation arises where there is no more any news of him and his whereabouts. The imams of the various schools differ regarding the law applicable to his wife.

Abū Ḥanīfah, al-Shāfi'ī according to his later and preferred opinion, and Aḥmad according to one of his two traditions, observe: Marriage is impermissible for the wife of a missing husband as long as he may be considered alive on the basis of a usual life-span. Abū Ḥanīfah has fixed this period at 120 years; al-Shāfi'ī and Aḥmad at 90 years.

Mālik states: She shall wait for 4 years and then observe an *'iddah* of four months and ten days, after which she may remarry.

Abū Ḥanīfah and al-Shāfi'i in the more reliable of his two opinions state: If the first husband returns after she marries another, the second marriage shall become void and she will become the first's wife.

Mālik observes: If the first husband returns before the consummation of the second marriage, she will belong to the first husband, but if he returns after consummation she will remain the second's wife. It will be *wājib*, however, for the second husband to pay *mahr* to the first.

According to Aḥmad, if the second husband has not consummated the marriage she belongs to the first; but if he has, the choice lies with the first husband: he may either reclaim her from the second husband and give him the *mahr* or allow her to remain with him by taking the *mahr*. (*al-Mughnī*, vol.7 and *Raḥmat al-'ummah*)^{1 2}

The Imāmiyyah state: The case of a missing person who is not known to be living or dead will be studied. If he has any assets by which the wife can be maintained, or has a guardian willing to maintain her, or someone volunteering to do it, it is *wājib* for her to patiently wait for him; it is not permissible for her to marry in any circumstance until she learns of his death or his divorcing her. But if the missing husband has neither any property nor someone willing to maintain her, if the wife bears it patiently, well and good; but if she wants to remarry, she will raise the issue before the judge. The judge will order a four-year waiting period for her from the time the issue was brought to him, and then start a search for the husband during that time. If nothing is known, and the missing husband has a guardian or an attorney in charge of his affairs, the judge will order him to divorce her. But if the husband has neither a guardian nor an attorney, or has, but has prohibited him from divorcing, and it is not possible to compel him, the judge will himself pronounce the divorce by using the authority granted to him by the Shari'ah. After this divorce the wife will observe an *'iddah* of four months and ten days after which she may remarry.

The method of search is that the judge will question about his presence and seek information from those coming from the place where there is a possibility of his being present. The best way of it is to depute a reliable person from among the people of the place where the search is being conducted to supervise the search on his behalf and report to him the result. A search of an ordinary extent is sufficient, and it is neither necessary that his whereabouts be inquired in every place which can possibly be reached, nor that the inquiry be conducted continually. When the search is completed in a period of less than four years in a manner that it becomes certain that further inquiry is fruitless, the search is no longer *wājib*. Yet it is necessary that the wife wait for four years; this is in compliance with an explicit tradition and the demand of

precaution in marital ties, as well as the possibility of the husband returning during these four years.

After the completion of this period the divorce will take place and she will observe an *'iddah* of four months and ten days without *ḥidād*. She is entitled to maintenance during this period, and the spouses inherit from each other as long as she is in *'iddah*. If the husband comes back during the *'iddah*, he may return to her if he wants or let her remain as she is. But if he comes back after the completion of the *'iddah* but before her marrying another, the preferable opinion is that he has no right over her; and more so if he finds her married.¹³

The Rules Governing *'Iddah*:

We said in the chapter on maintenance that there is consensus regarding a revocable divorcée's right to maintenance during her *'iddah*. We also said that there is a difference of opinion regarding an irrevocable divorcée during her *'iddah*. Here we shall discuss the following issues:

Inheritance Between a Divorcer and a Divorcée:

There is consensus that when a husband revocably divorces his wife, their right of inheriting from each other does not disappear as long as she is in *'iddah*, irrespective of the divorce being given in mortal illness or in condition of health. The right to mutual inheritance is annulled on the completion of the *'iddah*. There is a consensus again regarding the absence of mutual inheritance if the husband divorces his wife irrevocably in health.

Divorce by a Sick Person:

The schools differ when a sick person divorces his wife irrevocably and then dies in the same sickness. The Ḥanafis entitle her to inherit as long as she is in *'iddah*, provided the husband is considered attempting to bar her from inheriting from him and the divorce takes place without her consent. In the absence of any of these two conditions she will not be entitled to inherit.

The Ḥanbalis state: She will inherit from him as long as she does not remarry, even if her *'iddah* terminates.

The Mālikis state: She inherits from him even after her remarriage.

Three opinions of al-Shāfi'i have been reported, and one of them is that she will not inherit even if he dies while she is observing *'iddah*.

It is notable that apart from the Imāmiyyah the other schools speak of a divorce by a sick person only when it is irrevocable. But the Imāmiyyah have observed: If he divorces her while sick, she will inherit

from him irrespective of the divorce being revocable or irrevocable, on the realization of the following four conditions.

1. That the husband's death occurs before the completion of one year from the date of divorce. Thus, if he dies one year after the divorce, even if by an hour, she will not inherit from him.

2. That she does not remarry before his death. If she does and he dies within a year (of the divorce), she will not inherit.

3. That he does not recover from the illness in which he divorced her. Thus, if he recovers and then dies within a year, she will not be entitled to inherit.

4. That the divorce does not take place on her demand.

'Iddah and Location.

The schools concur that a revocable divorcée will observe *'iddah* at the husband's home. Therefore, it is not permissible for him to expel her. Similarly, it is not permissible for her to leave it. The schools differ regarding an irrevocable divorcée. The four schools are of the opinion that she will observe *'iddah* like a revocable divorcée, without there being any difference, in accordance with the verse:

... لَا تُخْرِجُوهُنَّ مِنْ بُيُوتِهِنَّ وَلَا يُخْرِجَنَّ إِلَّا أَنْ يَأْتِيَنَّ بِفُحْشَةٍ مُبِينَةٍ ...

Do not expel them from their homes, and neither should they themselves go forth, unless they commit an obvious indecency. (65:1)

The Imāmiyyah state: An irrevocable divorcée is free to decide about her own affairs and may observe *'iddah* wherever she wants, because the marital bond between her and the husband has snapped; neither do they inherit from each other, nor is she entitled to maintenance, unless pregnant. Accordingly, the husband is not entitled to confine her. As to the above verse, they say that it relates specifically to revocable divorcées, and there are many traditions from the Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt (A) to this effect.

Marriage with a Divorcée's Sister in 'Iddah:

If a person marries a woman, it is *ḥarām* for him to marry her sister. However, if she dies or is divorced and her period of *'iddah* terminates, it becomes *ḥalāl* for him to marry her sister. But is it *ḥalāl* for him to marry her sister before her *'iddah* comes to an end? The schools concur that it is *ḥarām* to marry the sister of a divorcée in *'iddah* if the divorce is revocable, and differ where the divorce is irrevocable. The Ḥanafī and Ḥanbalī schools observe: Neither marriage with her sister

is permissible nor the marrying of a fifth wife (if he had four, one of whom he has divorced) until the completion of her 'iddah, irrespective of the divorce being revocable or irrevocable.

The Imāmi, the Māliki and the Shāfi'i schools state: It is permissible to marry the sister of a divorcée and a fifth wife before the completion of 'iddah if the divorce is irrevocable.

Can a Divorcée in 'Iddah be Redivorced?

The four schools state: In revocable divorce, he is entitled to divorce her again while she is observing 'iddah, without returning to her, but not if the divorce is irrevocable (*al-Mughnī*, vol.7, chapters on *khul'* and *raj'ah*; *al-Fiqh 'alā al-madhāhib al-'arba'ah*, the discussion on conditions of divorce).

The Imāmiyyah observe: Divorce of a divorcée, revocable or irrevocable, does not take place unless he returns to her, because it is meaningless to divorce a divorcée.

Return to the Divorcée (al-Raj'ah):

Al-raj'ah in the terminology of legists is restoration of the divorcée and her marital status. It is valid by consensus and does not require a guardian, or *mahr*, or the divorcée's consent, or any action on her part, in accordance with the verses:

... وَيُعُولُهُنَّ أَحَقُّ بِرَدِّهِنَّ ...

Their husbands are better entitled to restore them.(2:228)

فَإِذَا بَلَغْنَ أَجَلَهُنَّ فَأَمْسِكُوهُنَّ بِمَعْرُوفٍ أَوْ فَارِقُوهُنَّ بِمَعْرُوفٍ ...

So when they have reached their prescribed term, retain them honourably or separate from them honourably....(65:2)

The schools concur that it is necessary that the divorcée being restored be in the 'iddah of a revocable divorce. Thus there is no *raj'ah* for: an irrevocable divorcée of an unconsummated marriage, because there is no 'iddah for her; for a triple divorcée, because she requires a *muḥallil*; and for the divorcée of *khul'* against a consideration, because the marital bond between the two has been dissolved.

There is consensus among the schools that the return is effected by oral word, and they consider it necessary that the pronouncement be complete and unconditional. Thus if the *raj'ah* is made contingent upon something (such as when he says: "I return to you if you so

desire”), it will not be valid.¹⁴ Accordingly, if neither an act nor a satisfactory declaration proving *raj'ah* takes place on his part after the unsatisfactory pronouncement and the period of *'iddah* expires eventually, the divorcée will become a stranger for him.

The schools differ regarding the possibility of *raj'ah* being effected by an act, such as sexual intercourse or its preliminaries, without any pronouncement preceding it. The Shāfi'is observe: It is necessary that *raj'ah* be either by spoken word or in writing. Thus it is not valid by intercourse even if he intends *raj'ah* through it, and such intercourse with her during *'iddah* is *ḥarām*, making him liable to *mahr al-mithl* because it is an 'intercourse by mistake'.

The Mālikis state: *Raj'ah* is valid by an act if it is with the intention of *raj'ah*. Thus, if he has intercourse without this intention, the divorcée will not return to him. But such intercourse does not make him liable to any penal consequences nor *mahr*, and if she becomes pregnant consequently, the child will be attributed to him; and if she does not become pregnant, she will release herself after a single menstrual course.

The Ḥanbalis are of the opinion that *raj'ah* is valid by an act only if he has intercourse. Thus, when he has intercourse, she will be considered restored even if he does not intend it. Any act apart from intercourse, such as caressing and kissing, etc., does not result in *raj'ah*.

According to the Ḥanafīs, *raj'ah* is effected by intercourse, as well as caressing, kissing, etc., by the divorcer and the divorcée, provided it is with a sexual intent. Also, *raj'ah* by an act of one in sleep, or by an act performed absent-mindedly or under coercion, or in a state of insanity (as when the husband divorces his wife, turns insane, and has intercourse with her before the termination of her *'iddah*) is valid. (*Majma' al-'anhur, bāb al-raj'ah*)

The Imāmiyyah state: *Raj'ah* is effected through intercourse, kissing and caressing, with and without a sexual intent, as well as by any other act which is not permissible except between a married couple. It is not necessary that *raj'ah* be preceded by an oral pronouncement, because the divorcée is a wife as long as she is observing *'iddah*, and all it requires is an intention of *raj'ah*. The author of *al-Jawāhir* goes a step further, observing: "Perhaps the unconditional nature of the canonical texts (*al-naṣṣ*) and the *fatwās* requires that *raj'ah* take place by an act even if he does not intend to restore her by it." Sayyid Abū al-Ḥasan writes in *al-Wasīlah*: "It is highly probable that it (the act) be considered *raj'ah* even if the intent is absent."

The Imāmiyyah attach no significance to an act of a person in sleep or something done absent-mindedly, or under a false impression (such as his having intercourse under the impression that she is not his divorcée).

Raj'ah and Witnesses:

The Imāmī, the Ḥanafī and the Mālikī schools state: *Raj'ah* does not require witnessing, though it is desirable (*mustahabb*). A tradition narrated from Aḥmad conveys the same, and so does the more reliable opinion of al-Shāfi'ī. Accordingly, it is possible to claim a consensus of all the schools regarding the non-necessity of witnesses in *raj'ah*.

Raj'ah of an Irrevocable Divorcée:

The restoration of an irrevocable divorcée during *'iddah* is possible only in the case of a divorcée who has been granted *khul'* in return for a consideration, provided that the marriage has been consummated and the divorce is not one which completes three divorces. The four schools concur that the law applicable here is the one which applies to a stranger and requires a new marriage contract, along with *mahr*, her consent and the permission of the guardian (if necessary), with the exception that she is not required to complete the *'iddah*. (*Bidāyat al-mujtahid*, vol.2)

The Imāmiyyah observe: A divorcée of *khul'* is entitled to reclaim what she has paid as a consideration as long as she is in *'iddah*, provided the husband is aware of her reclaiming the consideration and has not married her sister or a fourth wife. Thus, when he is aware of it and there is no impediment, he is entitled to recant the divorce. By his recanting she becomes his lawful wife and there is no need for a new contract or *mahr*. If he becomes aware of her reclaiming the consideration but does not recant the divorce, the divorce which was irrevocable becomes revocable and all the rules applicable to it and its consequences will follow, and the divorcer will be compelled to restore what the divorcée had given him for divorcing her.

Disagreement During the 'Iddah:

If there is a disagreement between the divorcer and a revocable divorcée, such as when he claims: "I have returned to her", and she denies it, the divorcer will be considered to have made the return if it takes place during the *'iddah*, and similarly if he denies having divorced her at all, because his saying this guarantees his connection with the wife.

The burden of proof rests on the divorcer to prove *raj'ah* if the two differ regarding it after the expiry of the *'iddah*. On his failing to do so, she will take an oath that he has not returned to her, if he claims having returned to her by an act (such as sexual intercourse, etc.). If the divorcer claims *raj'ah* by oral word and not by an act, she will take an

oath that she knows nothing about it. According to Abū Ḥanīfah, her word will be accepted without an oath. (Ibn 'Abidin)

If they differ regarding the expiry of *'iddah*, such as when she claims its expiry by menstruation in a period sufficient for creating the possibility of her claim being veracious, her word will be accepted, as per consensus, though the Imāmi, the Shāfi'i and the Ḥanbalī schools also require her to take an oath. The author of *al-Mughnī* (vol.7, *bāb al-raj'ah*) has narrated from al-Shāfi'i and al-Khiraqī: "In all cases where we said that her word will be accepted, she will have to take an oath if the husband denies her claim."

If she claims the expiry of *'iddah* by the completion of three months, the author of *al-Mughnī*, a Ḥanbalī, and the author of *al-Sharā'i*, an Imāmi, observe: The husband's word will be accepted. Both argue that the difference is in reality regarding the time of divorce and not the *'iddah*, and divorce being his act, his word will be accepted.

But the author of *al-Jawāhir* observes that the acceptance of the divorcer's word is in accordance with the principle of presumption regarding the continuation of *'iddah* (unless the opposite is proved) and the presumption that any new situation is a latter development; but it contradicts the literal import of the canonical texts and the prevalent opinion among the legists, which place the affair of *'iddah* in the woman's hand. He further adds: The sole possibility of her veracity in a matter concerning *'iddah* is sufficient for its acceptance. This preference in accepting her word is in accordance with the tradition:

فَوَضَّ اللَّهُ إِلَى النِّسَاءِ ثَلَاثَةَ أَشْيَاءٍ: الْحَيْضَ وَالطُّهْرَ وَالْحَمْلَ.

God has placed three things in the lands of women: menstruation, purity, and pregnancy.

In another tradition, menstruation and *'iddah* are mentioned instead of the above three.

The Acceptance of a Claim Without Proof:

We have referred above to the acceptance of the woman's word in matters concerning *'iddah*. Here it is appropriate to explain an important rule of the Shari'ah closely related to our present discussion that has often been referred to in the works of the legists, especially those of the Imāmi and the Ḥanafī schools. However, these legists have discussed it as a side issue, in the context of other related issues. I have not come across in the sources I know of anyone who has written a separate section on this problem except my brother, the late al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Karim Maghniyyah,¹⁵ in his work *Kitāb al-qadā'*.

It is a known fact that both in the ancient and modern systems of law the burden of proof lies on the claimant and the negator is burdened with an oath. The rule under discussion is just the opposite of it. According to it, it is binding to accept the claimant's word where it concerns his intention and cannot be known except from him, and which cannot possibly be witnessed. Examples of it abound in law, both in matters related to rituals (*'ibādāt*) and transactions (*mu'āmalāt*). Some of them are the following:

1. If something is entrusted to a person and he claims having returned it, or claims its destruction without any negligence or misuse on his part, his word will be accepted on oath despite his being the claimant.

2. When a marriage contract is concluded between two minors by an officious third party, if one of them, on maturing, agrees and gives his/her consent to the contract and then dies before the other's majority, a part of his/her estate, equal to the minor's share will be set apart, and on his/her majority and agreement to the contract, he/she would also be required to take an oath that his/her consent is not motivated by greed for the legacy. On his/her taking the oath, he/she will take his/her share of the deceased's estate. This is so because the intention of a person can be known only from him.

3. If a person pronounces the divorce of his wife and then claims that he did not intend it, his claim will be accepted as long as she is undergoing *'iddah*.

4. The claim of a person to have paid *zakāt* or *khums* will be accepted.

5. The claim of a woman concerning her state of menstruation, purity, pregnancy and *'iddah* will be accepted.

6. The claim of indigence and need.

7. The claim by a woman that she is free of all impediments to marriage.

8. The claim of a youth that he has attained puberty (*iḥtilām*).

9. The husband's claim that he has had intercourse with his wife, after she claims that he is impotent and the judge grants him a year's time. Details of it were mentioned while discussing impotence (in the chapter on marriage).

10. The claim of a working partner in a *muḍārabah* partnership (where one partner contributes capital while the other contributes his skill, labour and knowhow) that he has purchased a particular commodity for himself, which the partner contributing capital denies. Here the purchaser's word is accepted because he knows his intention better. There are other such examples.

Al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Karīm has mentioned three proofs in his *Kitāb al-qadā'*:

The first proof is confirmed consensus, both in theory and practice.

I have seen legists invoking this principle in all instances of its application, issuing *fatwās* on its basis in different branches of law, considering it as one of the most incontrovertible of principles. All this points towards a definite proof and a consensus regarding its being a general premise referred to in instances of doubt. The legists invoke this principle as a cause while accepting the word of an insolvent person, because if his word is not accepted, it will result in a sentence of perpetual imprisonment due to his inability to prove it.

The second proof is that which has been explicitly reported in some traditions. A certain narrator says, "I asked al-'Imām al-Riḍā (A), '(What is to be done) if a man marries a woman and then a doubt arises in his mind that she has a husband?' The Imam (A) replied, 'He is not required to do anything; don't you see that if he asks her for a proof, she will not be able to find anyone who can bear witness that she has no husband?'"

Thus, the impossibility of producing witnesses is common to all these instances where another person's testimony is not possible due to the act being a private fact between the person and his Lord, which cannot be known except from the person himself. This is in addition to what has been narrated in the tradition regarding the acceptability of women's claim concerning menses, purity, *'iddah* and pregnancy.

The third proof is that in the event of not accepting the claimant's word in matters that cannot be known except from him, the dispute would of necessity remain unresolved and there would be no means in the Shari'ah for deciding disputes, and this is contradictory to the basic principle that says that there is a solution for everything in the Shari'ah. Therefore, in such circumstances the claimant's claim will be accepted after his taking an oath, because apart from this there is no other way to settle the dispute.

As to the need for an oath, it is in line with the consensus that in every claim in which the claimant's word is given precedence, he is bound to take an oath, because disputes are solved either by evidence or oath, and when it is not possible to produce a proof, the claimant's oath is the only alternative. Here it is not possible to burden the negator with an oath, because among the requirements of an oath is certain knowledge of the fact for which the oath is being taken, and there is no way a negator can have knowledge of the claimant's intention. It is necessary to point out that the need to make such a claimant take an oath arises in the case of a dispute that cannot be settled except by his oath. But if there is no such dispute, his word will be accepted without an oath (e.g. his claim of having paid *zakāt* and *khums*, or his claim of their not being *wājib* upon him because he does not fulfil the conditions for their incidence).

Also necessary for accepting the claim of such a claimant is the

absence of circumstantial evidence refuting the veracity of his claim. Thus if an act of his proves his intention — such as when he buys or sells and then claims that it was unintentional — it would result in his proving his own falsity because the apparent circumstances establish his intention. As to the acceptance of a claimant that he did not intend divorce, it is limited, as mentioned earlier, to a revocable divorce as long as the divorcée is undergoing *'iddah*, and this claim of his is considered his reclaiming her. Hence his word will not be given credence and his claim will not be heard if the divorce is irrevocable or if he makes the claim after the completion of *'iddah*.

Court Divorce (Ṭalāq al-Qāḍī):

Is a judge entitled to divorce someone's wife against his will? Abū Ḥanīfah says: A judge is not entitled to divorce someone's wife, whatever the cause, except when the husband is *majbūb*, *khaṣī* or *'anīn*,¹⁶ as mentioned earlier in the section on defects. Thus failure to provide maintenance, intermittent absence, life imprisonment, etc. do not validate a woman's divorce without the husband's consent, because divorce is the husband's prerogative.

Mālik, al-Shāfi'ī and Ibn Ḥanbal allow a woman to demand separation before a judge on certain grounds, of which some are the following:

1. Non-provision of maintenance: These three legists concur that when the incapability of a husband to provide essential maintenance is proved, it is valid for his wife to demand separation. But if his inability is not proved and he refuses to provide maintenance, al-Shāfi'ī observes: The two may not be separated; Mālik and Aḥmad remark: Separation may take place, because the failure to provide her maintenance is similar to insolvency. The law in Egypt explicitly validates the right to claim separation on the failure to provide maintenance.

2. Causing harm to the wife with word or deed: Abū Zuhrah, in *al-'Aḥwāl al-shakhṣiyyah* (page 358), says: It is stated in Egyptian law, Act 25 of 1929, that if a wife pleads harm being caused to her by the husband, so that the like of her cannot continue living with him, the judge will divorce her irrevocably on her proving her claim and after the judge's failing to reform the husband. If the wife fails to prove her claim but repeats her complaint, the judge will appoint two just arbitrators related to the couple to find out the reasons for the dispute and to make an effort to resolve it. On their failing to do so, they will identify the party at fault, and if it is the husband or both of them, they will cause their separation through an irrevocable divorce on the judge's order. This law is based on the opinion of Mālik and Aḥmad.

The Sunni Shari'ah courts in Lebanon rule separation if a dispute

arises between them and two arbitrators specify the necessity of separation.

3. On harm being caused to a wife by the husband's absence, according to Mālik and Aḥmad, even if he leaves behind what she requires as maintenance for the period of his absence. The minimum period after which a wife can claim separation is six months according to Aḥmad, and three years according to Mālik, though a period of one year has also been narrated from the latter. The Egyptian law specifies a year. Whatever the case, she will not be divorced unless he refuses both to come to her or to take her to the place of his residence. Moreover, Mālik does not differentiate between a husband having an excuse for his absence and one who has none with regard to the application of this rule. Thus both the situations necessitate separation. But the Ḥanbalīs state: Separation is not valid unless his absence is without an excuse. (*al-'Aḥwāl al-shakhṣiyyah* of Abū Zuhrah, and *Farq al-zawāj* of al-Khafif)

4. On harm being caused to a wife as a result of the husband's imprisonment. Ibn Taymiyyah, a Ḥanbalī, has explicitly mentioned it and it has also been incorporated in Egyptian law that if a person is imprisoned for a period of three years or more, his wife is entitled to demand separation pleading damage after a year of his imprisonment, and the judge will order her divorce.

Most Imāmiyyah legists do not empower the judge to affect a divorce, regardless of the circumstances, except in the case of the wife of a missing husband, after the fulfilment of the conditions mentioned earlier. This stand of the Imāmiyyah is in consonance with the literal meaning of the tradition *الطَّلَاقُ بِيَدِ مَنْ أَخَذَ بِالسَّوْقِ*.

But a group of grand legal authorities (*al-marāji' al-kibār*) have permitted divorce by a judge, with a difference of opinion regarding its conditions and limitations. We cite their observations here.

Al-Sayyid Kāzim al-Yazdī, in the appendices to *al-'Urwah (bāb al-'iddah)*, has said: The validity of a wife's divorce by a judge is not remote if it comes to his knowledge that the husband is imprisoned in a place from where he will never return, and similarly where the husband though present is indigent and incapable of providing maintenance, along with the wife's refusal to bear it patiently.

Al-Sayyid Abū al-Ḥasan al-'Iṣfahānī, in the *bāb al-zawāj* of *al-Wasīlah* (under the caption, *al-qawl fī al-kufr*), writes: If a husband refuses to provide maintenance while possessing the means to do so and the wife raises the issue before a judge, the judge will order him to provide her maintenance or to divorce her. On his refusing to do either, and it not being possible to maintain her from his wealth or to compel him to divorce, the obvious thing which comes to the mind is that the judge will divorce her, if she so desires. Al-Sayyid Muḥsin al-Ḥakīm has

given a similar *fatwā* in *minhāj al-ṣāliḥīn (bāb al-nafaqāt)*.

The author of *al-Mukhtalif* has narrated from Ibn Junayd that the wife has the option to dissolve marriage on the husband's inability to provide maintenance. The author of *al-Masālik*, while discussing the divorce of a missing person's wife, observes: As per an opinion, the wife is entitled to break off marriage on the basis of non-provision of maintenance due to pennilessness. The author of *Rawḍāt al-jannāt (vol.4)*, in the biographical account of Ibn Āqā Muḥammad Bāqir al-Behbahānī, one of the great scholars, says: He wrote a treatise (*risālah*) on the rules of marriage concerning indigence, entitled *Muḥhir al-mukhtār*. In it, he has upheld the validity of wife's annulling marriage in event of husband's refusing, despite his presence, to maintain or divorce her, even if his refusal is a result of poverty and indigence.

The Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt (A) are on record as having said: "If a husband fails to provide his wife clothes to cover her body (*'awrah*) and food to fill her stomach, the *imām* is entitled to separate them." This, along with other reliable traditions, especially the tradition: *الطَّلَاقُ لِمَنْ أَخَذَ بِالسَّاقِ*, bestows upon the Imāmi legist the authority to grant divorce on the fulfilment of the requisite conditions and no one may object to him for it as long as his act is in accordance with the principles of Islam and those of the legal schools.

There is no doubt that the scholars who have refrained from granting divorces have done so on account of caution and the fear lest this power should be misused by persons devoid of the necessary learning and commitment to the faith, resulting in divorces being granted without the fulfilment of the conditions of the Shari'ah. This is the sole reason which has caused me to refrain despite the knowledge that if I do so I would be justified before God. I consider that a sensible solution to this problem and one which would prevent every unfit person from exercising this authority is the appointment by the *marāji'* of reliable representatives in Iraq or Iran bound by certain conditions and limitations within which they may affect a divorce — as was done by al-Sayyid Abū al-Ḥasan al-'Iṣfahānī.

Al-Zihār:

'*Zihār*' means a husband telling his wife: "You are to me like the back of my mother". The schools concur that if a husband utters these words to his wife, it is not permissible for him to have sex with her unless he atones by freeing a slave. If he is unable to do so, he should fast for two successive months. If even this is not possible, he is required to feed sixty poor persons.

The schools also concur in considering a husband who has intercourse before the atonement a sinner, and the Imāmiyyah also require

him to make a double atonement.

The Imāmiyyah consider *zihār* valid if it takes place before two just male witnesses hearing the husband's pronouncement to the wife in a period of purity in which she has not been copulated with, exactly as in the case of divorce. Similarly, researchers among them also require her marriage to have been consummated, otherwise *zihār* will not take place.

The reason for opening a separate chapter for *zihār* in Islamic law are the opening verses of the *Sūrat al-Mujādilah*. The exegetes describe that Aws ibn Ṣāmit, one of the Prophet's (S) Companions, had a wife with a shapely body. Once he saw her prostrating in prayer. When she had finished, he desired her. She declined. On this he became angry and said: "You are to me like the back of my mother". Later he repented having said so. *Zihār* was a form of divorce amongst the pagan Arabs, and so he said to her: "I presume that you have become *ḥarām* for me. She replied: "Don't say so, but go to the Prophet (S) and ask him". He told her that he felt ashamed to question the Prophet (S) about such a matter. She asked him to permit her to question the Prophet (S), which he did. When she went to the Prophet (S), 'Ā'ishah was washing his (S) head. She said: "O Apostle of God! My husband Aws married me when I was a young girl with wealth and had a family. Now, when he has eaten up my wealth and destroyed my youth, and when my family has scattered and I have become old, he has pronounced *zihār*, repenting subsequently. Is there a way for our coming together, by which you could restore our relationship?"

The Prophet (S) replied, "I see that you have become *ḥarām* for him." She said, "O Prophet of God! By Him Who has given you the Book, my husband did not divorce me. He is the father of my child and the most beloved of all people to me." The Prophet (S) replied, "I have not been commanded regarding your affair". The woman kept coming back to the Prophet (S) and once when the Prophet (S) turned her back she cried out and said: "I complain to God regarding my indigence, my need and my plight! O God, send upon Thy Prophet (S) that which would end my suffering". She then returned to the Prophet (S) and implored his mercy saying, "May I be your ransom, O Prophet of God, look into my affair." 'Ā'ishah then said to her: "Curtail your speech and your quarrel. Don't you see the face of the Apostle of God?" Whenever the Prophet (S) received revelation a form of trance would overtake him.

The Prophet (S) then turned towards her and said: "Call your husband." When he came, the Prophet (S) recited to him the verses:

قَدْ سَمِعَ اللَّهُ قَوْلَ الَّتِي تُجَادِلُكَ فِي زَوْجِهَا وَتَشْتَكِي إِلَى اللَّهِ وَاللَّهُ يَسْمَعُ تَحَاوُرَكُمَا إِنَّ اللَّهَ سَمِيعٌ

بَصِيرٌ ﴿١﴾ الَّذِينَ يُظَاهِرُونَ مِنْكُمْ مِنْ نِسَائِهِمْ مَا هُنَّ أُمَّهَاتُهُمْ إِنْ أُمَّهُتُهُمْ إِلَّا اللَّاتِي وَلَدْنَهُمْ وَإِنَّهُمْ لَيَقُولُونَ مُنْكَرًا مِنَ الْقَوْلِ وَزُورًا وَإِنَّ اللَّهَ لَعَفُورٌ غَفُورٌ ﴿٢﴾ وَالَّذِينَ يُظَاهِرُونَ مِنْ نِسَائِهِمْ ثُمَّ يَعُودُونَ لِمَا قَالُوا فَتَحْرِيرُ رَقَبَةٍ مِنْ قَبْلِ أَنْ يَتَمَاسَّا ذَلِكَ تَوْعُظُونَ بِهِ وَاللَّهُ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ خَبِيرٌ ﴿٣﴾ فَمَنْ لَمْ يَجِدْ فَصِيَامُ شَهْرَيْنِ مُتَتَابِعَيْنِ مِنْ قَبْلِ أَنْ يَتَمَاسَّا فَمَنْ لَمْ يَسْتَطِعْ فَأَطْعَامُ سِتِّينَ مِسْكِينًا ذَلِكَ لِتُؤْمِنُوا بِاللَّهِ وَرَسُولِهِ وَتِلْكَ حُدُودُ اللَّهِ وَلِلْكَافِرِينَ عَذَابٌ أَلِيمٌ ﴿٤﴾

God has heard the speech of her who disputes with you concerning her husband and complains to God. And God hears your colloquy. Surely God is the Hearer, the Seer. Those among you who pronounce *zihār* to their wives, they (the wives) are not their mothers. Their mothers are only those who gave them birth; and they indeed utter an ill word and a lie, and indeed God is Pardoning, Forgiving. And those who pronounce *zihār* to their wives and then recant their words, should free a slave before they touch each other. Unto this you are exhorted; and God is aware of your actions. And he who does not possess the means, should fast for two successive months before they touch each other. And he who is unable to do so, should feed sixty needy ones. This, that you may put trust in God and His Apostle. These are the limits set by God; and for unbelievers is a painful chastisement. (58:1-4)

After reciting these verses the Prophet (S) said to the husband: "Can you afford to free a slave?" The husband replied: "That will take up all my means." The Prophet (S) then asked him, "Are you capable of fasting for two successive months?" He replied: "By God, if I do not eat three times a day my eyesight becomes dim and I fear that my eyes may go blind." Then the Prophet (S) asked him, "Can you afford to feed sixty needy persons?" He replied: "Only if you aid me, O Apostle of God." The Prophet (S) said, "Surely I will aid you with fifteen *Ṣā'* (a cubic measure) and pray for blessings upon you." Aws, taking what the Prophet (S) had ordered for him, fed the needy and ate along with them and thus his affair with his wife was settled.

Al-'Īlā':

Īlā' is an oath taken by a husband in God's name to refrain from having sex with his wife. The Quranic basis of this concept is verse 226 of the *Sūrat al-Baqarah*:

لِلَّذِينَ يُؤْلُونَ مِنْ نِسَائِهِمْ تَرَبُّصُ أَرْبَعَةِ أَشْهُرٍ فَإِنْ فَاءُوا فَإِنَّ اللَّهَ غَفُورٌ رَحِيمٌ ﴿٢٢٦﴾ وَإِنْ عَزَمُوا الطَّلَاقَ فَإِنَّ اللَّهَ سَمِيعٌ عَلِيمٌ ﴿٢٢٧﴾

Those who forswear their wives (by pronouncing *ilā'*) must wait for four months; then if they change their mind, lo! God is Forgiving, Merciful. And if they decide upon divorce, then God is surely Hearing, Knowing. (2:226-227)

The Imāmiyyah require that marriage should have been consummated in order for *ilā'* to be valid, otherwise *ilā'* will not take place.

The schools concur that *ilā'* takes place where the husband swears not to have sex with his wife for the rest of her life or for a period exceeding four months.¹⁷ The schools differ if the period is four months; the Ḥanafīs assert that it takes place and the other schools maintain that it doesn't.

There is consensus that if the husband has sex within four months, he must atone (for breaking his oath), but the hindrance to the continuation of marital relations will be removed. The schools differ where four months pass without sex. The Ḥanafīs observe: She will divorce herself irrevocably without raising the issue before the judge, or the husband will divorce her. (*Bidāyat al-mujtahid*)

The Māliki, the Shāfi'ī and the Ḥanbalī schools state: If more than four months pass without his having sex, the wife will raise the issue before the judge so that he may order the husband to resume sexual relations. If the husband declines, the judge will order him to divorce her. If the husband declines again, the judge will pronounce her divorce, and in all situations the divorce will be revocable. (*Farq al-zawāj* of al-Khafif)

The Imāmiyyah state: If more than four months pass without sex, and the wife is patient and willing, it is up to her and no one is entitled to object. But if she loses patience, she may raise the issue before the judge, who, on the completion of four months,¹⁸ will compel the husband to resume conjugal relations, or to divorce her. If he refrains from doing either, the judge will press him and imprison him until he agrees to do either of the two things, and the judge is not entitled to pronounce divorce forcibly on behalf of the husband.

All the schools concur that the atonement for an oath is that the person taking the oath should perform one of these alternatives: feed ten needy persons, provide clothing to ten needy persons, free a slave. If he has no means for performing any of these, he should fast for three days.

Furthermore, according to the Imāmiyyah, only those oaths which are sworn in the name of the sacred Essence of God will be binding. The oath of a child and a wife is not binding if the father and the husband prohibit it, except when the oath is taken for performing a *wājib* or for refraining from a *ḥarām*. Similarly, an oath will not be binding upon anyone if it is taken to perform an act refraining from which is better than performing it, or is taken to refrain from an act whose performance is better than refraining from it, except, of course, the oath of *ilā'*, which is binding despite the fact that it is better to refrain from it.

Concluded — *wa al-ḥamdu lillāh*

NOTES:

8. The Imāmiyyah state: When the husband, a born Muslim, apostatizes, his wife will observe the 'iddah of widowhood, and if he apostatizes by returning to his former faith, she will observe a divorcée's 'iddah.

9. As mentioned earlier, the Imāmiyyah do not consider 'iddah wājib for a menopausal woman. But they say: If he divorces her, and she menstruates once before reaching menopause, she will complete her 'iddah after two more months. The four Sunnī schools observe: She will start observing 'iddah anew, for three months, and her menstruation will not be included in the 'iddah.

10. The authors of *al-Jawāhir* and *al-Masālik* have mentioned the prevalent opinion (*mashhūr*) in this regard, acting in accordance with the tradition narrated by Sawdah ibn Kulayb. Both have discussed this issue at length and narrated other views which are not *mashhūr* and which most Imāmiyyah legists have deliberately ignored.

11. The following observation has been made in *al-Jawāhir*, (vol.5, *bāb al-'idad*). The 'iddah of a non-Muslim woman is exactly like that of a free Muslim woman in regard to both divorce and death. I have not come across any difference of opinion because of the generality of the proofs and an explicit tradition from al-'Imām al-Ṣādiq (A) from al-Sarrāj, who asked him (A): "What is the 'iddah of a Christian woman whose husband, a Christian, has died." He replied: "Her 'iddah is four months and ten days."

12. This is when she does not raise the issue before a judge. But if she suffers as a result of his absence and files a complaint in court demanding separation, both Aḥmad and Mālik allow her to be divorced in such a situation. Details follow under the section on divorce by a judge.

13. See *al-Jawāhir*, appendices to *al-'Urwah* of al-Sayyid Kāzim, *al-Wasīlah* of al-Sayyid Abū al-Ḥasan, and other books on Imāmiyyah fiqh. But the greater part of our discussion is based on *al-Wasīlah*, because it is both comprehensive and lucid.

14. The authors of *al-Jawāhir* and *al-Masālik* state that the *mashhūr* opinion among the Imāmiyyah legists is that a conditional *raj'ah* is not valid. The author of *al-Masālik* (vol.2, *bāb al-ṭalāq*) says: The more *mashhūr* opinion is that *raj'ah* will not take place, and even those who consider contingent divorce valid hold this opinion by placing *raj'ah* alongside *nikāḥ*.

15. He died in 1936 and left behind many compilations, all of them related to law and jurisprudence, and none of which have appeared in print. Among them is a good and useful treatise on '*adālah*. The best of these works is a big book on *qaḍā'* and there exists only a single copy of this work written in his own hand. It is a unique work and no other book like it has been compiled on this issue. My first reliance in writing this section has been on that book, then on *al-Jawāhir* and the appendices of *al-'Urwah*.

16. For the meanings of these terms, see "Marriage According to Five Schools of Islamic Fiqh," Part 2, under "*al-'Uyūb* (defects)", *al-Tawḥīd*, vol. IV, No.4, pp. 39 — 41.

17. The secret of stipulating this period is that a wife has a right to sex at least once every four months. It has been said that the difference goes back to the interpretation of the verse *لَلَّذِينَ يُؤُولُونَ*. Here, there are those who say that the verse has not stipulated any period for *ilā'*, and others who consider it necessary that four months pass before the judge may warn the husband either to restore conjugal ties or to divorce her, and this obviously requires a period of more than four months, even though by a moment.

18. Most Imāmiyyah legists state: The judge will allow the husband four months time from the day the matter was brought to his notice, and not from the day of the oath.

Non-Muslims and the Law of Social Security in Islam

by Shaykh Shawkat Husayn

The laws of social security in Islam do not exist in codified form. But they consist of the injunctions of the Quran, ḥadīth, precedents of the 'Righteous Caliphate' and the views of the jurists deduced from the original sources through *qiyās* and *ijtihād*. In order to examine these laws of social security with reference to non-Muslim subjects of an Islamic State, one should have recourse to these sources.

Before coming to the subject proper an appreciation of the contemporary concept of social security and its evolution is necessary. The term 'social security' denotes the programmes established by law to provide for the economic security and social welfare of the individual and his family.¹ Nowadays these programmes have assumed the shape of old-age pension, unemployment benefit, sickness benefit, death grant, disablement allowance, family allowance, etc. Some European authors try to trace the evolution of these laws to some practices of the late medieval period. But the truth is that Europe first got acquainted with the laws of social security at the end of the last century only. Before 1883, the functions that now come under social security law, were discharged by private arrangements made chiefly by co-operative movements among workers.² The practices considered to be the primitive forms of this concept have no relation to it. One of the instances referred to is the practice at some places in England where local magistracy was empowered in 1531 to licence the aged, sick and crippled persons to beg in their neighbourhood.³ Another statute referred to is that of 1536 which provided for organization of relief of those unable to work through voluntary funds.⁴ The attitude of the central government towards these local initiatives was nothing more than that of supervision and advice.⁵ The first instance of social security laws in Europe can be seen in the scheme of compulsory State insurance which was introduced by Bismark in Germany in 1883.⁶ Germany was followed by Austria and some other countries. By the beginning of this century

most of the European countries initiated promulgation of laws in this direction. In America, except the Workmans Compensation Act passed in 1908, no significant legislation was enacted until 1935 when the Social Security Act was passed by the Congress.⁷

Contrary to the European tradition, in Islam, right from the beginning, fulfilment of the basic needs of the subjects was conceived to be the concern of the State. *Zakāt* is the first institution of social security in Islam. Payment of 2½ percent of his/her savings to the *zakāt* fund is one of the fundamental duties of a Muslim. The State is responsible to collect *zakāt* and make arrangements for its distribution. Non-payment of it is tantamount to waging war against the State. The Caliph Abū Bakr subjugated by force all those who refused to pay it. Non-Muslims are also included in one of the categories of the recipients of *zakāt*.⁸ While prescribing laws for the distribution of *zakāt*, the Quran includes them among those 'whose hearts are to be conciliated'. Some jurists are of the view that this clause is inoperative after the time of the Prophet.⁹ Their views are based on a precedent of 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb who got it cancelled by Abū Bakr towards some recipients of this category.¹⁰ Some prominent scholars of the past and present are of the view that this injunction is operative even today.¹¹ It must be noted here that this share of the people belonging to this category is not on account of their inability to meet their material needs but for 'reconciliation' of their hearts. There are also some reports which suggest that the needy among the non-Muslims were also helped from the *zakāt* funds during the early days of Islam.¹² Majority of scholars hold it to be unlawful. Their opinion is based on the precept of the Prophet who directed Mu'adh to take *zakāt* from rich Muslims for distributing it among poor Muslims.

Some present day scholars also hold the view that poor and destitute among non-Muslims can be helped out of the *zakāt* funds.¹³ It is reported that 'Umar interpreted the word *masākīn* in the verse "Alms are for the poor and the needy (*masākīn*) and those employed to administer the funds...." as non-Muslims.¹⁴

Besides *zakāt*, the Quran provides for collection of *ṣadaqāt*. Although *ṣadaqah* is not an obligatory duty like *zakāt*, the Quran has given great importance for it. Emphasizing the payment of *ṣadaqah*, the Quran goes to the extent of declaring, "You will never attain piety until you spend of what you love."¹⁵ The difference between *zakāt* and *ṣadaqah* is that while the former is to be paid at a fixed rate, no such rate has been prescribed for the latter. In the words of al-Sayyid Quṭub, "The rich are obliged to contribute as much as is sufficient to meet the necessities of the needy.... There is no restriction or condition except that it should be sufficient for their needs".¹⁶ The guidance of the Quran to the believers as to what they should give in the way of

Allah is 'the superfluity.'¹⁷ So far as meeting the needs of non-Muslims from the funds of *ṣadaqah* is concerned, most of the scholars' view is positive. Elaborating the position of the Ḥanafīs, *al-Hidāyah* states, "Our doctors base their opinion regarding this point on the precept of the Prophet (S) who has ordained that alms should be bestowed upon persons of every religion indiscriminately. And they also argue that had not there been the Prophet's directions to Mu'adh, bestowing of *zakāt* on *dhimmīs* would have been deemed legal".¹⁸ Collection and distribution of *ṣadaqah* along with *zakāt* are among the fundamental duties of the government.¹⁹ If the funds raised out of *zakāt* and *ṣadaqah* are insufficient to meet the needs of the poor, the State can impose other taxes to realize funds for this purpose.²⁰ While prescribing the rules of *zakāt* and *ṣadaqah*, the Quran emphasizes that the needs of those who are economically hard-pressed and unwilling to ask for help out of self-respect should be given priority.²¹ Thus it is clear that these funds are to be spent primarily to relieve people from immediate hardships without creating a class of social parasites.²²

Besides Quranic institutions of *zakāt* and *ṣadaqah*, there are several Prophetic traditions which hold the State responsible for the fulfilment of the basic needs of all its subjects. The Prophet (S) is reported to have said: "I am the guardian of a person who has no guardian".²³ Another ḥadīth declares: "The State is the guardian of a person who has no guardian".²⁴ The guardianship, mentioned in the above traditions, is of a general nature which necessarily implies the fulfilment of basic needs.²⁵ In another tradition the Prophet (S) is reported to have told: "The son of Adam has basic rights for three things — a house to live in, a piece of cloth to cover his body, a loaf of bread and water".²⁶ In the above traditions there is no reference to a particular community. By referring to 'the son of Adam' any ambiguity in defining the scope of these traditions has been removed. Thus it is obvious that the Islamic State is bound to provide for the basic necessities of its people irrespective of their religion. Examination of the extent of applying these injunctions of the Quran and Sunnah during the period of Righteous Caliphate, will further clarify the scope of their implementation. Keeping in view the topic of discussion, the injunctions and precedents related to non-Muslims only are cited here. The earliest instance of fulfilment of basic necessities of non-Muslims during this period can be seen in one of the treaties concluded by the Muslim general Khālid ibn al-Walid during the days of Abū Bakr. The treaty reads: "And I have granted the right that if an old person becomes incapable of working or is suffering from ill health or is a destitute after being rich, so much so that his co-religionists start giving him alms, then his *jizyah* will be remitted; he and his family will receive the allowance for maintenance from public treasury as long as he lives in the Islamic

State".²⁷ Explaining the legal importance of the *dhimmī* treaties, of which the above extract forms a part, Majid Khadduri says: "The *dhimmī* treaties, it will be recalled, were in the form of constitutional guarantees from the moment *dhimmī* communities ceased to be separate entities. Finally Muslim authorities tended to regard their contractual understandings as religious obligations which should be strictly observed".²⁸

Other instances of observance of social security laws can be found in the following practices of the Righteous Caliphs. Before going through the practices, it must be made clear that the nature of these practices was not that of compassion shown by some kings or rulers of the past towards some of their needy subjects. The exercise of the kings was in the nature of royal bounty rather than the realization of the rights of their subjects.²⁹ The Righteous Caliphs on the other hand considered these functions as discharging their duties and fulfilling the rights of their subjects. The legal significance of these can be gathered from the following words of an eminent jurist al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī. While answering the questions of a ruler regarding some precedents of the Pious Caliphs, he stated: "You have only to follow what your predecessors did".³⁰ Other Muslim jurists have also referred to these as the basis of their argument while giving their opinions. The *Kitāb al-kharāj* of Imām Abū Yūsuf is replete with such references.

The Caliph 'Umar, on seeing an old Jew begging, brought him to his house. He gave him some cash and ordered the treasury officer that such people who could not earn their living should be granted stipends from the public treasury.³¹ Once, seeing some non-Muslim lepers on his way back from a journey, he issued orders that they should be provided maintenance from the State funds.³² In a letter addressed to 'Adī ibn Arṭah, 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz wrote: "Be kind towards *dhimmīs*. If you find some of them old or helpless, give maintenance to them".³³

The above-mentioned instances bear clear evidence as to how Islamic Shari'ah assures the basic material needs of the non-Muslim subjects of an Islamic State. The legal guarantees of the material requirements of the citizens, with which the West became acquainted only in the beginning of this century, were given by Islamic Shari'ah fourteen hundred years ago. This attitude towards religious minorities is of great importance in view of the fact that such minorities are deprived of even basic human rights in the so-called welfare states of the twentieth century.

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Imām Khumaynī's Letter to President Gorbachev

In the Name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Your Excellency Mr. Gorbachev, Chairman of the Presidium of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

I offer my best wishes for the happiness of Your Excellency and the Soviet people. Since your assumption of responsibility, it has been felt that Your Excellency, in analyzing world political events particularly the issues pertaining to the Soviet Union, have found yourself in a new era of reassessment, transition and encounter. Furthermore, since your pluck and audacity in dealing with the world realities is quite likely to disrupt the dominant balance of interests across the world, I have found it necessary to draw your kind attention to the following points.

Although it is quite likely that your new attitudes and decisions will be confined to the resolution of Party problems as well as some of the problems confronting the Soviet people, yet your courage in reviewing a school of thought that has, for many many years, imprisoned the world's revolutionary youth within its iron fences, is praiseworthy. But if you are thinking beyond these boundaries, the first issue that will undoubtedly help you achieve success is to review the policies adopted by your predecessors of promoting atheism and irreligion, which have doubtless dealt the most devastating blow to the Soviet people. Rest assured that this is the only formula whereby you can tackle world issues realistically.

It is possible that the improper policies and practices of the former communist leaders concerning the Soviet economy, have helped the Western world seem more appealing. However, the reality lies somewhere else. If you wish to put an end to the economic woes of socialism and communism by simply resorting to the core of Western capitalism,

you will not only not ease the pains prevalent in the Soviet society, but others must come after you to offset the mistakes you will have committed. Because if Marxism has met with a stalemate in its economic and social aspects, the West, too, has become embroiled in similar problems, only of a different description, as well as some other problems.

Your Excellency Mr. Gorbachev, we should submit ourselves to the truth. The principal problem of your country does not originate from the issues of ownership, or economy, or freedom; your problem, in effect, emanates from lack of a real belief in God, the same problem that has dragged the West into decadence and deadlock. Your main problem stems from the persistent, and futile, struggle against God, Who is the actual root of being and creation.

Your Excellency Mr. Gorbachev, it is crystal clear to all and sundry that from now on one should look for communism in the museums of the world's political history, since Marxism cannot meet any of the real needs of human beings. It is a materialistic school of thought, and by dint of materialism one cannot save humanity from the crisis of a lack of belief in spirituality, which in turn is the acutest pain pervasive in human societies, both eastern and western.

Your Excellency Mr. Gorbachev, it is likely that on some aspects you have not ostensibly turned your back on Marxism, and even in the future you may voice your heartfelt belief in Marxism in public interviews. However, you yourself are well aware that in reality things are different.

The Chinese leader inflicted the first blow on communism, but you dealt the second, and apparently the last blow to it. Today we observe a communism of sorts across the world.

I, however, sincerely call on you not to get trapped in the prison of the West and the Arch-Satan while pulling down the iron curtains of Marxist idealism. I hope you will have the privilege of wiping off the last residues of the 70 years of the perversity of world communism from the chapters of history and your fatherland.

Today, even governments normally considered as your allies, who are eager to secure the interests of their peoples and motherland, will never be able to convince themselves to squander the resources of their countries to prove the validity of communism, the sound of whose crumbling bones has already been heard by its adherents.

Your Excellency Mr. Gorbachev, when after 70 years the call of "*Allāhu akbar*" and testimony for the prophetic mission of the Seal of Prophets (S) was heard from the minarets of mosques in some of the Soviet Republics, it moved all the followers of the genuine Islam of Muḥammad (S) to tears. Therefore, I deemed it necessary to mention this point to you so that you can once more reconsider both material and divine world views.

Materialists regard sense experience as the criterion of knowledge, and anything that is beyond the senses, according to them, does not lie within the domain of knowledge. They also consider existence as equivalent to material being, hence anything devoid of matter is regarded as nonexistent. Then, unavoidably, they consider the world of the unseen, such as the existence of God Almighty, Divine revelation, prophethood and Resurrection as outright legends.

The basis of knowledge in the Divine world view is composed of sense experience as well as reason, and anything which is intelligible falls within the domain of knowledge though it should be insensible. Hence, being includes both the seen and the unseen, and that which is immaterial can exist. In the same way as the knowledge of material things depends on the non-material, empirical knowledge rests on rational knowledge.

The Glorious Qur'ān finds fault with the fundamentals of the materialist world view and the argument of those who believe that God does not exist, otherwise He would be seen (as the Children of Israel said to Moses, "We will not believe you until we see God plainly" [2:55], and God says, "Vision perceives Him not and He perceives all vision" [6:103]). Setting aside the Qur'ānic arguments in the favour of revelation, prophethood and Resurrection — for I do not intend to enmesh you in the complexities of philosophical problems, especially those of Islamic philosophy — I will mention only two simple examples from human nature that can be beneficial even for politicians.

It is evident that regardless of whatever matter or physical bodies are, they are devoid of self-consciousness. It is characteristic of matter and physical bodies that they are unconscious and unaware of everything, whereas we observe clearly that man and living things are aware of their surroundings. They are aware of that which passes around them and in their environment. Hence man and all living beings possess something which transcends matter and is different from it, which does not pass away with death.

It is also known that man by nature tends to pursue every perfection to its absolute limit. And you are well aware that the power-seeking man is desirous of becoming omnipotent in the world. Hence, he is not interested in any power which is imperfect. Even if he enjoys full command over the universe and he is told that there is another world, he naturally wishes to wield power and control over that world too.

The man seeking knowledge, however learned, if he hears about other sciences he becomes naturally keen to learn those sciences as well. Hence there should be absolute power and absolute knowledge as the attributes of a being which is the object of man's love and pursuit. That is God Almighty, towards Whom all of us strive, even though we should not know it. Man is ultimately desirous of reaching the Absolute

and getting dissolved in It. In principle, the intense interest in eternal life, which is inherent in all persons, is indicative of the immortal life and of immunity to death.

If Your Excellency would like to conduct research on such subjects, you can order scholars to consult, besides the books of Western philosophers, the writings of al-Fārābī and Bū 'Alī Sinā (Avicenna) (may God's mercy be upon them) in peripatetic philosophy, because such studies will prove that the law of causality, upon which all knowledge hinges, is based on rational knowledge and not sense experience, and the comprehension of the universals as well as general laws, upon which all argumentation is based, is also rational not sensible.

In this connection, the writings of al-Suhrawardī (upon whom be God's mercy) on the philosophy of illumination could be consulted. He masterfully elucidates the fact that matter and every material object are in real need of a pure "light" which is totally free of all sensibility, and that the intuitive conception of man's essence definitely transcends sense perception. Your Excellency can also ask the scholars to consult the celebrated work of Ṣadr al-Muta'allihīn (may Allah be pleased with him, and may Allah raise him with the prophets and the pious) in transcendental philosophy, so that it may be clarified to you that knowledge in its reality is truly divorced from matter; hence it is not restricted by the laws of matter.

I will no longer tire you with details so I won't mention the names of the books of other great thinkers, particularly Muḥy al-Dīn ibn al-'Arabī. Should Your Excellency wish to fathom the subtleties presented by this great man, do dispatch some of the highly intelligent Soviet experts who are well prepared on such issues, to Qum, so that in a few years, by the grace of Allah, they may acquire knowledge of these subtleties. Without this journey such awareness will not be possible.

Your Excellency Mr. Gorbachev: Now after mentioning these points and preliminaries, I call on you to seriously inquire about Islam, not because Islam and Muslims need your inquiry, but because it is the exalted and universal values of Islam that can give comfort and salvation to all nations and resolve the basic problems confronting humanity. A profound investigation into Islam could, for ever, rid you of the issue of Afghanistan and other problems of this type. We treat Muslims across the world as we do the Iranian Muslims, and furthermore we share common destinies. By granting relative religious freedom to some of the Soviet Republics, you practically proved that you no longer think that religion is the opiate of society. By the way, is a religion that has made Iran as adamant as a mountain against the superpowers the opiate of society?

Is a religion that is desirous of the administration of justice in the world, and of the freedom of man from material and spiritual shackles,

the opiate of society? In fact, a religion that puts the material and spiritual resources of Islamic and non-Islamic countries at the disposal of the superpowers, and other powers, and asks the people and its followers to refrain from politics is indeed the opiate of society. This is no longer the true religion; in effect, it is 'American-sponsored religion', as it has been named by the Iranians.

In conclusion, I explicitly announce that the Islamic Republic of Iran, as the greatest and strongest base of the Islamic world, can fill the doctrinal vacuum pervasive in your system. In any case, Iran, as in the past, believes in and respects our good-neighbourly and bilateral relations.

Peace and blessings be upon those who seek the truth.

Dey 11, 1367
January 1, 1989

Rūḥullāh al-Mūsawī al-Khumaynī

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Divine Justice

by Sayyid Mujtabā Mūsawī Lārī

Translated from the Persian by Dr. Hāmid Algar

1. Opinions Concerning God's Justice:

The problem of justice as one of God's attributes has had its own distinct history. Various schools of thought in Islam have held different views on the subject, interpreting it in accordance with their own distinctive principles.

Some Sunnis who follow the views of the theologian Abū al-Ḥasan al-'Ash'arī do not believe in God's justice as a matter of creed, and they deny that justice is accomplished by the divine acts.

In their view, however God treats a certain person, and whatever punishment or reward He gives him, irrespective of what he might appear to deserve, this will represent justice and absolute good, even though it might appear unjust when measured by human standards.

These Ash'arites thus distinguish God's attribute of justice from His acts and they therefore regard as just whatever can be attributed to God. If He rewards the virtuous and punishes the sinful, this is justice, but so would be the reverse; it would still be in the broad sphere of His justice.

Their claim that the very terms justice and injustice are meaningless when applied to God is no doubt intended to elevate God's most sacred essence to the position of the highest transcendence. But no thoughtful person will regard these superficial and inadequate notions as having anything to do with God's transcendence. In fact they involve a denial of order in the world, of the principle of causality both in the general order of the world and in the conduct and deeds of individual men.

The followers of al-'Ash'arī believe, moreover, that the bright lamp of the intellect is extinguished whenever it is confronted with the perceptions and problems of religion, that it is unable to benefit man or light up his path.

This claim conforms neither to the teachings of the Qur'an nor to the content of the Sunnah. The Qur'an considers disregard for the intellect to be a form of misguidance and repeatedly summons men to reflection and meditation in order to understand divine teachings and religious beliefs. Those who fail to benefit from this bright lamp within them are compared to the animals.

The Qur'an says:

﴿إِنَّ شَرَّ الدَّوَابِّ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ الضَّمُّ الْبُكْمُ الَّذِينَ لَا يُعْقِلُونَ﴾

The worst of creatures in the sight of God are those persons who are deaf and dumb and do not reflect. (3:22)

The Prophet of Islam says:

God has assigned two guides to man: one external to him, the messengers of God, and the other internal, his own power of thought.

* * *

The Mu'tazilites and the Shi'ah stand in opposition to al-'Ash'ari and his school. Out of all the attributes of God they have selected justice to be a principle of their creed. Relying on both transmitted and rational proofs, they have also refuted and rejected as incompatible with the principle of justice the doctrines of the unmediated effect of divine destiny and the predetermination of man's acts.

They believe that justice is the basis of God's acts, both in the ordering of the universe and in the establishing of laws. Just as human acts can be weighed according to the criteria of good and bad, the acts of the Creator are also subject to the same criteria. Since the logic of reason determines that justice is inherently praiseworthy and injustice inherently reprehensible, an object of worship whose characteristics include infinite intelligence and spirit will never undertake an act that reason regards as impermissible.

When we say that God is just, it means that His all-knowing and creative essence does nothing that is contrary to wisdom and benefit. The concept of wisdom, when applied to the Creator, does not mean that He chooses the best means for attaining His goals or remedying His deficiencies, for it is only man who is called on to move from deficiency toward perfection. God's concern is to make beings emerge from deficiency and impel them toward perfection and the aims inherent in their own essences. God's wisdom consists of this, that He first implants a form of His favour within each phenomenon, and then after bestowing existence upon it impels it toward the perfection of its capacities through a further exercise of His generosity.

Justice has then an extensive meaning, which naturally includes the avoidance of oppression and all foolish acts.

Al-'Imām Ja'far al-Ṣādiq — peace be upon him — says in explanation of God's justice:

Justice in the case of God means that you should not ascribe anything to God that if you were to do it would cause you to be blamed and reproached.¹

Within man, oppression and all the forms of corrupt activity in which he engages, derive without doubt from ignorance and lack of awareness or need coupled with innate lowliness; sometimes, too, they are the reflection of hatred and enmity, which leap forth from man's inner being like a spark. Numerous are those people who are disgusted with their own oppressiveness and corruption. Nonetheless, because of ignorance about the final outcome of their deeds, they continue from time to time to act with injustice and pollute themselves with all kinds of shameful, corrupt deeds.

Sometimes man feels that he needs something that he does not have the resources or ability to acquire. This is the root cause of many evils. The feeling of need, hunger and greed, the prevalence in man of a desire to harm or dominate — all these are factors leading to aggressive behaviour. Under their influence man loses the reins of self-control. He concentrates all his efforts on fulfilling his desires, and violating all ethical restrictions he starts squeezing the throats of the oppressed.

The unique essence of God, that infinite being, is free of all such tendencies and limitations, for nothing is hidden from His boundless knowledge, and it is inconceivable that He should suffer from impotence vis-a-vis anything — He, the Pre-Eternal One Whose eternal rays bestow life and sustenance on all things and Who assures their movement, variety and development.

A subtle essence that comprehends all the degrees of perfection stands in no need of anything so that its absence might induce anxiety in Him when He conceives a desire for it. His power and capacity are without any doubt unlimited and they do not fall short of anything so that He might then be led to deviate from the path of justice and transgress against someone, or take vengeance in order to quieten his heart or undertake some inappropriate and ill-suited act.

None of the motivations for unjust behaviour can be found in God, and indeed the very concepts of oppression and injustice are inapplicable to a being Whose generosity and mercy embrace all things and the sanctity of Whose essence is clearly manifest throughout creation.

The Qur'ān repeatedly negates all idea of injustice by God, considering Him in His sanctity utterly removed from all unworthy acts. It

says:

إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَظْلِمُ النَّاسَ شَيْئًا وَلَكِنَّ النَّاسَ أَنفُسَهُمْ يَظْلِمُونَ ﴿١١﴾

God never considers it permissible to act unjustly toward His servants; it is rather men who commit oppression and injustice. (10:44)

In this verse God dissociates Himself from all notion of injustice, something repugnant to men, and instead attributes it to them. In addition, how is it possible that God should call on men to establish justice and equity while at the same time staining His own hands with unrighteous deeds? The Qur'an says:

﴿ إِنَّ اللَّهَ يَأْمُرُ بِالْعَدْلِ وَالْإِحْسَانِ وَإِيتَايَ ذِي الْقُرْبَىٰ وَيَنْهَىٰ عَنِ الْفَحْشَاءِ وَالْمُنْكَرِ وَالْبَغْيِ يَعِظُكُمْ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَذَكَّرُونَ ﴿٩٠﴾ ﴾

God commands men to act with justice and virtue and enjoins upon them generosity to kinsfolk. He forbids them evil deeds and oppression. He admonishes you out of His mercy, so that you may accept His advice. (16:90)

Islam values justice so highly that if one group of Muslims wish to deviate from the path of justice and start engaging in oppression, they must be repressed, even if this involves war. This is the command of the Qur'an:

وَإِنْ طَافَ بَيْنَانِ مِنَ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ فَاصْلِحُوا بَيْنَهُمَا فَإِنْ بَغَتْ إِحْدَاهُمَا عَلَى الْأُخْرَىٰ فَقَاتِلُوا الَّتِي تَبْغِي حَقَّ تَقَىٰ إِلَىٰ أَمْرِ اللَّهِ فَإِنْ فَاءَتْ فَاصْلِحُوا بَيْنَهُمَا بِالْعَدْلِ وَأَقْسِطُوا إِنَّ اللَّهَ يُحِبُّ الْمُقْسِطِينَ ﴿٩١﴾

If two parties of believers fight with each other, make peace between them. If one of them has committed aggression against the other, then make war on the aggressor until he returns to observance of God's command. Once he has so returned, then reconcile them and make peace in utter justice. Certainly God loves the just. (49:9)

The interesting point that emerges from this verse is that the mediator is strictly instructed to make sure, when bringing about reconciliation, that the dispute is settled in accordance with justice, without showing lenience to the aggressor. It may happen, in cases where war has been started for aggressive purposes, that a mediator tries to end the dispute by insisting on leniency and the overlooking of faults, and ultimately persuades one of the parties to renounce its claim in favour of the other. This lenient approach, although legitimate in itself, may reinforce the spirit of aggressiveness existing in those who gained by starting the war. It is, in fact, conventional to satisfy the

aggressor in such cases by granting him some concession.

Although the voluntary renunciation of one's claim is a desirable act in itself, it will, under such circumstances, have an undesirable effect on the mentality of the aggressor. The aim of Islam is to uproot force and injustice from Islamic society and to assure its members that no one can gain anything by aggression and force.

* * *

If we look at the order of creation, we can see that a vast and comprehensive equilibrium prevails among all physical phenomena. This is evident in the regularity of the atoms, the haste of the electrons, the rotation of the planets, and the movements of all bodies. It is visible in the mineral and vegetable realms, in the precise relations that exist among the organs of a living being, in the balance among the inner components of the atom, in the equilibrium among the vast heavenly bodies and their finely calculated forces of attraction. All these forms of balance and equilibrium, together with the other precise laws that science is still seeking to explore, bear witness to the existence of an undeniable order in the universe, one which is confirmed by mathematical equations.

Our veracious Prophet has described this universal justice and comprehensive equilibrium — the fact that nothing is irregular or out of place — in this concise and eloquent statement: "It is equilibrium and right proportion that maintain the earth and the heavens."

The Qur'an attributes the following words to Moses — peace be upon him and our Prophet:

قَالَ رَبُّنَا الَّذِي أَعْطَى كُلَّ شَيْءٍ خَلْقَهُ ثُمَّ هَدَى ﴿٥٠﴾

Our God is the One Who endowed all things with the needful and then guided them for the continuation of their existence. (20:50)

In this short sentence, Moses expounds to the Pharaoh the manner in which the world was created together with its orderliness and beauty, which are among God's signs. His aim was to save him from his erroneous thoughts and help him perceive the existence of a just and divinely instituted order in the universe.

One of the norms ruling ineluctably over nature is therefore order and justice, and all things, by virtue of their subordination to the norms and laws of nature, are engaged in the process of evolution toward perfection that is specific to each of them. Any deviation from this universal pattern of order and the relations founded upon it would result in confusion and chaos.

Whenever some irregularity occurs in nature, phenomena themselves evince some reaction, and inward or outward factors emerge to remove the barriers to development and re-establish the order needed to continue on the path to perfection.

When the body is attacked by bacteria and other factors of illness, white blood corpuscles begin to neutralize them, in accordance with ineluctable norm. Whatever medicine may be prescribed is an external factor aiding the white blood cells in their task of neutralization and re-establishing equilibrium in the body.

Finally, it is impossible that God, Whose love is infinite and Who unstintingly grants His favours to His servants, should perform the slightest unjust or inappropriate act. This is, indeed, what the Qur'an proclaims:

اللَّهُ الَّذِي جَعَلَ لَكُمْ الْأَرْضَ قَرَارًا وَالسَّمَاءَ بِنَاءً وَصَوَّرَكُمْ فَأَحْسَنَ صُورَكُمْ
وَرَزَقَكُمْ مِنَ الطَّيِّبَاتِ ذَلِكَُمُ اللَّهُ رَبُّكُمْ ...

It is God Who has made the earth a place of abode for you, Who has raised the heavens, created you in the best of forms, and given you delicious and pleasing foods as sustenance. This is God, your Lord. (40:64)

2. An Analysis of Misfortune and Hardship:

The question of God's justice involves certain problems, such as the existence of disasters, loss and evil in the natural order, and inequalities in the social order. This question arouses, in fact, a whole storm of questions and objections in the minds of many people. The problems they face are so fundamental that what start out as doubts and hesitations ultimately become an indissoluble complex.

Such people ask how it is possible that in a world created on the basis of intelligence and wisdom so much suffering, pain and evil should prevail; that the world should be subjected constantly to the successive blows of hardship and misfortune, with loss and deficiency always in the ascendant.

Why is it that in various parts of the world terrible, overwhelming events assault mankind, resulting in untold loss and destruction?

Why is one person ugly and another beautiful, one healthy and another sick? Why are all men not created equal, and does not their inequality point to an absence of justice in the universe?

Justice in the order of things depends on its being free of oppression, discrimination and disaster, on the absence from it of all defect, sickness, and poverty; this, they say, alone would result in perfection and justice.

* * *

We must begin by admitting that our evaluation of the affairs of the universe does not permit us to penetrate the ultimate depths of phenomena; it is inadequate for the analysis of the ends and purposes of things.

Our initial understanding of unpleasant events and disasters is bound to be superficial; we are not prepared to recognize any truth lying beyond our initial impression. We cannot at the outset delineate the ultimate aims of those events, and we therefore regard them as signs of injustice. Our feelings become aroused and lead us into the most illogical analyses.

But if we reflect more profoundly we will see that this one-sided evaluation of events we label injustice comes from making our interests or those of people to whom we are directly or indirectly related our criterion and yardstick. Whatever secures our interests is good, and whatever harms us is bad. In other words, our judgement of good and bad is based on a short-sighted perception, narrow horizons of thought, and a lack of precise knowledge concerning the norms of creation.

Is our existence the only issue involved in every occurrence? Can we make our own profit and loss into the criterion of good and evil?

Our material world is constantly engaged in producing change. Events that did not exist today will occur tomorrow; some things will disappear and others will take their place.

It is obvious that what is useful and beneficial for some people today will cease to exist tomorrow. But for us who are human beings and attached to our own existence and the things of the world, the acquisition of things is good and their loss is bad. But despite man and his attachments the changing nature of the world produces constantly changing phenomena. If the world did not comprehend the possibility of change, phenomena themselves would not exist, and therefore there could also be no question of good and evil.

In such a hypothetical unchanging world there would be neither loss and deficiency nor growth and development, no contrast or differentiation, no variety or multiplicity, no compounding or motion. In a world without deficiency or loss, there would also be no human, moral or social criteria, limits, or laws. Development and change are the result of the motion and rotation of the planets; if they ceased to exist, there would be no earth, no moon and no sun, no day, no month and no year.

* * *

A somewhat comprehensive view of the world will permit us to understand that what is harmful for us today, or may be so in the future, is beneficial for others. The world as a whole moves in the direction dictated by the overall purpose of being and benefit of being;

individuals may suffer harm in this process, and it may even be that mankind at large does not stand to benefit.

Were we able to plunge deeply enough into the ocean of knowledge and turn the pages of its book replete with mysteries with the finger of our understanding, the ultimate purpose and outcome of all events and phenomena would be revealed to us. However, our power of judgement is not sufficiently comprehensive to deal with the complex web that confronts us: we know neither the chain of preceding causes that have produced the phenomena of today, nor the chain of future effects those phenomena in turn will produce.

If it were possible for us to look down from above on the broad plain of the world, in such a way that we could see all the positive and negative aspects of everything, all the mysteries of everything occurring in the world; if it were possible for us to evaluate the effects and results of every event in history, past, present and future and everything occurring between pre-eternity and post-eternity — if this were possible for us, then we might be able to say that the harm of a given event outweighed its benefit and brand it as evil.

But does man have such comprehensive awareness of the horizontal and vertical chains of causality? Can he situate himself on the moving axis of the world?

Since we do not dispose of such an ability, since we will never be able to traverse so infinite a distance, however long be our stride; since we will never be able to lift the veil from all these complexities and take their due measure, it is best that we refrain from one-sided and hasty judgements that are based on our own short-sightedness. We should recognize that we must not make our own benefit the sole criterion for judging this vast universe. The relative observations we make within the framework of the limited data at our disposal and the specific conditions to which we are subject can never furnish criteria for a definitive judgement.

Nature may often be working toward the fulfilment of a particular goal that is unimaginable to man, given his conventional circumstances. Why cannot it be supposed that unpleasant occurrences are the result of efforts aimed at preparing the ground for a new phenomenon that will be the instrument of God's will upon earth? It may be that the conditions and circumstances of the age necessitate such processes.

If all the changes and upheavals that terrify us did not take place within a given plan and design and for the sake of a specific aim, if they were to be extended throughout time without producing any positive or constructive result, there would be no trace on earth of any living creature, including man.

Why should we accuse the world of injustice, of being chaotic and unstable, simply because of a few exceptional occurrences and pheno-

mena in nature? Should we start objecting because of a handful of unpleasantnesses, major and minor, forgetting all the manifestations of precision and wisdom, all the wonders we see in the world and its creatures, that testify to the will and intelligence of an exalted being?

Since man sees so much evidence of careful planning throughout the universe, he must admit that the world is a purposive whole, a process moving toward perfection. Every phenomenon in it is subject to its own specific criterion, and if a phenomenon appears inexplicable or unjustifiable, this is because of man's short-sightedness. Man must understand that in his finiteness he lacks the capacity to understand the aims of all phenomena and their content; it is not that creation has any defect.

Our attitude to the bitter and unpleasant occurrences of this world resembles the judgement made by a desert-dweller when he comes to the city and sees powerful bulldozers destroying old buildings. He regards this demolition as a foolish act of destruction, but is it logical on his part to think that the demolition is unplanned and purposeless? Of course not, because he sees only the process of demolition, not the calculations and plans of the architects and others involved.

As a certain scientist said:

Our state is like that of children who watch a circus packing up and preparing to move on. This is necessary for the circus to go elsewhere and continue with its life of excitement, but those short-sighted children see in the folding of the tents and the comings and goings of men and animals nothing but the dissolution and termination of the circus.

* * *

If we look a little more deeply and imaginatively at the misfortunes and disasters that plague man and interpret them correctly we will appreciate that in reality they are blessings, not disasters. A blessing being a blessing, and a disaster being a disaster, is dependent on man's reaction to it; a single event may be experienced quite differently by two different persons.

Misfortune and pain are like an alarm warning man to remedy his deficiencies and errors; they are like a natural immune system or regulatory mechanism inherent in man.

If wealth leads to self-indulgence and pleasure-seeking, it is a misfortune and a disaster, and if poverty and deprivation lead to the refinement and development of the human soul, they are a blessing. Thus wealth cannot be counted as absolute good fortune nor poverty as absolute misfortune. A similar rule covers whatever natural gifts man may possess.

Nations who are confronted by various hostile forces and compelled to struggle for their survival are strengthened thereby. Once we regard effort and struggle to be a positive and constructive endeavour, we cannot overlook the role played by hardships in developing man's inner resources and impelling him to progress.

People who are not obliged to struggle and who live in an environment free of all contradiction will easily be immersed by material prosperity in their pleasures and lusts.

How often it happens that someone willingly endures hardship and pain for the sake of a great goal! Were it not for that hardship and pain, the goal might not appear so desirable to him! A smooth path along which one advances blindly and mechanically is not conducive to development and growth, and a human effort from which the element of conscious will has been removed cannot produce a fundamental change in man.

Struggle and contradiction are like a scourge impelling man forward. Solid objects are shattered by the pressure of repeated blows, but men are formed and tempered by the hardships they endure. They throw themselves into the ocean to learn how to swim, and it is in the furnace of crisis that genius emerges.

Untrammelled self-indulgence, love of the world, unrestricted pleasure-seeking, heedlessness of higher goals — all these are indications of misguidance and lack of awareness. In fact, the most wretched of men are those who have grown up in the midst of luxury and comfort, who have never experienced the hardships of life or tasted its bitter days along with the sweet: the sun of their lives rises and sets within, unnoticed by anyone else.

Following one's inclinations and adhering to one's desires is incompatible with firmness and elevation of spirit, with purposeful effort and striving. Pleasure-seeking and corruption on the one hand and strength of will and purposiveness on the other represent two contrary inclinations in man. Since neither can be negated or affirmed to the exclusion of the other, one must strive constantly to reduce the desire for pleasure and strengthen the opposing force within one.

Those who have been raised in luxury, who have never tasted the bitter and sweet days of the world, who have always enjoyed prosperity and never endured hunger — they can never appreciate the taste of delicious food nor the joy of life as a whole and they are incapable of truly appreciating beauty. The pleasures of life can be truly enjoyed only by those who have experienced hardship and failure in their lives, who have the capacity to absorb difficulty and to endure those hardships that lie in wait along every step of man's path.

Material and spiritual ease becomes precious to man only after experiencing the ups and downs of life and the pressure of its

unpleasant incidents.

Once man is preoccupied with his material life, all dimensions of his existence are enchained and he loses aspiration and motion. Inevitably he will also neglect his eternal life and inward purification. As long as desire casts its shadow on his being and his soul is ensnared by darkness, he will be like a speck tossed around on the waves of matter. He will seek refuge in anything but God. He therefore needs something to awaken him and induce maturity in his thoughts, to remind him of the transitoriness of this ephemeral world and help him attain the ultimate aim of all heavenly teachings — the freedom of the soul from all the obstacles and barriers that prevent man from attaining lofty perfection.

This training and refinement of the self is not to be had cheaply; it requires the renunciation of various pleasures and enjoyments, and the process of cutting loose from them is bitter and difficult.

It is true that such exertions will be for the sake of purifying man's inner being and allowing his latent capacities to appear. Nonetheless, patient abstinence from sin and pleasure-seeking is always bitter to man's taste and it is only through obstinate resistance to lower impulses, that he can fulfil his mission of breaking down the barriers that confront him and thus ascend to the realm of higher values.

3. Hardship, A Cause of Awakening:

Those who are drunk on the arrogance of power and success and who have totally forgotten humane ethics because of the seduction of their soul and their senses will sometimes find, in various corners of the world, that the occurrence of unpleasant events makes them open to fundamental changes and developments that tear away from them the veils of forgetfulness. They may even be guided to a path leading to some degree of moral perfection and a future more fruitful than their present. There are people in whom misfortune has induced a profound transformation.

Considering the harmful effects of neglectfulness and the intoxication of arrogance on the one hand, and the numerous moral lessons taught by misfortune on the other, it can be said that failure and misfortune are relative insofar as they contain great blessings; they contribute fruitfully to the building of man's awareness and will.

Hardship is then, the preliminary to higher, more advanced states of being; it prepares man for the recompense that awaits him, and from his response to it it becomes apparent whether he has attained the lofty degree of sincerity and devotion or is sunk in decay.

The Qur'ān says:

لَقَدْ خَلَقْنَا الْإِنْسَانَ فِي كَبَدٍ ﴿١﴾

We have created man in the embrace of hardship. (90:4)

Or again:

وَلَنَبْلُوَنَّكُمْ بِشَيْءٍ مِّنَ الْخَوْفِ وَالْجُوعِ وَنَقْصٍ مِّنَ الْأَمْوَالِ وَالْأَنْفُسِ وَالثَّمَرَاتِ وَبَشِّرِ الصَّابِرِينَ
الَّذِينَ إِذَا أَصَابَتْهُمُ مُصِيبَةٌ قَالُوا إِنَّا لِلَّهِ وَإِنَّا إِلَيْهِ رَاجِعُونَ ﴿١٥٦﴾ أُولَئِكَ عَلَيْهِمْ صَلَوَاتٌ مِّن رَّبِّهِمْ
وَرَحْمَةٌ وَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الْمُهْتَدُونَ ﴿١٥٧﴾

We test you with fear, hunger, the loss of wealth and possessions, death, and the loss of the fruits of your toil. Give glad tidings to those who struggle manfully on this path, those who say when afflicted with calamity and pain, 'We are from God and to Him we return on our path to perfection' — they it is who receive kindness and mercy from their Lord together with their suffering, and they it is who are truly guided. (2:155 — 157)

Without doubt God could have created a world without hardship, pain and misfortune, but that would have meant His depriving man of freedom and choice; he would have been let loose in the world as a creature without will or the power of decision, just like any other creature lacking perception and awareness, formed exclusively by nature and totally obedient to it. Would he then have deserved the name of man?

Having paid the heavy price of losing all his innate capacities and freedom, his most precious resource, would he have advanced toward perfection, or decayed and declined? Would not the world too have lost all goodness and beauty, these being comprehensible only in terms of their opposites?

It is plain that the power to distinguish and discriminate makes possible the existence of good and evil, of beauty and ugliness. By giving man the inestimable blessing of freedom and the ability to choose, God, Whose wisdom is manifest throughout creation, wished to display fully His ability to create phenomena bearing witness to His wisdom and power.

He placed within man's being the possibility of doing both good and evil, and although He compels him to do neither He always expects him to do good. God does not approve of evil; it is righteous conduct that meets with His approval and in exchange for which He provides abundant, unimaginable reward. God warns man against following the path of evil and threatens him with punishment and torment if he does so.

Thus by using the power of choice that God has bestowed on him, man can act as he should, conforming both to divine guidance and to his own conscience.

But if occasionally his foot should slip and he should commit some sin, the path remains open for him to return to purity and light, to God's favour and mercy. This is in itself a further manifestation of God's generosity and all-embracing justice, one more of the blessings He bestows on His servants.

Were God to give immediate reward to the virtuous for their righteous conduct and acts, they would not in any way be superior to the corrupt and the sinful. And if the evil in thought and in deed were to be always met with instant punishment and retribution, virtue and purity would not enjoy any superiority in this world to vice and impurity.

* * *

The principle of contradiction is, in fact, the basis of the created world; it is what enables matter to change and evolve, so that God's grace flows through the world. Were matter not to take on different shapes as a result of its encounter with various beings and were being unable to accommodate new forms within itself, the differentiation and advancement of being would be impossible. A stable and unchanging world would resemble stagnant capital that produces no profit. For creation, change is the capital that brings about profit. It is of course possible that the investment of a certain portion of capital should result in loss, but the constant motion of matter as a whole definitely results in profit.

The contradiction that takes place in the forms of matter results in the advancement of the order of being toward perfection.

There is some question as to whether evil exists in the world in the real sense of the word. If we look carefully we will see that the evil of things is not a true attribute; it is a relative attribute.

Firearms in the hands of my enemy are an evil for me, and firearms in my hands are an evil for my enemy. Setting aside me and my enemy, firearms are in themselves neither good nor bad.

The course of nature can be said to be mathematical; that is, its system has been established in such a way as not to answer all of our needs. We, however, wish to fulfil all our countless desires without encountering the least hindrance, and the forces of nature do not answer the limitless wishes we cherish, wishes which are in any event worthless from the point of view of our essential nature. Nature pays no attention to our desires and refuses to submit to our wants. So when we encounter unpleasantness in our lives, we become unjustifiably upset and we term the causes of our discomfort as "evil." If someone wants to light his lamp when there is no oil in it, he won't start sighing and complaining or cursing the whole universe!

Creation is constantly advancing toward a clear goal, through

unceasing effort and striving. Specific causes determine each step it takes, and the changes and developments it undergoes are not designed to meet men's approval or satisfy their desires.

It should be accepted that some of the occurrences of this world will not correspond to our wishes, and we ought not to regard as injustice things we experience as unpleasant.

'Ali, the Commander of the Faithful, — peace be upon him — describes the world as an abode of hardship, but nonetheless a good place for the one who knows it properly. Although he encountered himself all kinds of hardship and unpleasantness, he constantly drew men's attention to the absolute justice of God.

Another important point which must not be overlooked is that good and evil do not represent two mutually exclusive categories or series in the order of creation. Goodness is identical with being, and evil is identical with non-being; wherever being makes its appearance, non-existence is also implied.

When we speak of poverty, indigence, ignorance or disease we should not imagine that they have separate realities: poverty is simply not having wealth, ignorance is the absence of knowledge, and disease is the loss of health. Wealth and knowledge are realities, but poverty is nothing other than the emptiness of the hand and the pocket, and ignorance the absence of knowledge. Hence poverty and ignorance have no tangible reality; they are defined through the non-existence of other things.

The same is the case with calamities and misfortunes that we regard as evil and the source of suffering. They too are a kind of loss or non-being, and are evil only in the sense that they result in the destruction or non-existence of something other than themselves. Apart from this, nothing, insofar as it exists, can in any way be called evil or ugly.

If calamities did not entail sickness and death, the loss and ruin of certain creatures, preventing their capacities from unfolding, they would not be bad. It is the loss and ruin arising from misfortunes that is inherently bad.

Whatever exists in the world is good; evil pertains to non-being, and since non-being does not form a category independent of being, it has not been created and does not exist.

Being and non-being are like the sun and its shadow. When a body is turned to the sun it casts a shadow. What is a shadow? The shadow has not been created by anything; it consists simply of the sun not shining in a given place because of the existence of an obstacle; it has no source or origin of its own.

Things have a real existence by virtue of having been created without reference to things other than them; in this sense they are not evil. For a world view derived from belief in God the world is equivalent to

good. Everything is inherently good; if it is evil, it is so only in a relative sense and in connection with things other than itself. The existence of everything is unreal for other than itself, and untouched by creation.

The malarial mosquito is not evil in itself. If it is described as such it is because it is harmful to man and causes disease. That which is created is the existence of a thing for itself, which is a true existence; relational existence has no place in the order of being and is not real. We cannot therefore ask why God has created relative or relational existence. Relational entities are inseparable from the real entities that give rise to them; they are their inevitable concomitants and do not partake of their being. One cannot then speak of relational entities having been created.

That which is real must necessarily derive its being from the Creator. Only those things and attributes are real that exist outside the mind. Relative attributes are created by the mind and have no existence outside it, so one cannot go looking for their creator.

Furthermore, that which has the potential to exist is the world as a whole, with all the objects it contains and the attributes that are inseparable from it; the world represents an indivisible unit. From the vantage point of God's wisdom, either the world must exist on the pattern that is peculiar to it, or it cannot exist at all.

A world without order or lacking the principle of causality, a world where good and evil were not separate from each other, would be an impossibility and a fantasy. It is not possible to suppose that one part of the world should exist and another should not. Creation is a whole, like the form and figure of man, and its parts are inseparable from each other.

God is absolutely free of all need, and one consequence of this is that He freely bestows being, like a generous man whose largesse expects no return, or like a skilled artist who is constantly busy with the creation of new forms. Such abundant generosity and creativity define the essence of the Lord Whose signs are manifest and evident in every phenomenon.

4. Some Aspects of Inequality:

Suppose that the owner of a factory employs both skilled and unskilled workers to operate and administer his factory. When it is time to pay their wages he pays the skilled and qualified workers whose job is at a higher level more than the unskilled workers.

Now is this difference in wages just or unjust? Is the factory owner acting equitably or inequitably?

Doubtless there is a difference involved here, but we cannot call it discrimination. Justice does not require the factory owner to pay un-

skilled workers the same as skilled workers. It means rather that he should give to each category what it deserves. Such a rule will clearly delineate the comparative value of each job and contribute to the welfare of the workplace.

To make distinctions in such cases is an eloquent and practical form of justice; not to do so would be equivalent to oppression, discrimination and injustice; it would be the result of an inadequate appreciation of the relative value of things in their differentiation.

When we look at the world as a whole and analyze its various parts, we see that each part has its own special position and function and is clothed in the qualities that are suitable to it. In the light of this realization, we can understand the necessity of vicissitudes in human life, of light and darkness, of success and failure, for maintaining the general equilibrium of the world.

If the world were to be uniform, without variation or difference, the varied and multiple species of being would not exist. It is precisely in this abundant variety and multiplicity that do exist that we see the splendour and magnificence of the world. Our judgement of things will be logical, correct, and acceptable when we take into consideration the equilibrium prevailing in the universe and the interrelations that beneficially bind its various parts to each other, not when we examine the part in isolation from the whole.

The order of creation is based on equilibrium, on receptivities and capacities; what is firmly established in creation is differentiation, not discrimination. This observation makes it possible for us to examine the matter more objectively and specifically. Discrimination means making a difference among objects possessing the same receptivities and existing under the same circumstances. Differentiation means making a difference among capacities that are unequal and not subject to the same circumstances.

It will be erroneous if we say that it would be better for everything in the world to be uniform and undifferentiated, for all the motion, activity and lively interchange we see in the world is made possible by differentiation.

Man has various ways of perceiving and experiencing beauty, once there is a contrast between ugliness and beauty. The attraction exerted by beauty is, in a sense, the reflection of ugliness and its power to repel.

In the same way, if man were not tested and tried in life, piety and virtue would have no value, and there would be no reason to refine one's soul and nothing from which to restrain one's desire.

If a whole canvas is covered in a uniform way, we cannot speak of it being a picture; it is the variation of colour and detail that displays the skill of the artist.

In order for the identity of a thing to be known, it is essential

that it be differentiated from other things, for the measure by which things or persons are recognized is the outer or inner differences they have with each other.

* * *

One of the wonders of creation is the variation in the capacities and gifts with which beings are endowed. In order to ensure the continuance of social life creation has given each individual a particular set of tastes and capacities the interplay of which ensures the order of society; each individual meets some of the needs of society and contributes to solving some of its problems.

The natural difference of individuals with respect to capacity causes them to need each other. Everyone takes on some of the tasks of society according to his own taste and capacity, and the social life secured in that way makes it possible for man to progress and advance.

Let us take a building or an aeroplane as an example. Each of them has numerous separate parts, complex and detailed components that differ greatly from each other in size and form, this difference deriving from the responsibility that each component has toward the whole.

Were this difference not to exist in the structure of the aeroplane, it would no longer be an aeroplane but a compound of assorted metals. If differentiation is a sign of true justice in the aeroplane, it must also be an indication of divine justice among all the creatures of the world including man.

In addition, we must be aware that differentiation among beings is innate to their essence. God does not create everything with a separate and discrete exercise of His will; His will is not exercised individually. The entire world from beginning to end came into being with a single exercise of His will; it was this that enabled creatures in their infinite multiplicity to come into being.

There is then a specific law and order that regulates all the dimensions of creation. Within the framework of causality it assigns a particular rank and position to everything. God's will to create and regulate the world is equivalent to His willing order in it.

There are definite philosophical proofs in support of this proposition, and it is also expounded in the Qur'ān:

إِنَّا كُلَّ شَيْءٍ خَلَقْنَاهُ بِقَدَرٍ ﴿٤٩﴾ وَمَا أَمْرُنَا إِلَّا وَاحِدَةٌ كَلَمْحٍ بِالْبَصَرِ ﴿٥٠﴾

We created everything with a certain quantity and limit; Our act is but one, like the blink of an eye. (54:49—50)

It would be wrong to imagine that the differentiation and relations established by God in His creation are the same as the conventional relations existing in human society. God's connection with His creatures is not a mere conventional or relational matter; it is a connection deriving from the very act of creation. The order that He has placed in all things is the result of His creating it. Every being receives from God the amount of perfection and beauty it is able to receive.

If there were no particular order regulating the world, any being might, in the course of its motions, give rise to any other being, and cause and effect might switch places. But it must be understood that the essential interrelations among things are fixed and necessary; the station and property bestowed on a thing adheres inseparably to it, whatever rank and degree of existence it may have. No phenomenon can go beyond the degree that has been fixed for it and occupy the degree of another being. Differentiation is a concomitant of the degrees of being, assigning to them differing amounts of weakness and strength, deficiency and perfection.

It would be discrimination if two phenomena had the same capacity to receive perfection but it was given only to one of them and denied to the other.

The degrees of being that exist in the order of creation cannot be compared with the conventional ranks of human society. They are real, not conventional, and not transferable. For example, men and animals cannot change places with each other in the same way that individuals can change the posts and positions they occupy in society.

The relationship connecting each cause with its effect and each effect with its cause derives from the very essences of the cause and effect respectively. If something is a cause, it is so because of some property that is inseparable from it, and if something is an effect it is so because of a quality inherent in it, which is nothing other than the mode of its being.

There is, then, an essential and profound order that links all phenomena, and the degree of each phenomenon within the order is identical with its essence. Insofar as differentiation relates to a deficiency indwelling in the essence it is not discrimination, because the effusion of God's bounty is not enough for a reality to come into being; the receptivity of the vessel destined to receive the bounty is also necessary. It is for this reason that certain beings suffer deprivation and do not attain higher degrees; it is impossible that a thing acquire the capacity for being or some other perfection and that God not grant it to it.

The case of numerals is exactly similar: each number has its own fixed place. Two comes after one and cannot change places with it. If we change the place of a number we will have changed its essence at the same time.

It is clear, then, that all phenomena possess fixed ranks and modalities and are subordinate to a series of stable and immutable laws. Divine law naturally does not form a separate created entity, but an abstract concept deduced from the manner in which things are seen to exist. That which has external existence consists of the levels and degrees of being on the one hand and the system of cause and effect on the other. Nothing occurs outside of this system, which is none other than the divine norm mentioned by the Qur'ān:

... وَلَنْ تَجِدَ اسْمَ اللَّهِ تَحْوِيلًا ...

You will never find any change in the divine norm. (35:43)

* * *

The order of creation is based on a series of laws inherent in its essence. The place of every phenomenon within it is clearly defined, and the existence of the various levels and degrees of existence is a necessary consequence of the systemic nature of creation, which inevitably gives rise to variety and differentiation.

Variation and differentiation have not themselves been created; they are the inseparable attributes of all phenomena. Every particle in the universe has received whatever it had the potential to receive; no injustice or discrimination has been visited upon it, and the perfection of the universe — resembling a multiplication table in its precise and immutable ordering — has thereby been ensured.

Materialists who regard the existence of variation and differentiation in the natural order as evidence of oppression and injustice and imagine that the world is not ruled by justice will inevitably experience life as difficult, unpleasant, and wearying.

The hasty judgement of the materialist confronted by hardship and difficulty is like the verdict of a child watching a gardener pruning the healthy, green branches of a tree in the spring. Unaware of the purpose and significance of the pruning, the child will think the gardener a destructive and ignorant person.

If all the bounties of the world were placed at the disposal of the materialist he would still not be content, For once the world is seen to be aimless and based on injustice, it is meaningless for man to seek justice, and in a world that is lacking an aim it is absurd for man to set himself one.

If the origin and destiny of man are as the materialists depict them, such that he is a grass that grows of itself and then disappears, then man must be the most wretched of creatures. For he would be living in a world with which he lacks all affinity, compatibility and harmony.

Thought, feeling and emotion would cause him distress, being nothing more than a cruel joke played on him by nature to increase his misery and wretchedness and augment his suffering.

Were a man of initiative and genius to devote himself to the service of humanity, what benefit would it hold for him?

Posthumous commemorations and honourings, ceremonies held at his tomb, would not benefit him in the slightest; they would serve only to maintain a hollow legend, because the person in question would have been nothing more than a form assembled by nature for its amusement as a plaything for a few days before being turned into a handful of dust.

If we look at the fate of the majority of people who are constantly struggling with various kinds of sorrow, anxiety, deprivation and failure, the picture grows still bleaker. With such a view of human life, the only paradise materialism has to offer man is a hell of terror and pain. The materialist position that man lacks freedom and choice makes of him an even more wretched creature.

The monodimensional worldview of materialism would have it that man is like an automaton, with the mechanism and dynamism of its cells operated by nature. Can human intelligence and instinct — not to mention the realities of existence — accept such a banal and petty interpretation of man, his life and his destiny?

Were this interpretation to be true, man would be as incapable of experiencing happiness as a child's doll. Placed in such a situation, man would be compelled to make of his own passions and inclinations the foundation of morality and the yardstick of value, to judge all things according to personal profit and loss. He would do his utmost to destroy every obstacle in his path and loosen all restraints on his carnal desires. Were he to act otherwise, he would be regarded as backward and ignorant.

Anyone who possesses the slightest amount of insight, and judges the matter in a disinterested and dispassionate way will regard these short-sighted and fantastic notions as invalid, however much they be decked out in philosophical and scientific sophistry.

A man with a religious worldview regards the world as an orderly system possessing consciousness, will, perception and aim. The supreme justice-dispensing intelligence of God rules over the universe and every particle of being and watches over all actions and deeds. A religious man therefore feels a sense of responsibility vis-a-vis the consciousness that rules over the world, and knows that a world created and administered by God is necessarily a world of unity, harmony and good. He understands that contradiction and evil have an epiphenomenal existence and play a fundamental role in the achievement of good and the emergence of unity and harmony.

Furthermore, according to this worldview which sketches out broad

horizons for man, life is not restricted to this world, and even the life of this world is not restricted to material well-being or freedom from effort and pain. The believer in religion will see the world as a path that must be traversed, as a place of testing, as an arena of effort. In it, the righteousness of men's deeds is tested. At the beginning of the next life, the good and the evil in the thoughts, beliefs and actions of men will be measured in the most accurate of balances. God's justice will be revealed in its true aspect, and whatever deprivation man may have suffered in this world, whether material or otherwise, it will be made up to him.

In the light of this destiny that awaits man, and given the essential nullity of the goods of the material world, man orients his conscious striving exclusively to God. His aim becomes to live for Him and to die for Him. The vicissitudes of this world no longer claim his attention. He sees ephemeral things for what they are, and he allows nothing to seduce his heart. For he knows that the forces of seduction would cause his humanity to wither and draw him down into the whirlpool of materialistic misguidance.

* * *

In conclusion, we would add that even apart from the question of receptivity the existence of difference in the world does not imply injustice. Oppression and injustice mean that someone is subjected to discrimination although he has a claim equal to that of someone else. But beings do not have any "claim" on God nor did they ever, so if some things enjoy superiority over others this cannot count as injustice.

We have nothing of ourselves: each breath and each heartbeat, each thought and idea that passes through our mind, are taken from a stock that we do not own and have done nothing to build up. That stock is a gift from God, bestowed on us at the moment of birth.

Once we understand that whatever we have is nothing but a divine gift, it will become apparent that the differences among the gifts He gives men are based on His wisdom but have nothing to do with either justice or injustice, because there was no question of any merit or claim on our part.

This finite and temporary life is a gift to us, a present from the Creator. He has absolute discretion in deciding the type and quantity of the gift that He gives, and we have no claim upon Him. We have therefore no right to object even if the gift given us quite free of charge appears slight and inconsequential.

NOTES:

1. *Kifāyat al-muwaḥḥidīn*, I, 442.

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**Martyr Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr's
Critique of Marxist Philosophy:
A Critical Summary of His Book *Our
Philosophy: Part 2***

by 'Alī Qulī Qarā'ī

Preface:

Ever since man has attempted to determine his relation to the external world, the formulation of world view has been a central problem of philosophic thought. The author's aim is to present the world view of Islamic philosophy against the backdrop of other views presented by modern Western philosophy, especially Marxism.

Two issues are involved in the difference between world views: The first one relates to realistic and idealistic conceptions of the world. Realism believes in the existence of an objective reality independent of mind, while for idealism reality can be only mental. The second issue involves two separate outlooks within realism: materialism and theological realism. Materialism regards sensible matter as the common ground of all existence including mind and consciousness. Theological realism (hitherto referred to as 'realism') goes beyond matter and asserts the existence of an eternal and infinite cause as the primary cause of all phenomena, including the mental and the material realms.

Correction of Some Errors: Here, it is necessary to correct the misconceptions of some modern writers. The first of these errors is to consider the conflict between theology and materialism as the one between idealism and realism, as if theological thought advocated idealism and materialism was the only representative of realism.

The second is the accusation that the theistic world view attributes every phenomenon to a supernatural cause and thus makes science impossible by completely eliminating causality and law from the realm of nature. This accusation is false, because theology considers God as a cause transcending nature, as a power above nature and matter. This error involves a misunderstanding of the place of the transcendent cause in the causal chain.

The third error is that of identifying spirituality with idealism, whereas spirituality can be considered as an attribute of idealism as well realism; it has a different meaning in each of these outlooks.

Thus there are three kinds of world views: idealism, materialism and theological realism. Idealism was studied in Part 1, while discussing the theory of knowledge. Materialism and theological realism will be studied in this part.

A Clarification: At the outset a number of points have to be clarified.

Firstly, what is the basic feature that distinguishes all the various versions of materialism from theological realism, making them two conflicting schools? The answer is that the basic distinguishing feature of materialism is its denial that there is anything beyond the scope and realm of experimental science. Both the theologian and the materialist accept the findings and formulations of science, but they differ over the issue that there is an immaterial realm of existence beyond the realm of experiment and sensible phenomena. The materialist considers natural causation revealed by experiments as the sole ground of all existence, including mind and consciousness. The theological realist, on the contrary, regards the knowing subject and its knowledge as being of an immaterial nature. Further, theological realism asserts that the developments and movements studied by science are, in the ultimate analysis, attributable to a cause transcending nature and the material world. The materialist denies this and claims that no immaterial or transcendent causes are revealed in the field of experiment; nature is dynamic, autonomous, self-sufficient and self-contained.

It is clear that there is no dispute between theology and materialism with regard to scientific truths. The theologian admits all scientific truths; he just admits other truths and asserts the existence of a primary, non-sensible and immaterial cause of nature's movements and phenomena.

Secondly, if the conflict between theology and materialism is that of affirmation and negation, which of the two schools is responsible for giving evidence in favour of its position? The theologian must offer reasons for his affirmation and the materialist for his negation, for absolute denial like absolute affirmation requires proof. The materialist, by his absolute denial, in fact asserts that he has examined the entire realm of being and not found any immaterial cause in it.

Now a second question arises: What kind of evidence that can be? The answer is that the evidence for the affirmation or for the denial must be based on reason, not on sense experience. This is contrary to the materialist view, which considers sense experience as its evidence and claims that the propositions of metaphysics and theology cannot in general be verified by sense experience and that an analysis of experience

and nature does not reveal the existence of immaterial things. Now if materialism is correct in its claim that sense experience and science do not constitute a proof for the propositions of theology, then neither can they be proof for its absolute negation. Moreover, the truths of science are not the subject of disputation between theology and materialism. For the disputation relates rather to the philosophical interpretation of these truths which asserts the existence of a cause transcending the limits of sense experience. It is clear that sense experience cannot be considered as a proof for the negation of a truth outside its own limits.

Science does not affirm the materialist view of the world. All the truths uncovered by science leave room for the assumption of a cause above matter. Scientific experimentation cannot prove that matter is not created by an immaterial cause. Therefore, the proof in support of materialism cannot be based on scientific truths or sense experience. Rather, materialism is a philosophic interpretation of experience and scientific truths, in the same way as theological realism is; both of them give different interpretations to the findings of science. The soundness of these interpretations cannot be established on the basis of sense experience.

This leads us to a third question: If scientific experimentation is not sufficient by itself for deciding the issue, is there any other means available to the human mind? Al-Ṣadr's answer is that human reason is sufficient for studying this issue, in the same way as it studies all scientific issues in the light of primary rational knowledge, which is independent of experience. Thus the method adopted by theological realism in demonstrating its propositions is ultimately the same method by which we prove all scientific truths and laws.

Dialectics:

In classical Greek philosophy 'dialectics' meant a specific method of discussion in which the debate between the representatives of opposite points of view begins from preliminaries admitted by both the sides and proceeds until one of the points of view is affirmed or a new conclusion is reached by the way of synthesis of formerly opposite viewpoints.

Dialectic in modern Western philosophy is not a method of discussion but a method of explaining reality and a general law of the universe according to which movement is a continuous development of oppositions and contradictions, their merging and reconciliation. The idea is an old one, foreshadowed by Empedocles (who explained change as a conflict between the world forces of Love and Strife) and Zoroaster, and embodied in the 'golden mean' of Aristotle, who held that "the

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knowledge of opposites is one."

Hegel was the first to establish a complete logic (and metaphysics, which in Hegel is same as logic) on the basis of the notion of dialectic. In this logic, which is claimed to govern thought and existence, the fundamental principle is one of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, which involves a constant 'taking up' and reconciliation of pairs of contradictories in higher, more comprehensive and penetrating ideas, until finally all oppositions are overcome in the all-inclusive, all-reconciling and all-explaining Absolute Idea.

Hegel views conception as a hierarchy of syntheses whose skeleton is constructed of ascending triads in which seemingly antagonistic concepts are reconciled by dialectic in higher logical concepts. The most basic triad involving the concepts of *being* and *non-being* as thesis and antithesis yields the synthetic concept of *becoming*. The ideas of *becoming* and *change* involve the concepts of *identity* and *difference* which are reconciled in the concept of *essence*. The concepts of *essence* and *existence*, *whole* and *part*, *appearance* and *reality* are resolved in the concepts of *ground* and *force*. The concept of *force* suggests those of *actuality* and *potentiality*, whose dichotomy is reconciled in the concept of *fact*. Also the notion of *fact* suggests those of *necessity* and *freedom*, which are resolved in the concept of 'nature of things'. Now we are confronted with the thesis and antithesis of *substance* and its *attributes* or *accidents*. This contradiction is overcome by regarding the *substance* as the *cause* of its attributes. Here *cause* contains the *effect* and so cause and effect become one. Similarly final and efficient causation are synthesized in the identity of *means* and *end*, which are neither external to nor distinct from each other, by the concept of *process*. The world-process and the Absolute are one; it is its own cause and its own goal. Hence the actual is the ideal; on the moral plane, value and fact are identical.

Hegel's stand on the law of contradiction is dubious. As can be seen, the driving motive behind every Hegelian synthesis is avoidance of contradiction; i.e. it is inspired by belief in the impossibility of contradiction. Moreover, he holds that the nature of Reality can be deduced from the sole consideration that it must not be self-contradictory.

On the contrary, according to Hegel, truth and falsehood are not sharply defined opposites, as is commonly supposed; nothing is wholly false and nothing that we can know is wholly true. The truth is the 'whole', and nothing partial is quite true. Whatever the value of his arbitrary analysis of concepts, it does not seem correct, on the whole, to hold that Hegel rejects the principle of contradiction.

Hegel is one of the most confused of philosophers. His philosophy is difficult because it is difficult to understand confusion. The Marxist interpretations, or misinterpretations, of Hegelian dialectics have added

to this difficulty. Therefore, when al-Ṣadr criticizes Hegel, he has the Marxist interpretation of Hegel before him.

Thus when we see al-Ṣadr charging Hegel with the *complete* rejection of the principle of contradiction and with holding that contradiction is not only the primary principle of all knowledge but the general law of the universe, we should understand him as criticizing the Marxist interpretation of dialectics rather than Hegel. With these remarks now we turn to al-Ṣadr's criticism of Marxist dialectics.

According to the Marxists, the dialectical method is characterized by four main points: (1) The movement of development, (2) the contradiction of development, (3) the leaps of development, and (4) the general linkage. These are supposed to replace the four laws of thought recognized by formal logic: the law of identity, the law of contradiction, the law of conversion, and the law of demonstration. Al-Ṣadr then goes on to deal with the four points of the dialectical logic one by one.

The Movement of Development:

The dialecticians reproach metaphysics and traditional logic for considering nature in a static state of unchanging frozenness and stagnant stability and for failing to reflect nature in its moving and progressive reality. According to this claim, the poor metaphysician is an unperceptive being devoid of consciousness and awareness who fails to notice change, transformation and movement in the realm of nature.

Al-Ṣadr briefly recapitulates the standpoints of Greek philosophers regarding motion. He refers to the paradoxes of Zeno (d.c. 430 B.C.) — which were arguments put forward to demonstrate the inconceivability of motion — and to the acceptance of motion by the Aristotelian school. The problem is related to the manner in which motion was conceived: either as a succession of pauses in instants of time or as a gradual advance in which there is no pause or rest.

Islamic philosophy pictures motion as the gradual actualization of the potentiality of a thing. Development always consists of something actual and something potential. Thus motion continues as long as a thing combines both actuality and potentiality, existence and possibility. If possibility is exhausted and no capacity for a new stage remains, motion ceases. Mullā Ṣadrā (1572–1641) demonstrated that motion does not pertain to the accidental surface of things but goes on inside their very substances. Not only that, he also showed clearly that motion and change is one of the necessary principles of metaphysics.

The accusation of the dialecticians that metaphysics views nature as static and frozen is due to their failure to understand motion in its proper philosophical sense. The difference between the ways meta

physics and dialectical materialism view motion consists of these two points:

Firstly, dialectical materialism views motion as being based on contradiction and strife among contradictories. According to the metaphysics of Muslim philosophers motion is a progression from one stage to an opposite stage without involving the union of these opposites in any one of its stages.

Secondly, motion according to Marxism is not confined to external nature but is also common to intellectual truths and ideas. On the basis of this, there can be no absolute truths. According to Muslim philosophers, motion and development do not intrude into the realm of knowledge and thought.

In regard to the first point, al-Ṣadr quotes a passage of Engels wherein motion is conceived as continuous succession of contradiction and the temporary reconciliation of this contradiction. "The simplest mechanical change in place," says Engels, "cannot, in the last analysis, occur except by means of the presence of a certain body in a certain place at a certain moment and in another place at the same moment. In other words its being and non-being are simultaneously in one place." This shows that the Marxists have not made much progress since Zeno in conceiving motion. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī also raised similar objections against the gradual emergence of a thing. The Marxists however differ from the ancient Greek philosophers in that while the latter negated motion because it involves contradiction, the former use this conception of motion to justify contradiction.

The alleged contradiction in motion is only due to the confusion between potentiality and actuality. At no stage does motion involve a specific rank in actuality and another rank in potentiality. In other words, motion is a gradual actualization of potentiality. The confusion in the Marxist conception of motion arises due to its considering the entanglement of actuality and potentiality, or their union in all the stages of motion as a union of actual opposites, a continuous contradiction and a strife among the contradictories.

Now that motion is not the result of an inner cause in the form of conflicting contradictories, it is also impossible for motion to be self-sufficient or to be without an external cause that takes a thing continuously from potentiality to actuality. Applying this idea to material nature as a whole, al-Ṣadr derives a theological conclusion. The very existence of nature is a gradual progression and continuous departure from potentiality to actuality. Since there can be no self-sufficiency in the form of internal contradiction, the law of causality forces us to recognize a cause transcending the limits of nature.

Al-Ṣadr then takes up the second thesis of dialectical materialism,

that dialectical change and development also occur in the realm of thought and truth, which could not portray nature if thought did not grow and develop dialectically like nature. "Reality grows", states a Marxist citation, "and the knowledge that results from this reality reflects it, grows as it grows, and becomes an effective element of its growth." Al-Ṣadr rejects this dialectical picture of the movement of thought for the two following reasons:

1. The realm of nature involves fixed laws that reflect fixed truths in the realms of thought and knowledge. Scientific knowledge reflects the permanent underlying the transient in nature.

2. Firstly, concepts and ideas, no matter how accurate, do not possess the actual properties of the things to which they pertain (e.g. the idea of radium does not emit radiation). Motion is one of those properties. A true idea, although it reflects objective reality, need not possess the actual properties of the reality it represents. Hence the concepts of changing things do not change in order to reflect the objective reality of those things.

Al-Ṣadr then takes up the second Marxist argument intended to demonstrate the dialectic development of thought, that knowledge is a natural phenomenon and therefore governed by the same laws that rule nature. It changes and grows dialectically as do all the phenomena of nature. The laws of the dialectic apply to both matter and knowledge.

This argument rests on a pure materialistic explanation of knowledge. Al-Ṣadr postpones the analysis of this view to an independent chapter, "Knowledge", at the end of the book. Here it suffices to put a question to the Dialecticians: Is this materialistic explanation of knowledge reserved for the thought of the dialecticians or does it extend also to the thought of others who reject the dialectic? It becomes contradictory for Marxists to accuse other's thought of being frozen and static; for if the dialectic is a natural law common to both thought and nature, then it must apply to all human thought alike.

Thirdly, al-Ṣadr examines the Marxist effort to produce the history of science as an empirical evidence for the dialectical movement of thought. Although progress and development in human knowledge is an undeniable fact of history, this development is not a kind of motion in the philosophic sense intended by Marxism. It is no more than an increase in the quantity of truth and a decrease in the quantity of errors. When a theory moves from the level of hypothesis to that of law, it does not mean that scientific truth has grown and altered. Al-Ṣadr gives a few instances from the history of science to prove his point. He goes on to remark that Marxism seeks to achieve two ends by applying the dialectic to truth. First, it seeks to destroy metaphysics on which theology rests, by holding that since truth moves and grows there can be no fixed and

absolute truth. Second, by denying absolute falsity it seeks to make all truth relative.

The Contradictions of Development:

Here al-Ṣadr takes up the Marxist rejection of the law of contradiction and the claim of dialectical materialism that all change, becoming and development involve contradiction. He explains the meaning of the law of contradiction and points out that no logical person can deny the absolute validity of this law. He points out that the Marxist denial is based on a misunderstanding of what is meant by contradiction. He examines one by one seven instances of contradiction cited by the Marxists, and argues that none of them involves a union of actual contradictories. The first example is that of motion, which according to Engels is in itself contradictory. As explained previously, there is no contradiction in motion. The second example is that of the growth of the living body, which, according to Engels, is at every moment itself and something other than itself. Other examples include the contradiction: of the positive and the negative charges, of action and reaction in mechanics, attack and defeat, advance and retreat, victory and defeat in war, etc. Al-Ṣadr disposes of all these examples by pointing out that actual opposites are not logical contradictories and that no logical contradiction is involved in any of these cases.

Al-Ṣadr points out that this compulsive urge to see contradictions in everything has political motives. In its effort to give a reassuring analysis of the conflict between the capitalist and the working classes, Marx builds up a whole social philosophy on the dialectic of contradictories that promises the ultimate collapse of capitalism and the victory of communism.

However, the social and political application of the dialectic would lead to its self-refutation. In the communist utopia envisioned by Marxism, in which classes and class-conflict are abolished, social development would also come to a halt due to the abolishment of contradiction. Al-Ṣadr sarcastically remarks that such a static and stagnant fate has indeed overtaken the communist states, wherein the subjugation of all thought to the official doctrine has led to intellectual repression, stagnation, and backwardness.

The Leaps of Development:

This is another idea in the Marxist ideological arsenal. According to the dialecticians, gradual quantitative changes reach a point when the accumulated change produces a sudden qualitative change. Hence development is not a circular movement but a linear progression from

one qualitative stage to a new one. Moreover, they assert that this is a general law of nature. One of the examples offered is that of some substances, like water, which pass from solid to liquid state and from liquid to gaseous state at specific temperatures.

Al-Ṣadr points out that although instantaneous leaps do occur in a number of natural phenomena, they are by no means general and do not hold true in the case of all phenomena (e.g. biological organisms, language, etc.). In the example of water, experimentation does not demonstrate that heating is a result of contradiction, nor there is any dialectical development involved. Secondly, neither the heating up of water nor its passage from one state to another is a linear, irreversible progression. Thirdly, the leap from solid to liquid state or from liquid to vapour state does not take place suddenly for the complete mass of water heated. Why should, then, the leap in the social sphere be imposed on society as a whole? Finally, al-Ṣadr points out, the change of state of water is as much a matter of quantitative change from the viewpoint of science as the change in temperature. Here al-Ṣadr seems to refer vaguely to the kinetic theory of heat, according to which the changes of state are quantitatively related to the speed of molecular movement and the force of molecular cohesion.

Al-Ṣadr goes on to criticize Marx's view of transformation of surplus value into capital as an instance of accumulated quantitative change passing into qualitative change. Although he is right in pointing out that money does not undergo any qualitative change by passing into capital, his insistence that the change involved is merely verbal amounts to ignoring a significant economic fact pointed out by Marx.

The General Linkage:

Marxism, following Hegel, insists on considering nature as a whole in which things and events are linked together organically and are dependent on one another. No thing or event makes sense if isolated, as allegedly done by metaphysics, from other things and events that surround it. Martyr al-Ṣadr denies this allegation. Metaphysics considers the world as completely interlinked in accordance with the law of causality. The novelty introduced by the Marxist dialectic lies not in the general linkage itself but in its application to political aims.

However, two points are noteworthy in regard to the view of the theory of general linkage held by metaphysics. First, the linkage of every part of the universe to the causes, conditions and circumstances relevant to it does not mean that one cannot notice or define it in an independent manner. Second, the causal linkage among the parts of nature cannot be circular.

Here, at the close of al-Ṣadr's refutation of the dialectics,

which was an attempt, albeit an unsuccessful one, to understand and interpret historical change — and indeed to bring it about — it is essential to point out that traditional Islamic philosophy as well historiography have not paid adequate attention to historical change, which is a kind of 'macro-change' that reveals itself over extended ages and eras of time. Western philosophy and science, at least since Hegel and Darwin, have been keenly cognizant of historical change and development and have tried to see beyond the immediate panorama of micro-changes of all sorts: physical, chemical, biological, social, economic, political and cultural.

Although al-Ṣadr insists that traditional metaphysics has not been blind to change, he himself gives no clear indication of the recognition which is due to macro-changes. One of the most significant characteristics of modern science is its attention to change that lies behind the veils of permanence in the universe. This historical awareness is now common to all the disciplines which have to deal with the past — from astronomy, geology and biology to sociology, history, anthropology, and the historical study of art, technology, religion, politics, language and ideas.

The Principle of Causality:

The law of causality, al-Ṣadr states, is a necessary rational principle present in the core of man's nature as a rational being. It is on the basis of this principle that (1) the objective reality of sense perception, (2) the validity of scientific theories and laws based on experimentation and (3) the validity of all philosophical and scientific inference, are based.

Al-Ṣadr explains that although the objective existence of the world is a necessary primary judgement that requires no evidence, the objective reality of every particular sense perception is not known in a necessary manner. It is on the basis of the principle of causality that a specific perception, under specific circumstances and conditions, reveals the existence of its cause as an external object.

Experimental theories do not acquire a scientific character unless they are generalized beyond the limits of particular experiments. And this is not possible without reliance on general causal laws which are: (1) the principle that every event has a cause, (2) the principle that every cause necessarily produces its effect, and (3) the principle of harmony between causes and effects.

Without the laws of causality, there would not be any link between evidence and conclusions and no evidence would lead to any result. Even those who attempt to deny this principle by resorting to a certain evidence would not make this attempt had they not believed that the evidence on which they rely is a sufficient cause of the knowledge of the falsity of this principle. But this is in itself an application of this

principle.

It is wrong to regard the principle of causality as an inductive law based on experimentation, because such a view reopens the fundamental question about the validity of perception and experimentation, to which no answer can be found. It is a principle which is accepted independently of the senses and is above experimentation. From the viewpoint of Islamic philosophers, (1) causality is not limited to the natural phenomena which figure in experimentation, but is a general law of existence, applicable to the material and the immaterial; (2) the cause whose existence is confirmed by this principle need not be subject to experimentation, nor it need be of a material nature; (3) the fact that experimentation does not disclose a specific cause of a certain phenomenon does not imply a failure on the part of this principle, for it does not rest on experimentation. These salient points differentiate the mechanistic, materialistic interpretation of the law of causality from its theological interpretation.

Causality and Microphysics:

Inevitable uncertainty entered the realm of modern physics as a result of experimentation with subatomic particles. If the position of an electron were to be accurately measured, radiations of very small wavelength would have to be used for the determination. But such radiations possess quanta of high energy, and would alter the momentum and energy of the electron by impact. Similarly, to measure the momentum of an electron, quanta of low energy would have to be used. The wavelengths of such quanta being large, the position of the electron would be correspondingly indeterminate. Heisenberg's Principle of Uncertainty followed from the wave-particle duality of matter and radiation, and from the fact that the characteristics of objects were usually unavoidably altered during the course of experimentation.

The indeterminacy at the subatomic level meant that there could be only probabilistic knowledge of subatomic events. This fact made the physicists — and erroneously according to al-Ṣadr — abandon belief in the universality of the principle of causality. Not only that, they came to interpret the causal fixity and regularity of macroscopic events as a statistical phenomenon, analogous to the stability of, say, suicide rates.

Al-Ṣadr points out that the doubts raised by scientists in microphysics are based on a specific notion of the principle of causality different from the notion of it held by Muslim philosophers. According to the latter notion, the principle is not based on experimental evidence and stands above experimentation. Moreover, the limits of experiment prove only our inability to apply it in some fields, not the invalidity of this principle in those fields. In addition, microphysical experiments do

not offer any scientific evidence proving the falsity of the principle of causality in the field of subatomic physics. The introduction of indeterminacy is a problem of the observing subject, something which does not warrant the elimination of causal laws from the universe.

The Meaning of Causality:

Al-Ṣadr states that there are four theories which resulted from attempts to answer the question: Why do things require causes?

(1) The first theory, adopted by some Marxist theoreticians, states that an existent requires a cause for its existence. According to it, causality is a general law of existence as confirmed by scientific experiments. To regard the law of causality as an inductive principle, al-Ṣadr points out again, is an error. It is not within the scientific possibilities of experiment to indicate that the secret of the requirement for a cause lies at the heart of existence in general. The principle of causality is a purely philosophical principle and so also are the issues concerning it and the theories that treat its limits.

(2) The second theory, which al-Ṣadr calls "the theory of creation", asserts that things need causes for coming into existence. Thus if a thing exists continuously and always and has not come into being after not having existed, there will be no need in it for a cause, nor will it enter the realm of causality. While the first theory goes too far in generalizing causality, the second theory goes too far in restricting it.

(3) & (4) The other two are the theories of "essential possibility" and "existential possibility". These two theories assert that what makes things need their causes is possibility. They differ from each other due to their different notions of possibility, which relate to a difference regarding quiddity and existence. Since a discussion of this difference lies outside the scope of the book, al-Ṣadr limits himself to the discussion of the theory of existential possibility, advanced by Mullā Ṣadrā, which asserts the fundamentality of existence.

According to this theory, causality is a relation between two existences: the cause and the effect. If, for example, B is an effect of A, does B have an existence independent of A? The answer is in the negative. Causality requires that the effect does not have a reality prior to its link with its cause; otherwise, it will not be an effect. Moreover, B is not something that has a link or relation to the cause; rather it is the very linkage, in the sense that its being and existence become a conjunctive being and relational existence. The discontinuity of its linkage to its cause means destruction of it and an end of its being, for its being is represented in that linkage. A relational entity cannot be detached from the thing to which it is essentially linked or related. Moreover, all being is not governed by the principle of causality. Rather, this principle

governs the relational existents, whose reality embodies linkage and relation.

Here Martyr al-Şadr points out that the Marxists fluctuate between the dialectical model and causality while explaining phenomena. That is, while they regard internal contradiction as a sufficient explanation of every phenomenon in the universe, they also take recourse now and then to the cause-effect relation for explaining some phenomena by external causes. A relevant case is the Marxist assertion that the means of production make up the social infrastructure, whereas all other aspects of society, including the intellectual and political conditions, are considered superstructural. This means that the relation between the superstructure and the means of production is a cause-effect relation. Here, there is no contradiction but causality.

Contemporaneity Between Cause and Effect:

Since the existence of the effect is essentially linked to the existence of the cause, the cause is necessary for the effect and the effect must be contemporaneous with the cause so that its being and existence are linked to that cause. This is the law of contemporaneity between the cause and the effect. Two arguments were forwarded to prove that it is possible for the effect to continue after its cause ceases to exist.

(1) The first argument, put forward by theologians, rests on two ideas. The first is that things need causes in order to come into existence; after its coming into being, a thing has no need for a cause. However, as pointed out earlier, a thing's need for a cause is not for its coming into existence, but because its existence is essentially linked to its specific cause.

The second notion is that the law of contemporaneity between the cause and the effect is not consistent with a certain group of phenomena in the universe. For example, a building erected by builders continues to exist even after all of them are gone and are no more alive. Al-Şadr states that in all such examples, the error lies in identifying the real causes.

(2) The other theory, suggested by the modern science of mechanics, asserts that in the light of the laws of motion continuity of motion does not require a cause. According to the first law of motion, a body continues to move with a uniform velocity in a straight line, after an impulse is imparted to it, unless disturbed by an external force.

According to al-Şadr such an assertion leads to an immediate cancellation of the principle of causality. If it were possible for motion to continue without a cause, then it would also be possible for it to occur without a cause and for things to begin existing without a cause. The reason is that continuity of motion always involves a new coming

into existence.

According to al-Ṣadr, the experiments which suggest the first law of motion do not actually show that the external force is the real cause of motion. It is possible, he says, that the real cause of motion is something that had existed all along; external causes act to activate a force within the body and prepare it as cause (Muslim philosophers have believed that all accidental motion, including the mechanical motion of bodies, is produced by a force within bodies). As a result, al-Ṣadr finds the law of inertia to be incompatible with the law of causality.

It is amazing that the author should consider the first law of motion as incompatible with the principle of causality. But that is because he, in the tradition of Mullā Ṣadrā, considers motion as a continual renewal of existence, a continual recreation. Mechanics, on the other hand, considers rest as well as uniform motion in a straight line as unchanged states. Only acceleration is considered a change of state that requires an external cause or force. Also, Mullā Ṣadrā considers circular motion as the most perfect kind of motion (and, it may be remarked, such a conception of motion can have unfortunate consequences for any civilization that adopts it). There is no reason why simple mechanical motion should necessarily be considered a continual renewal of existence and no reason why the first law of motion should be *logically* incompatible with the principle of causality.

One wishes that al-Ṣadr had treated some concepts of traditional Muslim philosophy with the same critical scrutiny with which he treats the dialectics. It is the view of some historians of science that certain misconceptions about motion inherited by Muslim philosophy and science from Aristotle were responsible for the failure of Muslim scientists to develop the science of mechanics, which was developed by the West only after it discarded the misconceptions of Greek philosophy regarding motion.

On the whole, it may be stated that the arguments advanced by the author in favour of contemporaneity of cause and effect are not very convincing. At the end of the chapter he draws a theological conclusion from the above discussion. The causal chain which relates relational entities cannot be infinite or circular; for in that case all the parts of the chain will be effects. Hence the world proceeds from a being necessary in essence, self-sufficient and not requiring a cause. Every cause except the first cause is a cause-effect, and hence needs a cause. The first cause, being a pure cause, does not require a cause prior to it, for a thing does not require a cause *qua* cause but as an effect *qua* effect.

Matter or God?

The question dealt with in this chapter is whether the first cause of existence is matter or something transcending it. This is the ultimate issue in the conflict between theological philosophy and materialism. The dialectic is but an unsuccessful attempt of materialism to unite the efficient cause and the material cause of the world, in accordance with the laws of dialectical contradiction.

Al-Ṣadr briefly recapitulates the development of the scientific study of matter from Greek thought to the twentieth-century atomic physics. Modern physics discovered that energy is the substratum of the world and matter is a state of energy. In the light of these discoveries the quality of materiality itself becomes an accidental quality.

The philosophical conclusion that follows from this is that it is not possible to regard matter as the first cause of the world. Moreover, science has established that there is one kind of matter that underlies all the various elements, compounds, substances and things. But how can a single reality be the cause of different and contradictory manifestations? According to al-Ṣadr such a thing is not possible. Hence matter cannot be the efficient cause of the world, as the world is full of different and multifarious phenomena.

Furthermore, the properties or qualities that matter manifests in the various spheres of its existence are accidental to the primary reality of matter. Further, the property of materiality itself is also accidental. Hence, raw matter, which all things share, cannot be an essential cause of those properties or qualities.

Al-Ṣadr points out that the method followed by theology for demonstrating the necessity of an efficient cause of the world is the same as that followed by experimental science for explaining empirical phenomena. He does not fail to point out here that the dialectic with its theory of contradictions is able to account neither for the progression of the elements in the atomic table nor for the formation of chemical compounds.

Matter and Philosophy:

The above discussion related to the necessity of the efficient cause of the world in relation to matter as conceived by science. Thereafter, al-Ṣadr proposes to examine the question in the light of the philosophical conception of matter. By 'philosophical matter' he means the most primary matter of the world, whether or not experimental science is able to posit it. Philosophical matter is matter simpler than scientific matter and has a form. Its existence can be demonstrated philosophically.

Atomic physics posited Democritean atomism, the theory that bodies are not continuous and are composed of minute atoms. But there is a philosophical side to the Democritean theory which is rejected by philosophy. Philosophically, according to al-Ṣadr, the unit of matter posited by science must be continuous, for it cannot be a real unit without internal continuity. At the same time, on account of its continuity, it should be capable of division and separation. That is, the unit must have a simple matter which is receptive to division and separation. Matter, therefore, is that which is receptive to division and separation, which are destructive of unity. Philosophically, it is not possible to conceive a unit without the receptivity to division, regardless of the ability of scientific tools and methods to affect such a division. The discovery of the so-called fundamental particles as the primary units of matter does not settle the question as to whether or not they are receptive to division.

When the philosophical conception of matter, as something composed of matter and form is understood, we know, according to al-Ṣadr, that philosophical matter cannot be the first cause of the world.

Matter and Motion:

Matter is in continuous motion and constant development. Can the same thing be simultaneously a subject of motion and a cause of it? Metaphysics insists on the multiplicity of the mover and the moved, because motion (i.e. growth) is a gradual development and completion of a deficient thing. A deficient thing cannot be the cause of its own completion. In the light of this, the cause of developmental motion is not matter itself, but a cause transcending matter that imparts to matter linear motion and gradual development. Here it should be noted that al-Ṣadr does not attempt to distinguish between different kinds of motion, such as simple mechanical motion and organic growth.

Dialectical materialism, on the contrary, does not recognize this duality between the mover and the moved, and considers matter itself as the cause of its motion and development. From the viewpoint of theology, there are no actual contradictions contained in matter. The internal content of matter is empty of everything except receptivity and capacity. Motion is a gradual departure from potentiality to actuality. Matter is not the cause of motion, for it is devoid of the levels of completion attained in the various stages of development. It is, therefore, necessary to search for the cause of the substantial motion of matter outside its limits. It is also necessary that this cause be God, the Exalted, Who encompasses essentially all the ranks of completion and perfection.

Al-Ṣadr then calls our attention to the digestive and circulatory

systems which provide proper nutrients to every one of the billions of cells in the body. In the same way, he calls attention to the eye and the apparatus of vision as a proof of the design of a supreme intelligence. He points out that experimental biology has failed to explain the origin of life upon the earth. He asks whether the astonishing work of the genes, which control the character of every cell and bestow particular traits to an organism, could be products of haphazard chance. He discusses various theories of animal instinct and finds all of them inadequate in explaining the wonderful behaviour of the bee, the shark, the ant, the hen and the eel. The only adequate explanation is that instinctive behaviour is the result of a mysterious, divine, supernatural inspiration. The marvellous order underlying nature bears testimony to the presence of an omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent intelligence.

The Nature of Knowledge:

The most important issue of epistemology, according to al-Ṣadr, is the one concerning the reality of knowledge: Is knowledge a material or an immaterial phenomenon? Marxism asserts that knowledge and thought are material, organic processes of the brain.

Scientific exploration of the processes of sensation and consciousness has revealed beyond doubt that there are physical, chemical and physiological events involved in the functioning of the sense organs and the nervous system. However, these findings do not prove that perception, knowledge, thought and consciousness are material processes and that mind is grounded in matter. Such an assertion about the reality of the mind lies outside the scope of experimental science. Similarly, psychology, either through introspection or objective observation, studies psychological phenomena; but the nature of knowledge and the reality of the mind are questions that have to be dealt by the philosophy of mind.

Al-Ṣadr takes up the nature of the perceived image in visual perception as an example to argue in favour of the immateriality of the mind.

When we enter a vast garden extending for thousands of meters, at a glance we perceive its extent together with most of the trees and objects that are in it. Is the image of the garden that we grasp a material image existing in a part of our brain? It is, according to materialism. It is not, according to the metaphysical view; it is a metaphysical entity outside the realm of the material world. It is true that the light rays form an image on the retina, and this image is transferred in some form to the brain. Nevertheless, the image transferred to the brain is other than the mental image. Al-Ṣadr offers two reasons for believing so.

Firstly, he states, the mental image does not have the same "geo-

metrical properties" as those of the material image transferred to the brain, because the former resembles the garden in extent, form and geometric properties, whereas the brain and its image are small and the imprinting of a large thing on a small thing is impossible. Therefore, it must be an immaterial image.

Secondly, the mental image is inclined to stability and does not change in accordance with the changes of the image reflected in the nervous system. What al-Ṣadr means by the 'stability' of the mental image is this: If, for example, I place a pencil at a distance of one meter from me it will form an image of a specific size on the retina. If this distance is doubled, the retinal image would be reduced in size accordingly. However, al-Ṣadr claims, in spite of this reduction in the size of the retinal image, the mental image we have of the pencil remains stable in size. This also proves, according to him, that the mental image is immaterial.

Both of the above arguments offered by al-Ṣadr appear to be invalid. In the first argument, the actual size of the mental image is assumed to be the same as that of the viewed object (garden, in the example). However, when one is inside a room, the visual field presents a part of the room; when viewing a landscape, it covers a much wider space consisting of near and distant objects. When viewing the sky at night, the same visual field presents stars located at astronomical distances. It is not logical to claim that the mental image assumes the extent of the room in the first case, the extent of the landscape in the second, and the extent of the Milky Way in the third. That the second argument is invalid will be revealed by a simple visual experiment. Every student of drawing familiar with the laws of perspective knows that objects of similar size should be drawn on a scale proportional to their distance of location. The 'stability' of size, referred to by al-Ṣadr, is simply an illusion.

However, the failure of these arguments does not mean that the philosophical position asserting the immateriality of the mind is indefensible. An argument that may be offered in favour of this position is the following. If we assume the contents of the mind to be material, then it can be said that the mind should be in direct contact with the fundamental reality of matter when perceiving the data of the senses, as well as while experiencing any of its phenomena, such as thoughts, dreams, feelings, emotions, and everything else that enters the consciousness. That is, the fundamental reality of matter must be the object of the mind's direct experience if its phenomena are of a material nature. However, we see that we do not come across any molecules, atoms or sub-atomic particles, which are what matter is composed of according to science, in any sphere of our consciousness. Moreover, it is believed that the reality of matter is one, while the phenomena that

manifest themselves in consciousness are fundamentally various. The data of the senses — smells, tactual impressions, impressions of taste, sounds, colours — are fundamentally of a different nature from one another. Further, perceived impressions of each class are different from imagined, dreamt, or recalled impressions of that class. Again, all the impressions of the senses are fundamentally different from thoughts. None of them can be imagined as being reducible into another, nor all of them can be reducible to any single substratum called matter. Furthermore, each of the impressions of the senses, and so also thoughts, are fundamental realities experienced by the mind. They are signs and images in that they represent something other than themselves, but in themselves they are things in that they are what they are. Material objects are represented by them in that they are images; but nothing that we know about matter enters their actual constitution as things.

Now, going back to al-Şadr's discourse, if there are two sides to a human being, one spiritual or immaterial and the other material and physical, how do the two sides constantly affect each other? Plato was unable to bridge the gulf between the soul and the body. Descartes' theory of parallelism denied that there was any causal relation between physical and mental events, and hence admitted an unbridgeable gulf between the body and the mind. This failure leads to the crystallization of the inclination in European philosophy to explain man's being on the basis of one principle, matter or mind, leading to the opposite tendencies of materialism and idealism.

In the Islamic world, the explanation of human being on the basis of two principles, spiritual and material, found its most convincing formulation in the thought of Şadr al-Muta'allihîn or Mullâ Şadrâ. According to Mullâ Şadrâ, movement does not occur only in the accidents, but goes on in the substances and in the core of the being of things. He called it *al-ḥarakat al-jawhariyyah*, substantial movement. According to his theory, matter in its substantial movement pursues the completing of its existence until it assumes an immaterial being, becoming free from all materiality. Thus, there remains no dividing line between spirituality and materiality. Rather, they are two levels of existence. In spite of the fact that the soul is not material, yet it has material relations, because it is the highest stage of the completion of matter in its substantial movement. The difference between materiality and spirituality is just a matter of degree. However, it does not mean that the soul is a product of matter and one of its effects. Rather, it is a product of substantial movement, which does not proceed from matter itself. The reason is that every movement is a gradual emergence of a thing from potentiality to actuality. Potentiality cannot bring about actuality, and possibility cannot bring about existence. Therefore, substantial movement has its cause outside matter. The soul is

'Alī Qulī Qarā'ī

a product of this movement, which itself is the bridge between materiality and spirituality.

Concluded — wa al-ḥamdu lillāh.

Islam and Iran:

A Historical Study of Mutual Services *Part 1*

by Martyr Murtadā Muṭahharī

Translated from the Persian by Dr. Wahīd Akhtar

As history shows, we Iranians, during the several thousand years of our existence, have had relations with other nations, sometimes friendly and sometimes hostile, depending on various historical factors. In this process we came in touch with different ideas and faiths. Similarly, we, in our own turn, influenced the beliefs and thoughts of others. Of course, we have resisted the intrusions of alien nationalities and did not let ourselves to be assimilated into a foreign nation. Though we have been attached to our national character, this strong attachment was never chauvinistic and blind; it did not block our inner vision or close our eyes to realities or hamper our sense of discretion. It did not breed in us any kind of grudge or hostility against realities and facts.

Since the inception of the Achaemenid dynasty, when the whole of present Iran as well as some parts of neighbouring countries were brought under a single rule, about two thousand and five hundred years have passed, out of which we have been living with Islam for fourteen hundred years. This religion has been part and parcel of our life and being. Our children learn the tenets of this faith in their cradle and

*This is Part One of *Khadamāt-e mutaqābil-e Īrān wa Islām* (The Mutual Services of Islam and Iran) which the author wrote around the year 1386 H./1966—7. Its first edition appeared in 1349 H.Sh/1970 (not in 1960, and we hereby apologize for the error in the earlier note to the translation of the book's introduction which appeared in *al-Tawhīd*, vol.V, Nos. 3 & 4). This part of the book is intended as a rejoinder to the Iranian nationalists who under the joint patronage of Western Imperialism and the Pahlawi regime had launched an anti-Islamic campaign under the guise of patriotism. The book reflects the political climate of Iran and the Muslim world in 1960's, and the reader should keep this in view.

continue to live with it through their lives. We have worshipped the One God according to the injunctions of this faith, and have buried our dead in accordance with its rituals. Our history, our literature, our politics, our system of law and judiciary, our culture and civilization, our social institutions — in short every mode of our life has been inseparably intertwined with this faith. All knowledgeable persons acknowledge that we have rendered extraordinarily valuable and highly admirable services to Islamic culture and have put in greater efforts for the advancement and propagation of its teachings among other peoples of the world than any other Muslim nation, including even Arabs. No nation or country has been ever so active in propagating, preaching, popularizing and disseminating its teachings to the extent that we have been.

On this basis, we have every right to investigate various aspects of the mutual relationship between Iran and Islam, and highlight our share in the propagation of Islamic teachings as well as the contribution of Islam to various aspects of our material and spiritual progress in the light of authentic historical sources.

Nationalism in the Present Age:

One of the problems of the modern age that attracts much discussion and debate is the issue of nationalism. These days many nations of the world, including Iranian and non-Iranian Muslims pay special attention to this issue, and some of them are so much absorbed in this matter that their engrossment knows no limits.

In reality, the issue of nationalism has created a great difficulty in the present world of Islam. Apart from the fact that nationalism is incompatible with Islamic principles — for Islam regards all races to be equal — it has proved to be the biggest hurdle in the way of the unity of Muslims.

As we know, the Islamic society is composed of different peoples, and in the past Islam succeeded in unifying these different and diverse nations to form a single unit called Islamic society. This unity still exists. That is, in actual fact there is at present a single unit of seven hundred million people who share the same faith, the same ideals, a similar emotional ethos, and a powerful sense of solidarity prevails among them. Whatever dividing lines that seem to exist between them, are not related to the people; they are drawn by governments, states and politics. In modern times the European powers and the U.S. have been the greatest factor in this division. Despite it all, none of these factors could destroy the strong sense of unity among the people. In the words of Iqbal Lahori:

امر حق را حجت و دعوی یکیست خیمه های ما جدا، دلها یکیست
از حجاز و چین و ایرانیم ما شبنم یک صبح خندانیم ما

The Truth has only one proof and a single message,
Our tents are separate, but our hearts are together;
We are from the Hijāz, China and Iran,
(But) we are the dew drops of the same smiling dawn.

Every year the members of this great unit make up the one-and-a-half-million strong congregation on the occasion of Hajj.

But, on the other side, the ideologies of nationalism and racism want to array various nations against each other. This trend reigned supreme in the last few centuries in Europe. It was perhaps natural in their context, for no ideology existed there to unite them in one sublime human unit. This trend infiltrated the Eastern nations through the agency of colonialism. For the purpose of implementing its principle of "Divide and rule", colonialism could not find a better way than encouraging nationalist tendencies to divide the Muslim peoples and countries. It diverted their thoughts to a false pride in racial and national distinctions. It tells the Indian that you possess such and such a heritage; to the Turk it says that they should start the Young Turk movement and espouse Pan-Turkism; to the Arabs, who of all nations are more vulnerable to such prejudices, its advice is to rely on their Arab character and to patronize Pan-Arabism; and the Iranians are told that they are Aryans and should therefore consider themselves separate from the Arab Semites.

The ideology of nationalism and the nationalist ethos can occasionally play some positive and useful role in securing independence for some countries, but in the Islamic countries, they, far from being positive, have resulted in dividing Muslims and separating them from one another. It is for centuries that these nations have passed through this stage and have entered a higher phase. Many centuries have passed since Islam created a unity of thought, creed and ideology, and in the twentieth century Islam has showed its potential for playing a decisive role in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism.

During the twentieth century, in the struggles that the Muslims waged against imperialism and which resulted in their liberation from its clutches, the factor of Islam was far more effective than the factor of nationalism, as in the cases of Algeria, Indonesia, the Arab countries and Pakistan.

Yes, for centuries these nations have proved that they can bring about solidarity and wage struggle on the basis of an ideology and faith and achieve freedom from imperialism. Diverting the attention of such a people towards nationalism cannot be called anything but reactionism.

However, the trends of racial separatism and racism, which have been encouraged by the Europeans, have created a great difficulty for the Islamic world. It is said that the reason why Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn Asadābādī concealed his nationality was that he did not wish to identify himself with any particular nation, for it could have been utilized by the imperialists for inciting others' sentiments against him.

We, being the followers of a faith, creed and ideology called Islam, which negates all the elements of racism and nationalism, cannot remain indifferent to currents and movements that oppose this ideology and take shape under the label of nationalism.

We all know that lately innumerable persons have started a wide campaign in Iran against Islam in the name of the defence of Iranian nationhood, and in the guise of struggle against Arabs and Arabism they have insulted the sanctities of Islam. We find the evidence of such a campaign against Islam everywhere — in books, newspapers, journals, weeklies, etc. It shows that this is not something accidental; it is a preconceived plan and has a purpose behind it. The Zoroastrian propaganda, too, has assumed greater dimensions today, and it also has a political motive. All of us know that the Iranian of today will never accept that faith and will never regard it as an alternative to Islamic teachings. The figures out of Mazdak, Manichaen and Zoroastrian and all traditions who are being projected, falsely, as 'national' figures — who have no distinguishing mark except that of being antithetical to Islamic teachings, whether they formally fought against Islam or indirectly struggled against it in the name of struggle against Arab domination — can never in the hearts of the Iranians take the place of the heroes of Islam. Muqanna', Sandbād, Bābak Khurramī and Māzyār can never take the place of 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī or even that of Salmān al-Fārsī. This is obvious enough, and everybody knows it.

Nevertheless, it is possible to incite raw and ignorant youths against Islam by playing upon national, racial and patriotic sentiments and to sever their relation with Islam. That is, though no other religious sentiments can possibly replace the Islamic ethos, their pro-Islamic sentiments can be transformed into anti-Islamic feelings, thus rendering a valuable service to imperialism. Hence we see that those who are totally opposed to any kind of faith and religion and are anti-God, highlight the virtues of Zoroastrianism and pre-Islamic Iran in their worthless and absurd works and writings. Their aims are obvious.

In our discussion of this subject, we shall enter it with the same logic as employed by our opponents, that is, the logic of national sentiments and nationalism. Yes, with the same logic, although we are aware, as Iqbāl Lāhorī said, nationalism is a kind of barbarism. We are aware that national sentiments, so far as they play a positive role and

result in fruitful service to one's countrymen, deserve appreciation. But when they take a negative aspect that gives rise to discrimination in judgement, in seeing, or result in ignoring virtues and evils and inculcate partialities, they are incompatible with morality and humanism. We are aware of the existence of a logic that is higher than the logic of nationalism, according to which knowledge, science, philosophy and faith are over and above the level of sentiments. National sentiments and pride may have some place in some spheres, but they are undesirable in the scientific, philosophical and religious quest for truth. A scientific hypothesis or a philosophical theory or a religious doctrine cannot be accepted just because it belongs to one's own nation or country. In the same way, these cannot be ignored or rejected because of their being forwarded by foreigners. He spoke the truth who said: "Science, philosophy and religion have no homeland; they are cosmopolitan and universal." Similarly the men of science, religion and philosophy do not belong to any particular land; they are citizens of the world and belong to entire humanity; every land is their home and all the people of the world are their fellow countrymen. Yes, we are aware of all these things.

But at this stage we are not concerned with that higher logic of reason and humanity; rather we want to discuss the issue with the same logic of sentiments that suits unedified human beings. We want to see whether Islam is to be reckoned as an alien force or not when viewed through the logic of sentiments; whether in accordance with the criteria of nationalism Islam is part of the Iranian nation and Iranian national sentiments, whether they include or exclude Islam.

Accordingly we should divide our discussion into two parts: First, what is the criterion of nationality? That is, what is the criterion according to which something is considered to be part of a nation or alien to it? Secondly, we have to see whether according to this criterion Islam is compatible with Iranian nationalism or is something foreign and alien to it. Thus our argument consists of a major premise and a minor premise. The first part of our discussion forms the major premise, while the second part makes up the minor premise.

As a secondary issue, we shall compare and contrast Islam and Zoroastrianism, and see which of the two religions, according to the criteria nationalism, has a more dominant Iranian aspect.

The Term "Nation" (Millat):

"*Millah*" is an Arabic word, which means path or creed. In the Qur'an it occurs 17 times in 15 verses, with the same meaning.² But the sense this term carries in the Qur'an is different from its meaning in modern Persian usage. From this word they have derived another term, that is, "*milliyyat*" (nationality or nationhood).

“*Millah*” in the terminology of the Qur’ān means the ‘way’ or ‘path’ shown to the people by a God-sent leader. For instance, it says, *مِلَّةَ أَبِيكُمْ إِبْرَاهِيمَ*, “The creed of your father, Ibrāhīm.” In another place it says: *مِلَّةَ إِبْرَاهِيمَ حَنِيفًا*, “The creed of Ibrāhīm, a man of pure faith.” Al-Rāghib al-’Iṣfahānī, in his book *Mufradāt al-Qur’ān*, writes: “*Millah* and *imlāl*, the latter meaning *imlā*’ (dictation), are from one root: *فَلْيُمْلِلْ وَلِيَّهُ بِالْعَدْلِ* “Then let his guardian dictate justly.” Al-Rāghib says further: “The reason for calling a Divine path ‘*millah*’ is that it is dictated by God.”

Hence, from the Qur’ānic point of view, a system of ideas and beliefs and a path which people must follow is called *millah*. Therefore *millah* is synonymous with *dīn*, with the only difference that the same reality is called *dīn* from one point of view and *millah* from another. It is *millah* as it is dictated by God to a prophet, that he may communicate it to people and lead them accordingly. The etymologists say: The difference between the word *dīn* and the word *millah* is that *dīn* may be prefixed with God, as in *Dīn Allāh*, that is, ‘the creed of God’; similarly, this word may also be prefixed with the name of a follower, as in *dīn Zayd*, *dīn ‘Amr*, etc. But the word *millah* is neither prefixed to God nor to the name of a follower; it is never said “*millah* of God” or “*millah* of Zayd or ‘Amr”. On the other hand, it is joined to the name of the prophet or leader who is appointed by God to lead people on a specific path. For instance it is said *millat Ibrāhīm*, or *millat ‘Isā* or *millat Muḥammad*. It is as if the sense of leadership is implied in the word *millah*.

On this basis it can be said that the term *millah* is closer to another term, *maktab* (school). This word, too, is prefixed to the name of the leader or founder of a doctrine or way. If we take into consideration the fact that the word *maktab*, also like the word *millah*, implies the sense of dictation, the close affinity between the two terms will become more explicit.

The Word ‘Millat’ in Modern Persian:

In modern Persian this word has assumed quite a different meaning far from its original import. Nowadays the word is used to refer to a social unit having a particular historical past, a common code, a common government, and, occasionally, having common ideals and aspirations. Today, instead of saying the people of Germany, England or France, we say the *millat* of Germany (German nation), the *millat* of England, or the *millat* of France. Often we do not apply this term to the entire people but mean by it to refer to one class of the people, who are divided into two classes, the ruling and the ruled. The ruling class is called the ‘government’ (*dawlat*) and only the ruled one is called *millat*.

This is a newly-coined term in Persian, and is actually a misuse. A hundred, two hundred, or a thousand years ago this word was not used in this sense. I think this word in its present sense came into usage since the Constitution Movement. It appears that the cause of this incorrect usage is that it was joined with another word as a noun in the genitive case (*mudāf ilayh*). For example, they would speak of the followers of the *millat* of Ibrāhīm (*payrawān-e millat-e Ibrāhīm*), the followers of the *millat* of Muḥammad (S), or the followers of the *millat* of Christ, and so on. Later, the word 'followers' was dropped and the term assumed its current form: *millat-e Muḥammad* (S), *millat-e Ibrāhīm*, *millat-e 'Īsā*. This usage was later stretched to the extent of being applied to different nations: *millat-e Irān* (the Iranian nation), *millat-e Turk*, *millat-e 'Arab*, *millat-e Inglīs*, etc. Anyhow, this is a new term.

The Arabs of today use the words *qawm* or *sha'b* on the occasions that we use the word *millat*. For instance, they say *al-sha'b al-'Irānī* or *al-sha'b al-Miṣrī*, etc. For the sake of our present study we shall use the modern Persian terms *millat* and *milliyyat* in their current sense, irrespective of their being wrong or right.

Milliyyat (Nationality) from the Social Viewpoint:

Leaving lexical and etymological consideration aside, we now enter the sociological study of the subject. The smallest social unit is the family. So far as this unit is confined to wife and husband, children and grandchildren, and sometimes sons and daughters-in-law, it is called 'family'. The family is an ancient institution. Since his own origin, man has been living a family life. Some believe that the animal ancestors of the present man also led some kind of family life. The unit bigger than family is tribe, which is comprised of families having the same ancestry. Tribal life is a further step in the social evolution of a man. It is said that in the individual and the family life of the primitive man everything was owned collectively, and nothing belonged to anybody specially. Private property was a later development.

Another social unit, larger and more developed, which includes a single government and a common law code is called *millat* in the present Persian terminology. The national (*millī*) unit may have been formed of tribes with a common ancestry, or tribes with different ancestories might have merged to constitute a single unit. It is also possible that a people forming a *millat* did not have a tribal life at all, and if there existed any tribal tradition among them it did not include all the people but only some of them.

In the book *The Principles of Political Science* (vol.1, p.327), it is written that:³

In the distinction made between the terms 'nation' and 'people' in the twentieth century, the word 'people' is used to specify a social group, while the term 'nation' from a legal and political viewpoint refers to a social unit settled in a specific geographical territory, and this settlement results in historical, linguistic, religious and economic unity, or gives rise to common ideals and aspirations and a desire for the continuity of a common way of life. The word 'people' has more of a sociological connotation, whereas 'nation' is more relevant from the viewpoint of law and politics, national or international. Apart from this, the usage of these terms in Marxist and liberal jargons entails a different sense, and one has to be attentive to the ideology of a speaker or writer in his usages.

In the present world numerous nations exist. What gives them the form of a nation is a common system of life, law and government, not something else such as race, blood, etc. Their common feature is that they are managed by a single government. Some of these nations do not have a considerably long history, but were born as a result of a social accident. For instance, many nations of the Middle East were born as a result of the Second World War and the defeat of the Ottomans.

At present there is no nation that is totally different from all other nations racially. For example, are we, Iranians, who enjoy a past history and are governed by a specific law code and have a particular form of government, different from all the neighbouring nations in regard to blood and race? Is it correct to claim that we are Aryans, while Arabs are Semitic? Has there remained any trace of the purity of race after the intermingling of the different races for centuries?

In fact, the distinction of blood and race is nothing but a myth, for the Semites and the Aryans were separate and independent races only in the past. So much intermixing and intermingling, transfer and exchange of population has occurred for such a long time that no race has remained pure. Many of the people of present Iran who speak Persian and champion the cause of Iranism are Arab, Turk or Mongol by origin, in the same fashion as many of the Arab patrons of Arabism are Persians, Turks or Mongols by origin. Just now if you travel to Makkah and Madīnah, you shall see that most of their residents are by origin Indians or Iranians, or from Balkh or Bukhārā or some other place. Perhaps many of those who exhibit extreme Arab chauvinism are from the race of Cyrus or Darius, and, contrarily, perhaps many of those who blow hard the trumpet of Persian chauvinism are descendants of Abū Sufyān and his peers. A few years ago, one of the professors of Tehran University took great pains to prove that Yazīd ibn Mu'āwiyah was Persian by origin, to say nothing of his descendants who may still inhabit this county.

Hence what is indicated by the term 'our nation' is that we are a people who presently live together in a territory under one flag and one

government and lead our lives according to specific laws. But as to whether our ancestors were, for certain, Persian or Greek or Arab or Mongol or some other thing, we do not know.

If we, Iranians, were to judge people on the basis of race and accept only those as Iranians who are of Aryan origin, we shall have to regard the majority of our people as non-Iranians and shall have to give up many of our great men. That is, it will be the severest blow that we shall have dealt to our own nationhood. At present, there are peoples and tribes living in Iran who neither speak Persian nor do they consider themselves Aryan by race.

In any case, making claims of the purity of race and blood in the present age is nothing but nonsensical.

National Prejudices:

A social unit, whether it is family or tribe or nation, carries with it some kind of feelings and prejudices, which result in a kind of partiality towards one's family, kin or nation. This sense of partiality may assume broader forms of loyalty to embrace a much bigger unit, even of continental or regional dimensions. For instance, the people of Europe nurse a feeling of partiality against the people of Asia, and vice versa. Similarly the people of a race may possibly nurse a similar feeling for the members of their race.

The sense of nationhood belongs to the family of egoistic feelings that crosses the confines of the individual and the tribe to encompass the people of an entire nation. This loyalty inevitably carries with it all the moral accidents accompanying egoism, such as prejudice, pride, blindness to one's own vices (on the plane of the nation), exaggeration of one's virtues, self-aggrandizement, and the like.

Nationalism:

The inclination towards one's own people or nation is called 'nationalism' in European languages, which is translated by some scholars of Persian as *millat parastī*. Nationalism, as mentioned above, is based upon the sentiments and feelings for one's own people and nation, not on logical or rational grounds. Nationalism should not be condemned outright, for if its positive aspect is practised it brings about solidarity, good relations, benevolence and readiness for the service of fellow beings who live together. In this sense it is not opposed to reason or logic, nor is it a vice from the Islamic point of view. Islam rather encourages it, for in its view neighbours and relatives have preference over others in the matter of legal rights.

Nationalism is open to rational criticism when it takes a negative

aspect; that is, when it separates people from one another by cultivating hostile feelings towards others, and ignores the legitimate rights of others.

The view opposite to nationalism is internationalism, which condemns national feelings, and views things on the basis of universal standards. But, as pointed above, Islam is not for total condemnation of nationalist feelings; it condemns only the negative feelings towards others and not the positive feelings for one's own people.

The Criterion of Nationality:

At the outset it appears that nationalism necessitates that every thing that belongs to a certain land and is the product of its people's innovative thought is to be accepted as national and deserves to attract national sentiments, while all other things which belong to other lands and people are to be regarded as alien and foreign. But this is not a correct criterion; for a nation comprises a large number of individuals and it is just possible that one of them may invent something that is not acceptable to all the people and the public taste; no doubt, such a thing cannot acquire a national character. For instance, suppose a nation adopts a particular social system suited to its life-style, and one or more individuals of the same nation conjure up and suggest a system different from the former that fails to win public acceptability. In this case the rejected system will not be considered to be a national phenomenon just because its inventor or builder is a member of the nation. On the other hand, it is possible that a social system is developed outside the confines of a nation by individuals of another nationality, but the people of the nation welcome it with open arms. It is evident that in this case we should not consider the system alien just because it is borrowed from outside, or condemn the people who have accepted it for behaving against the principle of nationalism and for letting their nation to be submerged into another one, or condemn them for transforming their national character.

Of course, the thing borrowed from outside may be called alien and its acceptance may be dubbed as contrary to the principle of nationalism, and even on occasions may be considered to entail a total transformation of a nation's character, when that thing carries the special character of a particular nation and is totally alien to the modes and norms of the nation that adopts it. Evidently, in such cases, when a nation accepts another nation's mode of living and moulds itself upon it, it is against the principle of national identity. For instance, Nazism and Zionism possess specific national characters, and in case another nations adopt them they will have acted against their own national character.

But in case a thing has no special colour of a nation, its relevance to all nations will transcend national boundaries and it will be accepted as having a general and universal human character. It will never be considered to be contrary or alien to the character of a nation. In the jargon of theology students: *إِنِ الْإِبْشَرِطُ يَتَّفِقُ وَيَجْتَمِعُ مَعَ الْإِبْشَرِطِ* (i.e. A thing having no colour can adapt to a thousand conditions). But a thing possessing a specific nature and colour cannot be adopted by any other coloured thing.

On the basis of this argument, scientific truths belong to the whole world. The theorem of Pythagoras or Einstein's theory of relativity are not confined to any particular nation and are not alien to any people, for they contain truths which have no specific colour and are devoid of any specific national character. It is for this reason that scientists, philosophers and prophets belong to all the people of the world, as their beliefs and ideals are not confined to any particular people or nation.

The sun is not specifically related to any nation and no nation is alien to it, for the sun shines over all the world and its light and heat are not confined to any particular land. If some lands benefit less than others by it, that is due to their own situation, not due to the sun itself, which does not limit itself to any particular land.

Hence we come to know that just because a thing emerges in a certain nation it is not confined to it, and just because a thing comes from a foreign land it is not necessarily alien.

In the same way, past history is in no way a criterion of action. That is, a nation may adopt a particular social system for centuries and change it afterwards by substituting another system. For example, we, the people of Iran, have been, for twenty-five centuries of our national history, like many other nations, living under despotic regimes; it is only for the last half a century that we have opted for a constitutional system in its place. Though we did not invent it and it came from outside, our people not only opted for it, but also offered great sacrifices to realize it. Of course, at the same time there were many people who resisted it with a strange stubbornness, rose up in arms and shed their blood for the sake of defending the despotic regime. But as they were a minority and the majority of the Iranian people had accepted the constitutional system, the minority was defeated and it ultimately surrendered to the will of the majority.

Should we, now, consider constitutionalism as our own national system of government, or should we say that our national government should remain despotic and consider the constitutional regime as alien to us, because despotic government not a constitutional regime has been with us in the course of our long national history and moreover because this form of government was not developed by us and was borrowed from outside?

We have not drawn up the Declaration of Human Rights, nor had we any role in it. The issues that have been propounded in it were never raised in the course of our history, but we have accepted its articles, more or less like other nations of the world. Now what we have to say about this Declaration from the Iranian nationalist viewpoint? What do all other nations, whom this declaration has reached from outside, say about it? Do our national sentiments demand — on the basis of our past record and on the ground that this declaration had originated outside our borders — that we resist it and discard it as alien to us? Or should we accept it, as something our own and not as alien, on the basis of the two aforesaid principles, that, firstly, because it has no specific national colour and, secondly, because our nation has accepted it?

The converse of it may also to be taken into consideration. For instance, it is just possible that a law or creed evolving in our own nation be not considered as national, either for having the colour of some other nation or because it is not acceptable to our nation despite emerging within its confines. For example, Manicheism and Mazdakism emerged within our own nation, but they could not win the support of our people. For this very reason we cannot accept them as the spiritual expressions of our people.

Basically if we treat such matters as national just because they were Iranian innovations and were followed by a small number of our people, we shall have ignored the sentiments of the majority.

From what has been said hitherto, it is clear that from the standpoint of nationalist sentiments and inclinations, neither everything evolved in our land has a national character, nor is everything coming to our country from a foreign land necessarily alien. It is better first to know if a thing has a particular national colour or is colourless and universal in nature; secondly, it is to be seen whether the nation under study has accepted it willingly and voluntarily. If both the conditions are fulfilled, the thing will be considered non-alien and regarded as our own. If these two conditions are not fulfilled, but only one of them or none is fulfilled, in both the cases any idea or thing will be regarded as alien. In any case, the sole consideration that a thing has evolved in a certain nation neither necessarily entails its being considered national nor does it imply that it is alien.

At this juncture we should take up the issue as to whether Islam in Iran fulfils both these conditions. That is, we have to see whether Islam has a particular colour (viz. the Arab colour), or if it is a religion of universal character, free from any specific national or racial characteristic. Secondly, one has to see whether Iran accepted it willingly or under duress.

Whatsoever has been said so far forms 'the major premise', in the jargon of the students of theology (*ṭullāb*). Now we have to take up

'the minor premise'.

Islamic Internationalism:

It is certain that nationalism in its present sense has no place in Islam. On the contrary, this religion treats all nations and peoples as equals. From the very outset Islam did not specify any particular people for its call. Rather, it has always endeavoured to eradicate nationalist sentiments and racial prejudices from their roots.

It is essential to divide this discussion into two parts: firstly, that Islam had a universal objective from its very inception; secondly, that Islamic criteria are universal and not national, regional or racial.

The Universality of Islam's Objectives:

Some European authors claim that in the beginning Islam aimed at guiding only the people of the Quraysh, but when it saw its mission progress it resolved to extend its invitation to all Arab and non-Arab peoples. This is an unmanly slander against Islam, and has no truth. Besides, it is not supported by any historical evidence and is contrary to the principles that can be inferred from the first verses of the Qur'an to be revealed to the Prophet (S). In the Qur'an there are early verses revealed at Makkah, which show that from its very beginning Islam had a universal mission.

One of such verses is a verse of the *Sūrat al-Takwīr*, one of the shorter Makkan *sūrahs* which was revealed in the early days of the Prophet's mission. It is as follows:

إِنْ هُوَ إِلَّا ذِكْرٌ لِلْعَالَمِينَ ﴿٢٧﴾

It (the Qur'an) is nothing but a Reminder unto the worlds. (81:27)

In another verse in the *Sūrat Saba'*, it is said:

وَمَا أَرْسَلْنَاكَ إِلَّا كَافَّةً لِّلنَّاسِ بَشِيرًا وَنَذِيرًا وَلَكِنَّ أَكْثَرَ النَّاسِ لَا يَعْلَمُونَ ﴿٢٨﴾

And We have not sent you but as a bearer of good tidings and a warner to all the men, but most men do not know. (34:28)

In the *Sūrat al-'Anbiyā'*, also, it is declared:

وَلَقَدْ كَتَبْنَا فِي الزَّبُورِ مِن بَعْدِ الذِّكْرِ أَنَّ الْأَرْضَ يَرْثُهَا عِبَادِيَ الصَّالِحُونَ ﴿١٠٩﴾

And verily We have written in the Psalms (Zabūr), after the Reminder, that My

righteous slaves will inherit the earth. (21:105)

Also, the *Sūrat al-'Aṣṣaf* contains this verse:

قُلْ يٰٓاَيُّهَا النَّاسُ اِنِّي رَسُوْلُ اللّٰهِ اِلَيْكُمْ جَمِيْعًا ...

Say (O Muḥammad [S]): "O mankind! Lo I am the messenger of God to you all...." (7:158)

Nowhere in the Qur'ān do we see the mode of address "O Arabs", or "O people of Quraysh". Of course, on some occasions, its address is: *يا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا*, "O those who believe", which is specifically related to the believers who had gathered around the Prophet (S). But addressing the believers in this way, also, does not involve any discrimination, for it includes the believers of all tribes and nations. In other cases where the address relates to mankind in general, it says: *يا أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ* "O mankind".

There is another point that strengthens the view that Islam has always been universal in its mission and appeal; there are verses in the Qur'ān which indicate an attitude of imperious indifference toward the Arabs, so far as their acceptance of Islam is concerned. The crux of these verses is that Islam is not dependent upon Arabs; if they do not embrace it, there are other nations in the world who will submit to it, most heartily and willingly. On the whole, it may rather be inferred from these verses that the spirit of those other nations is more compatible with and attuned to Islam than that of the Arabs. These verses prove the universal character of Islam in a convincing manner. It is said in the *Sūrat al-'An'ām*:

... فَإِن يَكْفُرْ بِهَا هَؤُلَاءِ فَقَدْ وَكَلْنَا بِهَا قَوْمًا لَّيْسُوا بِهَا بِكَافِرِينَ ﴿٨٩﴾

...But if these disbelieve therein, then indeed We shall entrust it to a people who will not be disbelievers therein. (6:89)

The *Sūrat al-Nisā'* also affirms this:

إِن يَشَأْ يُذْهِبْكُمْ أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ وَيَأْتِ بِآخَرِينَ ۗ وَكَانَ اللَّهُ عَلَىٰ ذَٰلِكَ قَدِيرًا ﴿١٣٣﴾

If He will, He can remove you, O people, and produce others (in your stead). Allah is able to do that. (4:133)

In the *Sūrat Muḥammad* it is stated:

... وَإِن تَوَلَّوْا يَسْتَبَدِلْ قَوْمًا غَيْرَكُمْ ثُمَّ لَا يَكُونُوا أَمْثَلَكُمْ ﴿٢٨﴾

...He will exchange you for some other folk, and they will not be likes of you.(47:38)

In the context of this verse al-'Imām Muḥammad al-Bāqir (A) said: "By the 'other folk' here is meant the *mawālī*", who were Iranians. Al-'Imām Ja'far al-Ṣādiq (A) also said: "This matter — that is, the Arabs' turning their backs upon the Qur'ān — came to be true, and in their place God sent the *mawālī* — that is, Iranians — and they willingly and readily embraced Islam."⁵

Anyhow, our intention at the present is not to prove that the Qur'ānic phrase "other people" refers to Iranians or non-Iranians. What we want to submit is that from the viewpoint of the acceptance of Islam both Arabs and non-Arabs were equal in the eyes of Islam, to the extent that Arabs were repeatedly censured for their indifference to Islam. Islam wanted Arabs to understand that whether they embraced Islam or not, this religion would make a headway, for it was not a religion specially meant for a particular people.

Here another point needs to be noted. The matter of the spreading of a faith, an ideology, a religion or a creed beyond its original frontiers and its influence in other lands and over the people of far-flung countries is not confined to Islam only. All the great religions of the world — rather all the great creeds — were not appreciated in the lands of their origin to the extent they were welcomed in other lands. For instance, Christ was born in Palestine, in the East; but at the present the number of Christians in the West is much larger than in the East. The majority of the people of Europe and America are Christian, though they are different from Christ so far as region and continent is concerned. Conversely, the Palestinians themselves are mostly either Muslims or Jews, and if there are Christians they are very few. Do the people of Europe and America regard Christianity as an alien religion?

I do not know why the Europeans, who have been the propagators of divisive ideas, do not think on the same lines about themselves and preach these ideas only to their instruments of imperialism. If Islam is alien to an Iranian, Christianity is equally so for the Europeans and the Americans. The reason is obvious: They know that in the Eastern and Islamic lands it is only Islam which, as a comprehensive philosophy of life, sustains the spirit of independence and resistance among the people. Should Islam leave the scene, there is nothing that can resist the onslaughts of black or red imperialist ideas.

Buddha, also, as we know, was born in India; but millions of the people of China and other countries follow his creed.

Zoroaster's creed, though it did not spread much and did not cross the Iranian borders, attracted more followers in Balkh than in Azarbaijan, which is said to be the land of Zoroaster's birth.

Also Makkah, the birthplace of the Prophet (S), did not accept Islam in the beginning; but Madīnah, a city many miles away from this city, welcomed Islam with open arms.

Leaving aside the discussion about religions, we turn our attention towards ideologies and political creeds. The strongest and the most popular political ideology of our day is communism. Where was communism born? From whose mind did it emerge, and who were the people that accepted it? It were two Germans, Karl Marx and Fredrik Engels, who laid down the foundations of modern communism. Karl Marx spent the last days of his life in England, and he prophesied that the people of England would accept communism before any other nation. But the German and the English nations did not accept it, while the people of Russia embraced it. Marx himself could not anticipate that, instead of Germany and England, his thought would flourish in the far off lands of Russia and China.

One should ask again these over-zealous nationalists as to why the national sentiments of the people of Soviet Union and China are not awakened, and why they do not expel communism out of their borders for the reason that it entered their lands from outside and clashes with their national sentiments. If you say this to them, they will laugh at you and say:

هين مگولا حول کبدم زاده ام من زلا حول آنطرف افتاده ام

Don't exorcise me, for I am born of Adam;
I have been thrown here because of being exorcized.

The issue that a creed or a faith travels out of its country or origin and acquires greater importance and influence in other lands, is not a new phenomenon. Islam, from its very inception, anticipated this possibility, and by taunting the Arabs, who refused to believe in the Qur'ān, foresaw the grandeur of its future and called other nations to share in it.⁶

Islamic Criteria:

At the time of the advent of Islam the spirit of kinship and tribal pride was very strong among the Arabs. In those days, they did not take so much pride in being Arab, for the sense of Arab nationality had not yet developed and they did not see themselves as a distinct unit separate from other nations. The basis of the Arab's allegiance was the tribe. The Arab boasted of his own tribe's superiority over others. Islam not only did not pay any heed to such prejudicial sentiments, but also attacked them fiercely. The Holy Qur'ān unambiguously declares:

يَا أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ إِنَّا خَلَقْنَاكُمْ مِنْ ذَكَرٍ وَأُنْثَىٰ وَجَعَلْنَاكُمْ شُعُوبًا وَقَبَائِلَ لِتَعَارَفُوا إِنَّ أَكْرَمَكُمْ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ أَنْفَكُمْ ...

O people, surely We have created you of a male and a female, and made you tribes and nations that you may know each other; surely the most honourable of you near God is the most God-fearing of you....(49:13)

This verse, along with the Prophet's insistence (upon indiscrimination) and his own behaviour towards the non-Arabs as well as different Arab tribes, perfectly clarifies the Islamic approach to this issue.

Later on, under the influence of the Umayyads and their anti-Islamic policies, a section of Arabs brought to the fore the element of Arabism and kindled the fire of national and racial prejudice. All other Muslim peoples, particularly the Iranians, revolted against them. They made the above-quoted Qur'anic verse their political slogan and called themselves 'Ahl al-Taswiyah', that is, champions of equality. They also called themselves Shu'ubiyyah, applying to themselves the word *shu'ub*, which occurs in the verse. According to some exegetes of the Qur'an, as well as a tradition of al-'Imām Ja'far al-Ṣādiq (A), '*qabā'il*' (singular, *qabīlah*) refers to the communal units, tribes, in which the Arabs were divided, and the term *shu'ub* refers to larger units, such as the national unit. On this basis, it becomes clear why the Shu'ubiyyah called themselves by this name. This clarification leads us to the conclusion that the Shu'ubiyyah Movement was directed against the Arab chauvinism and that it was based on support for Islamic principles or, at least, the ideological basis of this movement was such. If occasionally individuals belonging to this movement behaved in an anti-Islamic fashion it cannot be taken as an evidence of the Shu'ubiyyah being anti-Islamic.⁷

All the historians admit that the Holy Prophet (S) made this statement on many occasions:

أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ! كُلُّكُمْ لِآدَمَ وَآدَمُ مِنْ تُرَابٍ، لِأَفْضَلِ لِعَرَبِيٍّ عَلَىٰ عَجَمِيٍّ إِلَّا بِالتَّقْوَىٰ.

O people, all of you are from Adam and Adam was from dust. An Arab enjoys no superiority over a non-Arab except through piety (taqwā).⁸

According to a tradition, the Prophet (S) considered the pride in one's ancestry as something stinking, and compared the people who behaved in this way to dung beetles. The actual words of the tradition are these:

لَيَدْعُنَّ رِجَالٌ فَخْرَهُمْ بِأَقْوَامٍ، إِنَّمَاهُمْ فَحْمٌ مِنْ فَحْمِ جَهَنَّمَ. أَوْ لَيَكُونَنَّ أَهْوَنَ عَلَى اللَّهِ مِنَ الْجُعْلَانِ الَّتِي تَدْفَعُ بِأَنْفِهَا التَّنَّ.

Let those who are proud of their tribe and ancestry get rid of this trait, for those are nothing but the coal of hellfire. If they do not give up this habit, they will be more despicable in the eyes of God than the dung beetles who carry putrid filth on their noses.⁹

The Prophet (S) welcomed Salmān, the Persian, and Bilāl, the Ethiopian, with the same warmth as he welcomed Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī, Miqdād ibn al-'Aswad and 'Ammār ibn Yāsir, and as Salmān was able to leave others behind in his spiritual ascent, the Prophet (S) called him one of his Family: (سَلْمَانٌ مِّمَّا أَهْلَ الْبَيْتِ .)¹⁰

The Prophet (S) took care that no national prejudices cropped up among the Muslims, which could produce inevitable reactions on the part of others.

In the battle of Uḥud there was an Iranian youth who after inflicting a blow upon an enemy boasted with pride: خُذْهَا مِنِّي وَأَنَا الْغَلَامُ الْفَارِسِيُّ: "Take this from me, and I am an Iranian youth." The Prophet (S) immediately sensed that this kind of heroics would incite others. Immediately he said to him: "Why didn't you say, 'I am a youth of the Helpers (Anṣār)?" That is, he should take pride in an honour associated with his faith and creed, not in something associated with race and nationality.¹¹

On another occasion, the Prophet (S) said:

أَلَا إِنَّ الْعَرَبِيَّةَ لَيْسَتْ بِأَبٍ وَالِدٍ، وَلَكِنَّهَا لِسَانٌ نَاطِقٌ، فَمَنْ قَصَّرَ بِهِ عَمَلُهُ لَمْ يَبْلُغْ بِهِ حَسَبَهُ.

Now Arab lineage is not by birth, but it is through the language that one speaks; one who is diminished by his deeds will not rise in stature on account of lineage.

It is narrated in *Rawḍat al-Kāfi* that one day Salmān al-Fārsī was sitting in the Mosque of the Prophet (S) and some eminent Companions of the Prophet (S) were also present. The conversation somehow turned to lineage and ancestry. Everyone said something about his lineage boastfully. When the turn of Salmān came and he was asked to state his lineage and genealogical distinctions, this man of wisdom who was trained under the ethos of Islam said: "I am Salmān, son of a slave of God." Then he added:

كُنْتُ ضَالًّا فَهَدَانِي اللَّهُ (عَزَّ ذِكْرُهُ) بِمُحَمَّدٍ (ص)، وَكُنْتُ عَائِلًا فَأَغْنَانِي اللَّهُ (عَزَّ ذِكْرُهُ) بِمُحَمَّدٍ (ص)، وَكُنْتُ مَمْلُوكًا فَأَعْتَقَنِي اللَّهُ (عَزَّ ذِكْرُهُ) بِمُحَمَّدٍ (ص). هَذَا نَسَبِي وَهَذَا حَسَبِي.

I was lost, and God guided me through Muhammad (S). I was destitute and

God freed me from want through Muḥammad (S). I was a slave, and God liberated me through Muḥammad (S). This is my lineage.¹²

In the meantime the Prophet (S) arrived and Salmān reported to him what had transpired. The Prophet (S) turned to the gathering, in which all were from Quraysh, and said:

يا مَعْشَرَ قُرَيْشٍ! إِنَّ حَسَبَ الرَّجُلِ دِينَهُ، وَمُرُوءَتَهُ خُلُقُهُ، وَأَضَلُّهُ عَقْلُهُ.

O people of Quraysh, the lineage of a man is his faith. The manliness of a man is his character, and his roots lie in his intellect.

Thus he repudiated blood, race and lineage, and stressed that faith, character and wisdom were the real things to be considered; all other things were insignificant. He derided pride in decayed and rotten bones, and showed that the correct path to excellence lay through faith, morality and intellect. If one were to meditate, one would see that it is not possible to think of a more sublime and reasonable saying.

The Prophet's insistence on the baselessness and futility of national and racial prejudices exerted a profound influence on the hearts of the Muslims, particularly the non-Arabs. It was because of this that all the Muslims, including the Arabs and the non-Arabs, regarded Islam as their own, not as something alien to them in any way. It was on account of the same reason that the injustice, racial prejudice and discriminatory policies of the Umayyads could not make non-Arab Muslims pessimistic about Islam. All of them knew that the Islamic attitude was basically opposed to the policies of the caliphs. They protested why the caliphate did not follow the laws of Islam.

The Iranians' Conversion to Islam:

From the above discussion, the problem of the criterion of accepting or rejecting a thing from the national point of view has been clarified. It became clear that Islam fulfils the first condition, i.e. of not being alien because of its universal character, its appeal to all mankind, and its freedom from any specific colour.

Now we know that Islamic criteria are general and universal, not national and racial. Islam in no way confined itself to national, regional and racial prejudices; rather it struggled against them.

Now we have to see if Islam fulfils the other condition or not: Whether Islam enjoyed a national acceptability in Iran. In other words, did Islam make advancement in Iran because of its higher human and universal content and whether the Iranians themselves freely chose it, or, as claimed by some quarters, this faith was imposed upon them

against their own inclinations?

Of course, we do not intend to propose that the only factor of the attraction of non-Arab nations towards Islam was the cosmopolitan and universal character of Islamic teachings; that is, we do not wish to introduce the Islamic principle of equality as the sole factor of its appeal. The real factor of the acceptability of Islam for all nations lay in a series of advantages, of which some were intellectual and doctrinal and some were moral, social and political. Islamic teachings are rational, logically acceptable on the one hand, and are natural and intelligible on the other. Islamic teachings have a special attraction and appeal which proved to be the main cause of drawing various nations into the field of its influence. The universality and generality of Islamic criteria make up one of the advantages that gives Islam the quality of attraction. Here we do not intend to discuss all the other advantages of Islam. We shall discuss only the factor that is relevant to the issue of nationality.

It is for about fourteen centuries that Iranians have discarded their old religions and accepted the Islamic way of life. In the course of all these centuries millions of Iranians have been born in the Islamic faith, lived and died with this faith. Among the Muslim countries perhaps there is no other country except Sa'ūdi Arabia which has such a large majority of Muslim population. Even Egypt, which considers itself to be the capital and metropolis of Islam, does not have such a great proportion of Muslims in her population as Iran does. Nevertheless, it will be good to make it clear whether the Iranians' conversion to Islam has been under compulsion or if it was affected sincerely from within.

Fortunately, the history of Iran and Islam, despite all the machinations of the imperialists, is quite obvious and clear in this regard, and we can turn the pages of the history to investigate the facts from the days of the advent of Islam in Iran in order to acquaint the readers with its facts and realities.

The Advent of Islam in Iran:

According to historical evidence, the Holy Prophet (S), after a few years of the Migration, wrote letters to the rulers of various countries of the world and invited them to embrace Islam. One of these letters was addressed to Khusrow Parwiz, the emperor of Persia, and he was invited to accept Islam. But as we all know, he was the only person who showed disrespect to the Prophet's letter. This was in itself an indication of the decay of morals that had set in in the Iranian regime. No other king, ruler, or emperor behaved in such a way. Some of them sent replies with due respect, accompanied by gifts. Khusrow ordered the king of Yaman, who was his protégé, to investigate the affairs of this man who claimed himself to be a prophet and had dared to mention his name

before that of the emperor, and, if necessary, send him to Khusrow. God says:

يُرِيدُونَ لِيُطْفِئُوا نُورَ اللَّهِ بِأَفْوَاهِهِمْ وَاللَّهُ مُتِمُّ نُورِهِ، وَلَوْ كَرِهَ الْكَافِرُونَ ﴿٨﴾

They desire to put out the light of Allāh with their mouths, but Allāh will perfect His Light, though the unbelievers should be averse. (61: 8)

The emissaries of the king of Yaman were still in Madinah when Khusrow fell and his own son ripped his stomach open. The Prophet (S) informed the emissaries of the king of this incident, who were flabbergasted and brought the news to Yaman. After some time the news, as announced by the Prophet (S), was confirmed. The king of Yaman himself, along with a large number of his people, embraced Islam, and in the wake of this conversion many Iranians living in Yaman also embraced Islam. Due to certain historical factors, a large number of Iranians lived in Yaman in those days, according to historical records, and the government of Yaman was totally an Iranian protégé.

During the lifetime of the Prophet (S), many of the people of Bahrayn, where a considerable population of the Zoroastrian and non-Zoroastrian Iranians lived in those days, were converted to Islam. Even the ruler of Bahrayn, who was appointed by the Persian emperor, accepted the Islamic faith. In this way the first Iranians converted to Islam were from Yaman and Bahrayn.

Of course, as to individuals, Salmān al-Fārsī was perhaps the first Iranian who embraced Islam. As we know, his faith attained such perfection that he was regarded by the Prophet (S) as one of his Family, Ahl al-Bayt. Salmān is highly revered not only amongst the Shi'ah but is also considered to be one of the Companions of the first rank by the Sunnis. Those who have visited Madinah know that the names of the major Companions and the Imams of the legal schools are inscribed all around the Prophet's Mosque. There, the name of Salmān appears amongst the major Companions.

This degree of association of Iranians with Islam during the Prophet's era was sufficient to acquaint many of them with Islamic teachings. Naturally it was a means of spreading the news of the advent of Islam throughout Iran and of acquainting Iranians with the new faith. Especially due to the conditions prevalent in Iran, both at the levels of government and religion, the people were keen to listen to a new message. They were actually in search of some relief. Every news of this kind travelled fast among the people, and they were naturally eager to know the principles and precepts of the new faith. This was the situation until the caliphate of Abū Bakr and 'Umar. As a result of the battles between the Persian empire and the Muslims, in the last days of the

reign of the first caliph and the entire period of 'Umar's, almost whole of Iran fell in the hands of the Muslims and millions of Iranians living in these parts came in close contact with Muslims and accepted the faith in large numbers.

I reproduce a part of the study made by 'Aziz Allāh 'Uṭāridī, under the title "When Did the Services of Iranians to Islam Begin?", so that we may know the conditions of Iran before the military conquest:¹³

The Beginnings of Iranians' Contribution to the Islamic Culture:

The Iranians' interest in Islam began with the first days of its inception. Earlier than the time when Islam was brought to Iran in the wake of the victory of the Muslim warriors, Iranians living in Yaman were attracted towards Islam and embraced it of their own free choice and subscribed to teachings of the Qur'ān. Subsequently, they made efforts to propagate the Shari'ah of Islam and even sacrificed their lives in the way of Islam while fighting against the Prophet's enemies.

The contributions of Iranians to the spreading and propagation of Islam require an extensive research project conducted by a group of researchers and Islamic scholars, with each pursuing research in his own field of specialization. The history of the conquests of Islam both in the east and the west, is immensely indebted to the painstaking and bold endeavours of a group of Iranians, who showed unwavering faith in Islam, and with enthusiasm and devotion subdued its internal and external enemies.

The Muslims of the eastern and the south-eastern countries, such as those of the Indian subcontinent, eastern Turkistan, China, Malaysia, Indonesia and the islands of the Indian Ocean, owe much to the unflinching efforts and activities of Iranians, who through their constant efforts on high seas and through trade carried Islam to the farthest corners of Asia and propagated the teachings of Islam among the people through preaching and guidance.

The Iranians had a significant share in spreading Islam in the countries of western and northern Africa, Europe and Asia Minor as well. After the revolt of the people of Khurāsān and the eastern parts of Iran against the anti-Islamic caliphate of the Umayyads, who ruled the Muslims in the name of Islam, was successful, and the Abbāsids took charge of the caliphate, all the administrative and military offices of the Muslim lands fell into the hands of Iranians, particularly the Khurāsānians, and they were entrusted with all the political offices of the Islamic state in the east and the west.

At the time of al-Ma'mūn's return to Iraq, a group of the nobles and gentry of Khurāsān accompanied him and settled in Iraq. As al-Ma'mūn was unhappy with the betrayal of some members of his own

family, he decided to appoint Iranians to governmental posts. Accordingly, he sent a group of Iranian nobles to Egypt and North Africa, so that they should settle there and check the influence of the opponents in those regions, particularly because the Umayyads were still in power in Andalusia (Spain), and the 'Abbāsids lived in a state of constant worry on this account and were keen to take preventive measures against their influence.

A research study concerning these migrant families, most of whom were from Nishābūr, Hirāt, Balkh, Bukhārā, and Farghānah, requires a number of volumes. A detailed account of the services of Iranians in North Africa is given in books of history and biographies of scholars of arts and science.

We present a brief account of the activities of Iranians in two parts, the first of which deals with the period before the advent of Islam in Iran, and the second is concerned with the period when they had embraced Islam. Here is the first part of this story.

Iranians in Yaman:

At the time of the birth of the Prophet (S) groups of Iranians lived in Yaman, 'Adan, Hadramawt and on the banks of the Red Sea. They also controlled the government of Yaman. Before investigating this subject further, in order to understand the matter better, it is essential to probe into the reasons of the immigration and settlement of Iranians in Yaman.

During the reign of Anūshīrwān, the kingdom of Ethiopia attacked Yaman through sea and routed the rule in this area. Sayf ibn Dhī Yazīn, the king of Yaman, came to the court of Anūshīrwān and sought help from him to oust the Ethiopians. Historians write that Sayf lived at Tisfūn (Mada'in) for seven years before he got a permission to see Anūshīrwān. Sayf said to him: "Help me in fighting the Ethiopians by sending a contingent of your warriors with me so that I may take back my kingdom." Anūshīrwān told him: "According to my creed, it is not proper for me to betray my soldiers by sending them to help a people who do not share our faith." After consultations with the courtiers and advisers it was resolved to dispatch a group of prisoners awaiting death sentence with Sayf ibn Dhī Yazīn to Yaman to oust the Ethiopians from there. This move was approved and was put into action.

The total number of this group is mentioned to be around one thousand, and it was this small party that defeated thirty-thousand strong Ethiopian army and killed all of them. The command of the Iranians in Yaman was entrusted to a person named Wahraz. After the defeat of the Ethiopians and the death of Sayf, Wahraz the Iranian, whose real name was Kharzād, took control of Yaman and obeyed the

orders of the Iranian government.

The Conversion of Bādhān, and other Yamanite Iranians:

At the time of the inception of Islam and the beginning of the mission of the Prophet (S), Bādhān ibn Sāmān was at the helm of the rule in Yaman. He was an Iranian. The battles of the Prophet (S) against the Arab tribes and the polytheists of Quraysh took place during the reign of Bādhān. He ruled Yaman on behalf of Khusrow Parwiz and was also responsible to watch over the affairs of the Hijāz and Tihāmah. He used to send regular reports of the Prophet's activities to Khusrow Parwiz.

The Prophet (S) invited Khusrow Parwiz to accept Islam in the sixth year after Hijrah. Khusrow was greatly displeased with this invitation and tore up the Prophet's letter. He ordered Bādhān, his governor in Yaman, to send the writer of the letter to his court. Bādhān sent two Iranians, Bādawayh and Khusrow, to Madīnah and conveyed the message of Khusrow Parwiz to the Prophet (S). This was the first contact of the Iranians with the Prophet (S).

When the news of the Prophet (S) being summoned to Iran reached the infidels of the Quraysh, they were much jubilant and told each other that Muḥammad would not be able to escape now, for he had challenged the authority of the King of Kings and would be eliminated. The emissaries of Bādhān reached Madīnah with the order they had to execute, and made their mission known. The Prophet (S) said: "Come tomorrow and receive the reply of your letter." The next day they came and were told by the Prophet (S): "Shirawayh has ripped open the stomach of his father, Khusrow Parwiz, and killed him." The Prophet (S) said: "God informed me that your king was murdered and very soon your empire would fall into the hands of Muslims. Now return to Yaman and tell Bādhān to embrace Islam. If he is converted to Islam, he will keep the rulership of Yaman." The Prophet (S) gave gifts to the two men, who returned to Yaman, where they reported the events to Bādhān. Bādhān said that he would wait for some days; if what the Prophet (S) said was confirmed, it would be known that he was a prophet who spoke on behalf of God, and then he would resolve what to do. When some days passed, a messenger arrived from Tisfūn and delivered to Bādhān a letter from Shirawayh, in which he had officially reported the incident and his reason for killing his father. Shirawayh had asked for the support of the people of Yaman, and directed him to leave the claimant to prophethood in the Hijāz alone and not to bother him. On this occasion Bādhān was converted to Islam, and after him a large group of Iranians, called the Abnā' and the Aḥrār, also embraced Islam. They were the first Iranians to enter the fold of Islam.

The Prophet (S) retained Bādhān as the ruler of Yaman, and from this day he ruled Yaman on the Prophet's behalf. He busied himself with the task of propagating Islam and subjugating its enemies and adversaries. Bādhān died during the Prophet's (S) lifetime, and his son Shahr ibn Bādhān was appointed in his place by the Prophet (S). He also followed the policy of his father and fought against the enemies of Islam.

The Renegation of al-'Aswad al-'Ansī:

On his return from the last pilgrimage (*Hijjat al-Wadā'*), the Prophet (S) was confined to bed for a few days due to exhaustion. Al-'Aswad al-'Ansī came to know about the Prophet's sickness and thought that the Prophet (S) would not survive it. With this idea in his mind he laid claim to prophethood, and gathered a group around him. A large number of Yamanite Arabs followed him. Aswad's is the first instance of renegation in Islam.¹⁴ He, with the Arab tribes who followed him, attacked Ṣana'ā. Shahr ibn Bādhān, the Iranian who was the ruler on the Prophet's behalf and whose capital was Ṣan'ā', prepared himself to combat Aswad, the Liar, who had revolted against Islam. Aswad arrived with a seven-hundred strong force to fight Shahr ibn Bādhān. A fierce fight ensued, in which Shahr ibn Bādhān was killed. He was the first Iranian who attained martyrdom in the way of Islam.

Al-'Aswad al-'Ansī married Shahr's wife, and got hold of the entire Yaman, extending his influence to Ḥaḍramawt, Baḥrayn, al-'Aḥsā' and the entire desert between Najd and Ṭā'if. He subordinated all the tribes of Yaman. Only some Arabs did not surrender to him and they retreated to Madinah.

After Shahr ibn Bādhān was killed, the leadership of the Iranians was taken by Firūz and Dādawayh, who, following the footsteps of their predecessors, remained loyal to Islam and unwavering in their obedience to the Prophet (S). Meanwhile, the reports of the death of Shahr ibn Bādhān and the incidents of Yaman reached the Prophet (S). The Muslims of Madinah came to know that except the Iranians en bloc and some Arabs, all the people of Yaman had turned away from Islam and followed Aswad, the Liar.

The Prophet's Letter to Yamanite Iranians:

Jashish Daylamī, an Iranian Muslim of Yaman, says: The Prophet (S) wrote a letter to us asking us to fight against Aswad. The order of the Prophet (S) was addressed to Firūz, Dādawayh and Jashish. They were appointed to wage an overt and covert war against the enemies of Islam, and to communicate the message of the Prophet (S) to all the

Muslims. Firūz, Dādawayh and Jashish conveyed the Prophet's message to all the Iranians.

Daylamī says: We started correspondence with the people and called upon them to prepare themselves to fight al-'Aswad al-'Ansi. In the meantime Aswad, learning about the matter, sent a messenger to warn the Iranians that they would have to face evil consequences if they intrigued against him. We said in reply: We have no intention of fighting against you. But Aswad did not believe us and was in constant fear of the Iranians that they might kill him. In the midst of this turmoil, letters arrived from 'Amir ibn Shahr and Dhū Zūd and from some other places, encouraging us to combat Aswad and promising aid in this matter. Afterwards, we came to know that the Prophet (S) had written a letter to another party, ordering them to support Firūz, Dādawayh and Daylamī in their struggle against Aswad, the Liar. This made us secure the support of the people.

The Iranians' Plot to Kill al-'Aswad al-'Ansi:

Aswad sensed the danger of the Iranians' plot and realized that it might lead to crucial consequences. Jashish Daylamī says: Āzād, the widowed wife of Shahr ibn Bādhān, who was taken by Aswad, rendered us great assistance, and it was through her guidance that we succeeded ultimately. Daylamī says further that he reminded Āzād that Aswad had killed her husband and all her relatives, and seized all their women folk. Āzād, being a woman of courage and honour, said: "By God I do not hate anybody as much as I hate Aswad; he is a callous man who does not follow any law of God, and makes no distinction between permissible and prohibited women." She asked him to inform her of their decision, so that whatever takes place in the house of Aswad would be made known to them. Daylamī says further: As I came away from Āzād and reported our talk to Firūz and Dādawayh, a man came and asked Qays ibn 'Abd Yaghūth, who was our ally, to come to the house of Aswad. Qays went there along with some others, but they could not do him any harm.

On this occasion some words were exchanged between Aswad and Qays, and the latter returned to the residence of Firūz, Dādawayh and Daylamī. He told them that Aswad, the Liar, would be coming to them in a short time and they could do whatever they wished to do with him. As Qays left the place, Aswad entered with a group of his followers. In the vicinity of the house were around two hundred cows and camels. Aswad ordered all of them to be slaughtered. He shouted at them: "O Firūz, is it true that you intend to kill me and to fight against me?" He threw a weapon he had in his hand towards Firūz, and said: "I will cut off your head, like those of these cattle." Firūz replied: "It is not true.

We have neither any intention of fighting you, nor we have any designs to kill you, for you are the son-in-law of Iranians. We shall not harm you because of our respect for Āzād. Besides, you are now a prophet and have authority over the affairs of this world and the hereafter."

Aswad asked him to take an oath that he would not betray him and would remain faithful to him. Firūz uttered some words and followed him for some distance until they came out of the house. While they had gone some way out of the house, somebody was heard saying something against Firūz to Aswad. Aswad replied to the man, saying: "Tomorrow I will kill Firūz and his companions." Then Aswad realized that Firūz had overheard him.

Daylamī says: Firūz returned and reported to his friends about Aswad's treacherous plans. We sent for Qays, who also joined our company. After consulting for some time, we resolved to contact Āzād once again to discuss the situation with her and to seek her view about the matter. Daylamī continues: I went to see Āzād, told her about the matter and explained all the aspects of the affair to her. Āzād said: "Aswad is always afraid for himself and has no assurance for his life. When he is inside the palace, all around it as well as all the passages that lead to it are guarded and every moving thing is watched carefully. Therefore there is no chance for an ordinary person to enter the building. The only place where he takes rest without being guarded by his men is this very room. Only here you can find him alone and finish him off. Be assured that he has nothing in his bedroom with him except his sword and a lamp."

Daylamī says: As I left her and wanted to come out of the palace, Aswad saw me. He became very angry. His face red with anger, he said to me: "Where did you come from? Who admitted you into the palace without my permission?" Daylamī says: He seized my head and nearly crushed it. At this moment Āzād saw us; she shouted, "Aswad! leave him alone!" Had she not come to my rescue, he would have killed me. Āzād said to Aswad, "He is my cousin. He came to see me. Keep your hands off him." Aswad, after hearing these words, took his hands off and released me. I came out of the palace and went straight to my friends to report what had transpired. When we were engaged in conversation, a messenger came from Āzād and said: "It is time to carry out what you intend to do. Whatever you have decided, put it into action immediately."

We asked Firūz to go to Āzād as soon as possible. He reached her hurriedly, and Āzād informed him of the circumstances. Firūz says: We found an underground passage to the room where Aswad lived and we placed some of our men at the entrance, so that whenever the occasion arose they would enter the room and kill him. After making these arrangements Firūz entered the room and appearing as if he had

come to talk to Āzād engaged himself in conversation with her.

At the time when Firūz was busy conversing with Āzād, Aswad entered the room. As soon as he caught sight of Firūz, he was greatly agitated. When Āzād witnessed his agitation she pleaded ardently: "He is my relation, a close relation". In a rage, Aswad threw Firūz out of the room and drove him out of his palace. When night fell, Firūz, Dādawayah and Daylamī, all the three resolved to enter the particular room through the underground passage and attack Aswad.

After all the preliminary steps were ready for killing Aswad, they informed their friends and fellows about their plans and communicated the matter to the Arab tribes of Hamadān and Himayr. Daylamī says: At night we started to execute our scheme and opened the underground way to Aswad's bedroom. We reached there. In the room a lamp was burning and it gave a dim light.

We had full confidence in Firūz, for he was a courageous and bold man, as well as strong and energetic. We told him, "Look, what do you see in this light?" Though there were guards on duty at the entrance to the room, he reached its door and heard the sound of someone snoring in sleep. It was evident that Aswad was fast asleep and his trumpet was blowing. Āzād, his wife, sat near him in a corner. As Firūz entered the room, Aswad woke up at once, rose, and sat up in his bed. He cried out, "Firūz, what do you want from me?" Firūz realized that if he returned he would be killed by the guards and Āzād would also be killed. He threw himself upon Aswad. He grappled with him and attacked with the might of a he-camel. Then he seized his head between his hands and strangled him. When he prepared to leave the room, Āzād asked him if he was sure that the man was dead. Firūz said, "Of course, and now you are free from his clutches."

He came out of the room and beckoned to us, who were awaiting at the threshold of the underground passage. We also entered the room and saw him still emitting a sound like a cow's. We severed his head from his body with a large knife, and thus Yaman was cleansed of his foul existence.

At this moment a tumult rose in the vicinity of the palace and the guards came from all around to gather around Aswad's residential quarters. They shouted, "What has happened?" Āzād told them: "Nothing has happened; the prophet is in a state of receiving revelation." She explained that he was lying the way he lay under the influence of revelation. Convinced, the guards dispersed from around the room, and we were relieved of the danger. After the guards had left, silence returned to the room. The four of us, Firūz, Dādawayh, Jashish Daylamī and Qays, were thinking of how to inform our comrades about what had happened. We decided to announce the death of Aswad at dawn. As soon as the dawn broke, we loudly announced the news and in-

formed the people of the great event.

Daylamī continues: Then I started to make the prayer call. I called out loudly: *أشهد أن مُحَمَّدًا رَسُولُ اللَّهِ*, "I bear witness that Muḥammad (S) is the Messenger of Allah." Then I announced that Aswad was a liar who falsely claimed to be a prophet. With this announcement I threw his head into the midst of the crowd. After witnessing these developments some of the guards started plundering the palace and everything therein. Within seconds, all that had been kept in the palace was looted and taken away. In this manner a false claimant who had caused the loss of innumerable lives was destroyed.

After this, the people of Ṣan'ā' were told to arrest every one of the followers of al-'Anṣī. As a consequence of this announcement, a group of Aswad's companions was imprisoned. When the supporters of Aswad came out of their bastion they found seventy of their comrades missing. They wrote to us about the matter. We also wrote back that if they handed over that which was in their hands, we would also surrender to them that which was in our possession. This proposal was accepted and carried out. But henceforth the friends of Aswad could never see one another to plan their future course of action, and we were relieved of their evil. As a result of Aswad's assassination, his companions fled and took refuge in the deserts lying between Ṣan'ā' and Najrān and were kept from interfering in our affairs. At this time all the officers and functionaries of the government appointed by the Prophet (S) returned to their appointed posts and took over the charge of their duties and normalcy returned to our region.

The news of the murder of Aswad soon reached the Muslims of Madīnah. 'Abd Allāh ibn 'Umar narrates the following tradition: "The night when Aswad, the Liar, was killed, the Prophet (S) came to know about the event through revelation. He told us that al-'Anṣī had been killed and that the job had been carried out by a blessed member of a blessed family. The Muslims enquired as to who had killed Aswad. 'Fīrūz', said the Holy Prophet (S)."

The reign of Aswad in Yaman and its vicinity lasted for three months. Fīrūz says: When we killed Aswad, normalcy was restored and conditions became as they were in the days before his reign. Once again peace prevailed in Yaman. Mu'ādh ibn Jabal, who was deputed by the Prophet (S) as *imām al-jamā'ah* and who had retired to the seclusion of his house during the reign of Aswad, was asked again to hold the regular prayers and to lead the congregation of the believers. We were not afraid of anything, except that a few members of Aswad's cavalry had dispersed in the region surrounding Yaman. It was at this time that the sad news of the demise of the Prophet (S) arrived, and once more the conditions deteriorated and uncertainty gripped us.

The Struggle of Yamanite Iranians Against Arab Renegades:

Qays ibn 'Abd Yaghūth, who had fought against Aswad, the Liar, in the company of Firūz and the Iranians residing in Yaman, turned away from Islam after the demise of the Prophet (S); he started hostilities against Firūz. Qays ibn 'Abd Yaghūth resolved to kill Firūz first, for he had acquired popularity among the people of Yaman because of his feat of killing Aswad and the people paid him extraordinary respect. Qays, hatching a conspiracy, drove Firūz to the wall through deceit and devilish plotting. Once again the conditions of Yaman, particularly those of the Iranians, deteriorated. The Muslims lost the nucleus of their strength and a genuine and self-denying patron.

Qays ibn 'Abd Yaghūth was afraid of three Muslims, who were all Iranians. They were Firūz, Dādawayh and Jashish Daylamī. When the news of Qays's renegation reached Madīnah, Abū Bakr, who had recently become caliph, wrote letters to several persons requesting them to support Firūz and the Iranian Muslims who had been instrumental in the killing of Aswad.

When Qays came to know about the letters written by Abū Bakr, he invited Dhū al-Kalā' to join him to fight against the Iranians and oust them from the territory of Yaman. But Dhū al-Kalā' did not pay heed to this call and rejected his proposal. When Qays realized that no one was prepared to help him, he resolved to eliminate the Iranians any way, even if it had to be through fraud and deceit. He resolved to kill Firūz, Dādawayh and Daylamī, who were the leaders of the Iranians.

Qays contacted the companions of Aswad, who were scattered in the mountains and were staunch enemies of the Iranians. He invited them to join him in fighting the Iranians. Responding positively to this call, a group of Aswad's companions gathered at Ṣan'ā' and prepared themselves to fight the Iranians.

Meanwhile, the people of Ṣan'ā' came to know what was transpiring secretly behind the scenes at the instance of Qays ibn 'Abd Yaghūth. Qays started negotiations with Firūz and Dādawayh, pretending cunningly that he sought their help. He invited them to dinner, and they readily accepted his invitation. It was decided that they would gather at his place at the appointed time.

The first person to reach the residence of Qays was Dādawayh, and he was killed immediately by a group that had already gathered there to attack and kill him. A few moments later Firūz arrived. On his way, while approaching the house of Qays, he overheard two women whispering to each other that this man would also be murdered like the first one. Thus Firūz came to know that Dādawayh had been killed. As soon he heard this conversation, Firūz made a retreat from the place. When the comrades of Qays saw him withdrawing, they searched for

him but could not find him. Firūz managed to leave the vicinity of Qays's place with great speed. On his way he happened to see Jashish Daylamī, who was also proceeding to attend the dinner at the house of Qays. He approached him hurriedly and informed him of what had happened. Without losing time they fled towards the Khawlān mountains and took refuge with their relatives living there. When the companions of Qays saw them crossing over to the other side of the mountain, they returned. During Firūz's absence from Ṣan'ā' the companions of al-'Aswad al-'Anṣī revived their activities.

After Firūz had settled in Khawlān mountains, a group of Arab and Iranian Muslims gathered around him. Firūz sent a detailed report of the events to Madīnah.

The chiefs of Arabian tribes did not extend any support to Firūz and the Iranians. On the contrary, they joined the comrades of Aswad, the Liar. Qays issued orders to the effect that all the Iranians be expelled from Yaman. They were forced to leave Yaman immediately and to return to their own land. The women and children of Firūz and Dādawayh were also expelled from Yaman. When Firūz came to know about these events, he resolved to fight Qays ibn 'Abd Yaghūth. He wrote letters to some Arab tribes to help him in his resolve to wage war against the renegades.

On this occasion a group of the tribe of the Banū 'Uqayl, who had risen in arms to help Firūz, attacked Qays's cavalry which was engaged in driving away the Iranians from Yaman and freed them from the hands of their tormenters.

The tribe of 'Akk also came to the side of Firūz, and they succeeded in their effort to liberate another group of Iranians that had fallen captive in the hands of Arab renegades. The tribes of the Banū 'Uqayl and 'Akk joined hands in sending their men to support Firūz. They all made an assault on the army of the renegades led by Qays. In the end Qays ibn 'Abd Yaghūth was defeated. He fled from the battlefield and the comrades of al-'Aswad al-'Anṣī were scattered.

The flight of Qays and the destruction of his forces was final. He was ultimately captured by Muhājir ibn Umayyah, put in chains and sent to Madīnah. Abū Bakr cross-questioned him and asked him why he had killed Dādawayh, the Iranian. He replied that he did not murder him, that he was killed secretly and that it was not known who had killed him. Abū Bakr accepted his statement at its face value and abstained from executing him. Perhaps this was the first occasion when the Islamic laws were trampled upon and racial and national discrimination was exercised, setting a precedent for the superiority of Arabs over non-Arabs. For, all people knew that Qays had renegaded from Islam, had joined hands with the enemies of Islam and that Dādawayh, the Iranian Muslim, had been killed while defending the cause of Islam.¹⁵

The Muslim Conquest of Iran:

The Muslims' confrontation with the Iranians and their ultimate victory over the Sāsānīd empire proved to be a vital factor in establishing the supremacy and truth of Islam in the eyes of the Iranians.

When the Muslims were fighting against the Sāsānīd empire, Iran, despite all her internal turmoil and infightings, was a great military power. There was actually no comparison between the Muslim power of those days and that of the Iranians. In that period there were two supreme powers ruling the world: Persia and Byzantium. All the other states were either under their tutelage or paid tribute to one of them. The Iranians in those days were extraordinarily superior to the Muslims, both from the viewpoint of the numerical strength of armed forces and arms and from the viewpoint of food supplies, military equipment and other means. The Arab Muslims were not even acquainted with the current art, strategy and tactics of war of those days with which the Iranians and the Byzantines were familiar. As the Arabs were unfamiliar with the military arts, nobody could imagine the humiliating and decisive defeat that the Iranians eventually suffered at the hands of Arab Muslims.

Probably, the reason of the Muslims' victory can be attributed to their religious zeal, their clear goals, and their faith and conviction in the historic mission they had been entrusted with, along with their full confidence in their victory, which issued from their unflinching faith in God and the Day of Judgement. Of course, the role of faith in the Muslims' victories cannot be controverted. The accounts of their deeds of sacrifice and selflessness and their utterances that have reached us indicate that their faith in God and the Day of Resurrection and their faith in the prophethood of the Holy Prophet (S) and their own historic role was unshakable. They believed that they should not submit to anybody except God and that all the nations that worshipped deities other than God were to be liberated. They were equally sure that their own historic mission was to establish faith in the Unity of God and social justice and to emancipate all the oppressed sections of the people from the clutches of the oppressor classes.

All the statements made by the Muslim leaders on different occasions to explain their objectives indicate that they were perfectly conscious of their goal and every step they took to achieve it was fully defined and determined. In the real sense of the term, they were leading a movement. The following words of 'Ali (A) applied to them perfectly:

حَمَلُوا بَصَائِرَهُمْ عَلَىٰ أَسْيَافِهِمْ

They carried their vision on their swords.¹⁶

Yet the mercenaries of imperialism, in a most unmanly manner, place the Islamic movement at par with the conquests of Alexander and the Mongols!

Accepting all these truths, only the spiritual force of their faith was not sufficient to register such remarkable victories. Howsoever strong the faith might have been, it was not possible for a small force, with all the drawbacks mentioned above, to fight against an empire like that of the Sāsānids and to wipe it out completely.¹⁷

Iran in those days had an estimated population of 140 million,¹⁸ of which an innumerable number of people were militarily trained. On the other hand, the total number of Muslim combat forces that took part in the battles with Iran and the Byzantium did not exceed sixty thousand. The situation was such that if, for instance, the Iranians had retreated, this small army would have been lost amidst the huge population of Iran. But, despite all the factors referred to above, the Sāsānid empire was defeated and completely destroyed by this small army. Hence the basic reason of the defeat of the Iranians is to be sought somewhere else.

The People's Discontent:

In reality, the most important factor in the defeat of the Sāsānid empire should be traced in the discontent of the Iranian people with the oppressive rule and the taxing and cumbersome creed and rituals of those days. All the Eastern and Western historians are in agreement that the government and the socio-religious institutions had become so degenerate and corrupt that almost all the people were unhappy with them.

This discontent was not the direct result of the conditions of only the last few years after Khusrow Parviz. If the people have faith in a system or government, their temporary dissatisfaction cannot stop them from fighting a common enemy threatening their system. Conversely, if the national spirit is alive, howsoever the apparent conditions may deteriorate, in such a critical situation, a nation puts together all its energies and resources for overcoming internal differences and fights unitedly the common enemy as a single body. There are many examples of such resistance in the history of the world.

Usually, an enemy's aggression leads to greater unity, and internal differences are forgotten. But this happens on one condition only, that is, if there is among the people a vital spirit inspired either by their religion or government.

In our own age we see that despite all the differences and hostilities among the Arabs that are fanned by the imperialists, the existence of a common enemy, Israel, has proved to be a vital factor in uniting

them. This factor has led them to gradually develop and pool their resources and to cultivate a common political consciousness. This is itself a proof of the existence of a vital spirit among these people.

The Iranian society of those days was a strangely divided caste society, with all the maladies and evils that exist in such a society. Even the fire-temples of different castes were separate from each other. Suppose, if our rich and poor people were to have their separate mosques, what kind of spirit that would generate among the people? Moreover, all the castes were closed classes. Nobody had a right to enter a different caste. The religion and the law never permitted a cobbler or a worker to acquire education. Learning and teaching were the special privileges of the sons of the aristocrats, feudal lords and priests.

Whatever might have been the original spirit of the creed of Zoroaster, it was corrupted to such an extent by the priests that the intelligent people of Iran could never have a sincere faith in it. As researchers say, the conditions were so miserable that if Islam had not come to Iran at that time, Iran could have been gradually conquered by Christianity, and Zoroastrianism would have been wiped away. The intelligentsia and the educated class in the Iran of that time and so also all its academies and cultural centres were constituted not by Zoroastrians but by Christians. The Zoroastrians were so much plagued with false pride, prejudice and unhealthy traditions that they were not capable of thinking about knowledge, culture, justice and freedom. Actually, it was Christianity which suffered more than Zoroastrianism at the advent of Islam in Iran, for it lost a fertile ground for its expansion.

The Iranian people's indifference towards the State, their religious institutions and the clergy was the main reason why their soldiers did not fight whole-heartedly against the Muslims. On many occasions they rather helped the Muslims.¹⁹

Edward Browne, in the first volume of *A Literary History Of Persia*, writes:

Still it does not appear that the Zoroastrians as such were subjected to any severe persecution, or that the conversion of Persia to Islam was mainly effected by force. This has been very well shown by Mr. T.W. Arnold, professor at the College of Aligarh, in Chap. vii of his excellent work *The Preaching of Islam* (London, 1896, pp.177-184); he points out that the intolerance of the Zoroastrian priests, not only towards those of other religions, but towards non-conformist Persian subjects not only towards those of other religions, but also towards the persecution of the non-conformist Persian subjects, had stirred up feelings of bitter hatred against the established religion and the dynasty that supported its oppressions, and so caused the Arab conquest to appear in the light of a deliverance.²⁰

Edward Browne further says:

...It is quite certain that the bulk of conversions were voluntary and spontaneous. After the defeat of the Persians at Qadisiyya, for example, some four thousand soldiers from Daylam (near the Caspian Sea) decided, after consultation, to embrace Islam and join the Arabs, whom they aided in the conquest of Jalūla, after which they settled in Kufa with Muslims; and other wholesale and voluntary conversions were numerous.²¹

The constitution, law and government of Iran at the time of the emergence of Islam was such that all the people of Iran were prepared to submit to and accept a new government and a new creed. It was due to this reason that when Iran was conquered by Muslims, the people of Iran not only did not react adversely, they also worked hard to advance the cause of Islam in many directions.

Dr. Şāhib al-Zāmānī, in his "Introduction to Leadership" (*Dībācheh-yī bar rahbarī*) says:

The Iranian masses not only did not put up any resistance against the world-outlook and the anti-class, anti-discrimination ideology of Islam, but they also discovered in the Islamic ideals the thing for which they had been shedding tears and bleeding for centuries and for which had been making sacrifices; for centuries they had been thirsting for it....²²

The first generation of the Iranian masses at the advent of Islam did not in their encounter with the new creed come across high sounding and deceptive slogans empty of content. Not only the Prophet (S) had reiterated on numerous times that 'I am a human being like you' and that 'There is no difference between an Ethiopian black and a Qarashī Sayyid except on the basis of piety (*taqwā*)', but they also found that the policy of the government of the Rāshidūn Caliphs, particularly that of 'Alī (A), was practically more straightforward than they, in the heart of their hearts and even in their dreams, had wished or could imagine....

One of the most crucial moments relating to the encounter of the two worldviews — the decadent Sāsānīd tradition and the new creed of Islam — can be witnessed in Amīr al-Mu'minīn 'Alī's encounter, at the time of his mobilization against Syria, with the liberated farmers of the Iranian city of Anbār on the bank of the Euphrates. This encounter gave rise to one of the finest revolutionary speeches of 'Alī (A). This sermon of an unsurpassable statesman in the history of governance and politics still stands as a lighthouse for the guidance of succeeding generations of political leaders....The Iraqi forces had been mobilized for a war with Syria. The peasants of the beautiful city of Anbār on the bank of Euphrates stood in a file according to the old Iranian custom to welcome the cavalcade of Amīr al-Mu'minīn (A).... When 'Alī (A) approached, they ran towards 'Alī, who was not distinguishable from the other warriors, with cries of exultation, joy and applause. That great leader criticizes the Iranian custom of paying respect and homage to their rulers in these words: "God Almighty is not pleased with this act. It is also extremely unwelcome and disgusting in the eyes of the Amīr al-Mu'minīn. Free human beings never humiliate themselves in this way....Think, does a wise man invite the wrath of God at the cost of all this labour and hard-

ship?"....²³

Dr. Ṣāhib al-Zamāni says further:

Islam brought about a turning point in the masses' outlook on leadership. It considered the ruler as a shepherd encharged with protecting and defending the herd, not the herd as a means for quenching the thirst of bloodthirsty, wolf-like shepherds. Islam represented an epical struggle for the freedom of the people. Is the leader for the people, or are the people for the leader? This was the new question that Islam had raised as against the political philosophy of the ancient world and the Sāsānīd Iran. During the seven hundred years of war between Iran and Rome, such a question had never occurred to the people. The despotic policies of both the empires were the same: People are for the leader, and masses are sacrificial goats for the upper classes....²⁴ The simple court of 'Alī (A), shorn of all pageantry, was situated in Kūfah and the Iranians and the Mawālī were in close contact with it. They not only heard about its characteristic simplicity but saw it with their eyes. For this reason, if the oppressed masses of Iran welcomed this creed with open arms, there was nothing surprising in their attitude.²⁵

The Gradual Impact of Islam:

With the passage of time the Iranians' attachment to Islam grew and they accepted Islam in large numbers and abandoned their old creeds, traditions and customs.

The best example in this regard is Persian literature. As time passed, the impact of Islam, the Qur'ān and ḥadīth on Persian literature increased. Islamic influence on writers, poets, and even philosophers, in the 6th/12th and 7th/13th centuries, and afterwards, is much more evident in comparison with the poets, writers and philosophers of the 3rd/9th and 4th/10th centuries. A comparative study of the poetry of Rūdakī and Firdawsī with the works of Rūmī, Sa'dī, Niẓāmī, Ḥāfiẓ and Jāmī can reveal this fact.

In the introduction to *Aḥādīth-e Mathnawī*, the author, after stating that the influence of the themes of ḥadīth on Persian poetry is evident from the earliest period, cites Rūdakī's verses, and says:

Since the last decades of the fourth/tenth century, when Islamic culture spread all over the country and schools were established in its various parts, the religiosity of Islam came to prevail over that of all other religions. The resistance of the Zoroastrians met with final and definite defeat in all parts of Iran. Iranian culture began to flourish in Islamic colour, and its educational system was based on Arabic literature and the tenets of Islam. Naturally, the poets and writers showed greater inclination towards using Arabic phrases and themes, and the occurrence of old Persian phrases, proverbs and maxims in prose and poetry gradually decreased. If one compares the verses of Daqīqī, Firdawsī and other poets of the Sāmānīd and the early Ghaznawid periods with those of 'Unṣurī, Farrūkhī and Manūchehrī, who lived at the end of the

fourth/tenth and the beginning of the fifth/eleventh century, it can be seen that the names of Zoroaster, Avestā, Būdharmeh and their sayings occur more frequently in the former's works than in works of the latter ones.²⁶

It is also indicated by history that with the attainment of greater political independence the Iranians' acceptance of the ideals and realities of Islam had been on the increase.

The Ṭāhirids, the Buwayhids and other Iranian dynasties, who had, relatively speaking, gained complete political independence, never thought of reviving the Avesta or of subordinating their lives to its codes. On the contrary, they directed all their efforts to spreading Islamic teachings and views.

After a hundred years of the conquest of Iran by Muslims, the Iranians brought into existence a great military power. When the Umayyads' regime, due to its excesses and deviations from Islamic teachings, caused the disenchantment of Muslims in general — excepting those Arabs who followed a policy of Arab chauvinism — the Iranians, mustering all their forces, could manage to transfer the caliphate from the Umayyads to the 'Abbāsids. If they wished to form an independent state or to revive their old religion, they were definitely capable of doing so. But they neither made any attempt to revive their old creed or to abandon the new religion, nor did they think of establishing an independent government of their own against the institution of the caliphate. Until that time they thought that they could achieve their desire of living under an Islamic State that followed the teachings of the Holy Qur'ān by transferring the caliphate from one dynasty to another. When the 'Abbāsid rule was established and the Iranians became disillusioned with it, a war broke out between the Iranian forces under Ṭāhir ibn al-Ḥusayn supporting al-Ma'mūn and the Arab armies under the command of 'Alī ibn 'Īsa supporting al-'Amin. The defeat inflicted on al-'Amin's forces by Ṭāhir ibn al-Ḥusayn proved once again that military power was in the hands of the Iranians. But at this juncture too they neither sought to gain political independence nor did they think of setting Islam aside. They thought of gaining political independence only when they were totally disappointed with the Arab regimes, which failed in establishing a really Islamic State. But, at the same time, they remained content with the declaration of political independence and continued to be staunchly loyal to the sacred creed of Islam. The majority of Iranians embraced Islam during Iran's political independence. The political independence of Iran started at the beginning of the 3rd/9th century, and till that time a considerable number of Iranians had adhered to their old creeds — such as Zoroastrianism, Christianity, Sabaeism, and even Buddhism. The travelogues written in the 3rd/9th and 4th/10th centuries reveal that a large number of fire temples

and churches still existed in Iran, which gradually decreased in number and mosques were built in their place.

Historians of the Muslim world mention the names of some Iranian families which stuck to the Zoroastrian faith till the 2nd/8th and 3rd/9th centuries, and some even until the 4th/10th, and led a respectable life in the Muslim society; but after that they abandoned that faith. It is said that Sāmān, the ancestor of the Sāmānīds, was among the eminent men of Balkh; he embraced Islam in the 2nd/8th century. The ancestor of the Qābūs family, another ruling dynasty of the Islamic era, became Muslim in the 3rd/9th century. Mahyār al-Daylamī, an eminent Iranian poet, turned Muslim in the 4th/10th century. The people of Ṭabaristān and some other parts of northern Iran remained non-Muslims till the end of the 3rd/9th century and were hostile to the caliphal regime. Most of the people of Kirmān remained Zoroastrian throughout the rule of the Umayyads, and the majority of the people of Fārs were Zoroastrian in the time of al-'Istakhri, the author of *al-Masālik wa al-mamālik*. Al-Maqdisi (d.375 or 381/985 or 991), the author of *Aḥsan al-taqāsīm* and one of the world's greatest geographers and historians, who himself travelled to Iran, gives an account of the influence and power of the Zoroastrians in his book. He mentions that they were the most respected of all the dhimmis amongst the Muslims.²⁷ According to him all the bazaars of the town were decorated on the occasion of Zoroastrian festivals and the entire population participated in celebrating Nawrūz and Mehregān festivals with the Zoroastrians. Regarding the faith of the people of Khurāsān, al-Maqdisi writes in *Aḥsan al-taqāsīm*²⁸: "There are many Jews, few Christians, and a small number of Majūs (Zoroastrians)". Al-Mas'ūdī (d. some time between 344/955 and 346/957), the famous historian, travelled to Iran during the first half of the 4th/10th century. Though not an Iranian, he shows special interest in the history and monuments of Iran. In his work *al-Tanbīh wa al-'ishrāf*,²⁹ he refers to a respected family of Istakhr which possessed a comprehensive work of history about Sāsānīd Iran, which he made use of. He mentions even the names of the chief priest (*mu'bad*) of his age, which indicates that the *mu'bad*s (magis) of the Zoroastrians enjoyed an eminent status because of the large number of their followers. In the first volume of *Murūj al-dhahab*, under the title "Concerning the Fire-Temples and Other Places", he gives an account of Zoroastrian fire-temples, with a special mention of the fire-temple of Dārābgerd. He says that it existed at that date, the year 332/943, and that the Zoroastrians paid greater reverence to its fire than that of any other fire-temple.

All this indicates, as said earlier, that the Iranians accepted Islam gradually, and that Islam overcame the Zoroastrian faith gradually and especially during the period of Iran's political independence. What is surprising is that the Zoroastrians were held in greater esteem in the

earlier period when Arabs were in power than the later period when Iranians had captured political power. With the growing number of Iranians embracing Islam, the position of the Zoroastrians deteriorated and the Iranian Muslims showed more prejudice against the Zoroastrian faith than the Arab Muslims. Apparently these prejudices of the newly-converted Iranians proved to be the cause of the migration of some Zoroastrians to India, who came to constitute the minority community of the Pārsis there. It would not be inappropriate to quote here what Mr. Frye, the author of *The Heritage of Persia*, writes:

From various Islamic sources we know that Istakhr in Fars, which had been one of two centres of Zoroastrianism in Persia under the Sasanians, the other being Shiz in Azerbaijan, continued to flourish under Islam. Gradually the network of fire-temples fell to pieces as the number of Zoroastrians declined, but Fars remained predominantly Zoroastrian down to the tenth century and with substantial numbers of Zoroastrians even at the time of the Turkish Seljuk conquests in the eleventh century.

We have a fascinating account of struggles between Muslims and Zoroastrians within the city of Kazerun in the life of the famous founder of a Sufi or dervish order, Abu Ishaq Ibrahim b. Shahriyar al-Kazeruni, who died in 1034. Many Zoroastrians were converted to Islam by the Shaykh, but none the less the strong position of Zoroastrianism is clear from this book as well as from other Islamic sources. The governor of Kazerun under the Boyid dynasty, which ruled Fars at that time, was Zoroastrian called Khorshid, who held the high esteem of the Boyid rule in Shiraz, so much so that the Boyid prince ordered Shaykh Kazeruni to appear before him where he was reprimanded for disturbing the peace with his proselytizing activities.³⁰

At another place he writes:

Muslims and Zoroastrians constituted the major part of the Persians, while the number of Christians and Jews was very small....

As Islam grew in scope and richness, Sufism, Shi'ism and other Islamic movements provided a haven for Persians who could not longer follow the sterile, orthodox Zoroastrianism. When Persian leaders from Daylam, a Caspian Sea area, newly converted to Shi'ite Islam, wrested political control of western Persia from the caliphs and eventually took Baghdad, the capital, in 945, the end was in sight for Zoroastrian Persia. Here was the Boyid dynasty of Persians upholding Islam and the Arabic language, because both had become internationalized while Zoroastrian Persian culture had retreated into a ghetto. The Shi'ite Boyids on the whole seem to have been relatively tolerant of other beliefs, for they retained the Sunnite Caliphs and many Sunnite officials. We have already mentioned the Zoroastrian governor of Kazerun among other similar officers under them. The Boyids, however, were more interested in the Arab traditions of the family of 'Alī and general Islamic culture as a reality than they were in the past glories of Persia. It is true that they had an antiquarian interest in the past; for example, one of the Boyid princes 'Adud al-Dawlah in 955 had an inscription carved at Persepolis in Arabic telling how he visited the ruins and had Marasfand, the *mobad* of

Kazerun, interpret for him the Pahlavi inscriptions from the time of Shapur II.^{3 1}

What was the reason that many centuries after the end of Arab hegemony the people of Iran gravitated to Islam with a greater force? Was there any other cause of it than the inherent attraction of Islam and the compatibility of the Iranian soul with Islam?

Independent Iranian regimes which were politically hostile to the Arab states, defended Islam, patronized the 'ulamā' and encouraged the servants of Islam more than the Arab states. Muslim scholars were given liberal aid in their academic pursuits and their teaching of Islamic sciences. The animation and enthusiasm showed by Iranians with regard to Islam and Islamic sciences is unprecedented in the history of fourteen centuries of Islam — including the first two centuries, which have been called "two centuries of silence" by Sir John Malcolm. It has no parallel either from the viewpoint of Islam or that of Iran. That is, neither any nation except the Iranians ever showed such a zeal and passion for the service of Islam, nor did Iranians express so much enthusiasm in any other epoch for any other goal, whether national or religious.

After attaining independence, the Iranians had no obstacle in their way to revert to and revive their old creed and traditions, but they did not go that way. On the contrary, they abandoned them and turned to Islam with greater fervour. That was so because they found Islam to be suited to their own intellect, ideas and innate aspirations. They never thought of reviving the old traditions and codes which had been the cause of their spiritual distress. As history bears testimony, it is the same tradition which has been preserved and advanced throughout the long history of fourteen centuries of Islam in Iran. If you find a few individuals of known identity in our age, or in the days bygone, occasionally pleading for the revival of ancient customs and laws, they are not to be taken as representatives of the people of Iran.^{3 2} For Iranians, as we shall expound in detail in the following pages, have proved time and again that they, more than Arabs themselves, have regarded Islam to be in harmony with their spirit. A proof of this claim can be found in all the services that they have rendered to Islam and the Qur'ān in the course of fourteen centuries — services which have been accompanied with an amazing sincerity and faith. With the succour of God, we shall give a comparatively comprehensive account of some of the valuable contributions of Iranians in this respect, so that all may be able to know how the people of Iran wholeheartedly embraced the creed of Islam, regarded it as in harmony with their intellect and thought, and considered it as the only answer to their inner yearnings. And this is the fact which reminds us of the words of the Prophet (S), who said:

By God, I witness a day when these Iranians, with whom you are fighting for Islam, will be fighting you to convert you to Islam.

To be continued — inshā' Allāh.

NOTES:

1. The issue of nationalism is gaining momentum in the Arab countries day by day. Though the majority of the people of these countries is comprised by Muslims, they solely emphasize their Arabhood with a special fanaticism. And as we know this trend in itself means a revolt against the universalist criteria of Islam, which relies solely on the aspects related to humanity and spirituality. We also know that this tendency is harmful for themselves in the first place; for, in spite of their large numbers and vast military means they have been unable to meet the challenge of Israel. Had the Arabs relied more on their religious potentialities, undoubtedly they wouldn't have suffered such a humiliating defeat. A Pakistani writer wrote that in the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 a religious force, that is Zionism, overcame the force of nationalism, that is Arabism. Though this statement is based on a kind of exaggeration in giving undue importance to the element of religion in Zionism — for the element of race has always been more dominant than the element of faith amongst the Jews — yet it is true so far as Arab nationalism is described as the main factor responsible for the defeat of the Arabs.

Last year (1387/1967-8) when I was on hajj pilgrimage, in a conference organized by Rābiṭat al-'Ālam al-'Islāmī, an Arab scholar delivered an eloquent speech. He declared, "By God Islam never entered this war" (وَاللَّهِ بَدَخِيَ الْإِسْلَامُ الْمَغْرُوكَةَ فَظ). It was not Islam that fought against Israel; it was Arabism that faced Zionism.

2. Following are the verses in which the term "millah" is used: *al-Baqarah*: 120, 130, 135; *Al 'Imrān*: 95; *al-Nisā'*: 125; *al-'An'ām*: 161; *al-'A'rāf*: 88, 89; *Yūsuf*: 37; *Ibrāhīm*: 13; *al-Nahl*: 123; *al-Kahf*: 20; *al-Hajj*: 78.

3. *Uṣūl-e 'ilm-e siyāsī*, vol. 1, p. 327.

4. It is quoted in *al-Tafsīr al-Mizān* from al-Baydāwī's tafsīr that when this verse was revealed, the Prophet (S) put his hand on Salmān's back and said, "Those would be from his people."

5. Refer to al-Ṭabarsī's *Majma' al-bayān*.

6. As will be seen in detail later, excepting the first two centuries, Hijāz has never been one of the biggest centres of Islamic learning. On the contrary, since then, all the great Islamic schools flourished in Egypt, Baghdad, Nīshāpūr, Transoxania and other centres, and always non-Arab nations have been the torchbearers of Islam.

7. Regarding the Shu'ūbiyyah Movement and the extreme reaction of some of its adherents against Arab racism, we shall give further explanation in the latter parts of the book.

8. Al-Baḥrānī, *Tuḥaf al-'uqūl*, p. 34; Ibn Hishām, *al-Sīrat al-Nabawiyyah*, vol. 2, p. 414.

9. *Sunan Ibn Dāwūd*, vol. 2, p. 624.

10. Shaykh 'Abbās al-Qummi, *Safīnat al-Bihār*, under *s.l.m.*

11. *Sunan Ibn Dāwūd*, vol. 2, p. 625.

12. Al-Kulaynī, *Rawḍat al-Kāfi*.

13. Mr. 'Uṭaridī is an eminent contemporary scholar, an excellent expert in the field of Islamic manuscripts. He has discovered a number of Islamic manuscripts

in important libraries, particularly in India, which had not been accessible to any other scholar before him. He has filmed all these manuscripts. Presently, he is engaged in compiling an encyclopaedic work on eminent personages (*rijāl*) of Khurāsān, which would run into more than forty volumes. I pray to God to help him in completing this project.

14. Ibn al-'Athīr, in *Kāmil al-tawārikh*, vol. 2, p. 228, says that al-'Aswad al-'Ansī was the first person in the times of the Prophet (S) to apostatize after embracing Islam.

15. Here ends the article by 'Uṭāridī. Its second part will be reproduced in the second part of our book, where we shall also give the sources quoted by him.

16. *Nahj al-balāghah*, *Khuṭbah* 148: this description is related to the believers living in the Prophet's days.

17. The same thing happened in the case of the companions of al-'Imām al-Ḥusayn, who, despite their firm faith, were all martyred in a short time by the forces of Yazīd. Similar is the case of the Muslim Arabs in Europe; they made rapid advance there, but when met with stiff resistance they were forced to halt their victorious march. So we may conclude that one of the causes of the victory of the Muslims was that they did not face a strong resistance and a serious challenge in their early conquests anywhere. On the contrary, they were welcomed by the people of the vanquished countries, who saw in their victory a hope for the betterment of the chaotic conditions prevailing there.

18. This estimate of the Iranian population is made by Mr. Sa'id Nafisi in *Tārikh-e ijtimā'i-ye Irān*.

19. The late Muḥammad Qazwīnī, in *Bīst maqāleh*, writes: "As soon as the pro-Arab Iranians and the traitors among the officers and governors controlling the provinces and guarding the borders of their land felt the precarious position of the Sāsānīd regime, and the Iranian forces were defeated thrice at the hands of the Arab forces, they defected to the Arab camp. They not only assisted the Arab commanders in their conquest and guided them in leading them to proper roads and water wells, but also invited them to invade other parts of their country that were not yet attacked by the Arabs. They gladly handed over to them the keys to forts and treasuries, making a pact with them that they would be retained as rulers of those areas." The late Qazwīnī has narrated this story with a view to condemn those who guided the Arabs to wells and proper roads, but it should be investigated why they withdrew their support to the Sāsānīd empire. What was the reason that they helped the 'foreigners' — to use the terminology of the Iranian nationalists — in guiding them to roads and water resources? Was there any other reason for this except that they were disaffected with the Sāsānīd regime and the creed which it defended, and saw their welfare in following the Muslims?

20. Edward G. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia* (Cambridge University Press, 1929), vol. 1, p. 202.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 202 — 203.

22. Ṣāhib al-Zamānī, *Dībācheh-yi bar rahbari*, p. 255.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 267 — 270.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 272.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 323.

26. Badi' al-Zamān Farūzānfar, *Aḥādith-e Mathnawī* (Tehran: Intishārāt-e Amīr Kabīr, 2nd ed., 1347 H. Shamsī), p. 7.

27. Al-Maqdisī, *Aḥsan al-taqāsīm*, pp. 39, 420, 429.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 323.

29. Al-Mas'ūdī, *al-Tanbih wa al-'ishraf*, pp. 91 — 92.

30. Richard N. Frye, *The Heritage of Persia* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson: Lon-

don, 1962), p. 249.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 251.

32. Fortunately, since the advent of Islam in Iran until this day, whenever some persons have tried to make a fuss with the pretext of reviving old Iranian customs and traditions, they have been faced with the violent reaction of the Iranian people. Their Bahāfarīds, Sinbāds, Bābaks and Māzyārs have been completely routed by the likes of Abū Muslim Kurāsānī and Afshīn, together with similar innumerable warriors of our homeland. One fails to see why the trumpeters of imperialism do not see all those Iranians who crushed anti-Islamic movements, and only pick out the likes of Bābak as representative of the Iranian people — the same Bābak, who at the time of attempting to escape to Armenia was told: wherever he went he would be at home, for he had impregnated an innumerable number of girls and had numerous children born from them. (Ibn al-'Athir, *al-Kāmil*)

Kashkūl

“Kashkūl” or “Kashkol” is the darvish’s goblet, earthen or made of metal, shaped like a coconut, and used as a drinking vessel or a begger’s bowl.

*“Kashkūl” is also a scrapbook, an album, an anthology of motley material — quotations, verses, aphorisms, wise and witty observations, educative or humorous sayings and anecdotes — a stretchable genre which has been in vogue in the Muslim world, and many scholars and writers have compiled their kashkūls with varying ranges of themes and topics. A well-known collection of this type is the *Kashkūl of al-Shaykh al-Bahā’ī*.*

*This new section in al-Tawhīd also aims to collect such a diverse material and invites our readers all over the world, with their varying tastes and backgrounds, to make — God willing — this as yet empty bowl a treasure trove claimed by none and belonging to all by sending in interesting and educative, witty and enlightening, remarks and statements, quotations and sayings, anecdotes and verses, that may hear or read — or conjure up themselves. This section now opens with some remarks of René Guénon about the modern Western civilization selected out of his *The Crisis of the Modern World* by a reader of al-Tawhīd, Br. Mas‘ūd Ḥarīrī.*

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Defending the West

There are people today who talk about a “defence of the West”, which is odd, to say the least of it, considering that it is the West, as we shall see later on, which threatens to overrun everything and to involve the whole of humanity in the whirlpool of its own inconsequent activity; odd, we say, and also quite unjustifiable, if they really mean, as seems to be the case in spite of certain reservations, that the defence in question requires to be directed against the East, since the real East has no thought of attacking or dominating anyone; it asks no more than to be left independent and undisturbed, which surely seems legitimate enough. The truth of the matter is that the West actually stands in great need of being defended, but solely against itself and against its own tendencies which, if driven to their logical conclusion, must lead inevitably to ruin and destruction; one ought, therefore, to speak rather of a “reform of the West”, and such a reform, if it were all that it should be, that is to say a real traditional restoration, would also entail an understanding with the East as a natural consequence. For our part, we ask

no more than to contribute, as far as lies within our power, both to this reform and to this understanding, always supposing there is still time and that some results can be obtained before the ultimate catastrophe occurs towards which modern civilization is rapidly heading: but even if it were already too late to avoid this catastrophe the work undertaken with this end in view would not be without its own usefulness, for it would serve in any case as a preparation, however remote, for that “discrimination” referred to in our foreword, and would thereby help to assure the preservation of those elements which are destined to escape the shipwreck of the present world and become the seeds of the future one.

René Guénon in *The Crisis of the Modern World*, p. 27

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The East and the West

The crux of the matter is this: will the East, as the result of modern influences, merely have to undergo a temporary and superficial crisis, or is the West destined to involve the whole of mankind in its own downfall? It would be difficult at this moment to give an answer to this question based on indisputable evidence; both the two contrasted attitudes of mind exist side by side in the East today, and it is always possible that the spiritual power inherent in tradition, though unrecognized by its opponents, will triumph over material power once the latter shall have played its part, causing it to be dispersed as darkness is dispersed by the light; one might even say that it is bound to triumph sooner or later, but at the same time it is conceivable that before this can happen a period of total obscuration may intervene. The traditional spirit cannot die, being in its essence above death and change; but it might withdraw completely from the external world, and in such a case there would really be the “end of a world”. From all that has been said one may conclude that some such eventuality in the not far distant future is by no means unlikely; in the present confusion, which grew up first in the West and is now rapidly overrunning the East, it is possible to discern the “beginning of the end”, the signs that precede the moment when, according to an expression of the Hindu tradition, the sacred doctrine is destined to be enclosed inside a conch-shell, from which it will once more emerge intact at the dawn of the new world.

But let us leave anticipations and turn to present events: it remains an undeniable fact that the West is encroaching everywhere; its influence first made itself felt in the material sphere, where it was able to penetrate most easily, working through conquest by violence or through commerce, as well as by securing control over the resources of other countries; but now the process is developing still further. Westerners, spurred

on always by that urge to proselytize which is with them such an ingrained characteristic, have succeeded to a certain extent in introducing their own anti-traditional and materialistic outlook among other peoples; and whereas the first form of invasion after all affected only men's bodies, this latter form poisons their minds and kills spirituality. The one kind of penetration moreover prepared the way for the other and made its development possible, so that ultimately it is simply by brute force that the West will have succeeded in asserting its influence everywhere, as was indeed to be expected, since the only real superiority of its civilization, so inferior from all other points of view, resides in this sphere alone. The Western encroachment is the encroachment of materialism in all its forms, and can never amount to anything different; none of the more or less hypocritical disguises, none of the moralistic pretexts, none of the humanitarian declamations, none of the subtleties of a propaganda that knows how to become insinuating on occasion the better to encompass its destructive ends, none of these things is able to contradict this fact, which could only be denied by credulous persons, or by those who have some kind of interest at stake in this work which is truly "satanic" in the strictest sense of the word.

René Guénon in *The Crisis of the Modern World*, pp. 99-100

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Double Standards

Moreover, from another point of view, if the general mass of Eastern people have in the end become definitely hostile towards the Westerners, after regarding them for a long time without prejudice, who is to blame for that? Is one to accuse the intellectual elite who, occupied in contemplation, hold themselves strictly aloof from external distractions, or is it not rather the fault of Westerners themselves in that they have done so much to make their presence intolerable? It is enough to put the question fairly in this manner for the answer to become plain to everybody; admitting that the Orientals, who have hitherto given evidence of astonishing long-suffering, are at last showing a wish to be masters in their own home, is there anyone who can honestly bring himself to criticize them for that? It is true that when certain passions come into play things which are identical in themselves can be explained in very different and even contradictory senses according to circumstances: for instance, when a Western people resists a foreign invasion this is called "patriotism" and merits the highest praise, but when an Eastern people does the same thing it is called "fanaticism" or "xenophobia" and deserves nothing but hatred and contempt. Moreover, is it not in the name of "Right" and "Liberty", "Justice" and "Civilization", that the Europeans have claimed to impose their dominion everywhere

and to prevent others from living and thinking differently from themselves? It must be admitted that "moralism" has indeed had its uses, unless one prefers the simpler conclusion which we have already reached ourselves, namely that, apart from exceptions as honourable as they are rare, Westerners can practically be reduced to two classes of people: the credulous, who take these high sounding arguments at their face value and believe in a "civilizing mission", unaware as they are of the barbarous materialism into which they themselves have sunk, and the astute persons who exploit this state of mind in order to gratify their own instincts of violence and cupidity.

René Guénon in *The Crisis of the Modern World*, pp. 105—106

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The Profane Times

Neither persons nor things are any longer in the position which they should normally occupy; men no longer recognize an effective authority in the spiritual order nor any legitimate power in the temporal order; the "profane" permit themselves the discussion of sacred things, contesting their nature and even their very existence, what is this but the inferior judging the superior, ignorance imposing its limitations upon wisdom, error overtaking truth, the human substituting itself for the divine, earth in ascendancy over heaven, the individual setting himself up as the measure of all things and claiming to dictate laws for the universe drawn entirely from his own limited and fallible reason? "Woe unto you, ye blind guides" the Gospel says; and indeed everywhere today one sees these blind leaders of the blind, who, unless restrained by some timely check, will inevitably lead their followers into the abyss, there to perish in their company.

René Guénon in *The Crisis of the Modern World*, p. 65

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Suggestions

Naturally, when faced with an idea such as "equality", or "progress", or any other of the "lay dogmas" that find blind acceptance with practically all of our contemporaries, and of which the greater number began to be formulated explicitly during the course of the eighteenth century, it is not possible to admit that such ideas could arise quite spontaneously. These are indeed "suggestions", in the strictest sense of the word, which moreover could only produce their effect in an environment that was already ripe for receiving them; they did not create the modern state of mind all of a piece, but they have contributed substantially to maintaining it and to developing it to a pitch that it would

"Kashkūl"

doubtless never have reached without their aid.

René Guénon in *The Crisis of the Modern World*, p. 68

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Pseudo-ideas

We say "ideas", but it is only in a very loose sense that the word is applicable, since it is plain that there is no question here of pure ideas, nor even of anything belonging even remotely to the intellectual order: one could perhaps describe them as false ideas, but it would be better still to call them "pseudo-ideas", aimed primarily at provoking sentimental reactions, which is in fact the simplest and most efficacious way of influencing the masses. Under such circumstances, moreover, a word possesses greater importance than the notion it is supposed to represent, and indeed the majority of the modern "idols" really amount to no more than words, for here we are confronted with that remarkable phenomenon known as "verbalism" whereby the mere sonority of words serves to produce an illusion of thought; the influence which orators exercise over the crowd is particularly characteristic in this respect, and one need not study it very closely in order to become convinced that the process is one of suggestion in every way comparable to that resorted to by hypnotists.

René Guénon in *The Crisis of the Modern World*, p. 69

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Ignorant Knowledge

The truth is that there is really no such thing as a "profane realm" opposable in some way to a "sacred realm"; there is simply a "profane point of view", which is really nothing but the point of view of ignorance. It is for this reason that profane science, as understood by the moderns that is to say, can fairly be described as "ignorant knowledge", as we have already remarked elsewhere: it is knowledge of an inferior order, remaining at the level of the lowest degree of reality and blind to everything that transcends it or to any aims loftier than its own, as well as to any principle capable of assuring it a legitimate place, however humble, among the various orders of knowledge as a whole; imprisoned irremediably within the relative and narrow field in which it has striven to proclaim itself independent, thereby of its own accord severing all connection with transcendent truth and supreme knowledge, it amounts to no more than an aimless and illusory form of knowledge, issuing out of nothing and leading nowhere.

René Guénon in *The Crisis of the Modern World*, pp. 49—50

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Individualism and Intellectual Decline

Modern science, arising out of an arbitrary limitation of knowledge within a certain particular order which is indeed the most inferior of all, namely that of material or sensible reality, has as a consequence forfeited all intellectual value, so long that is to say as one uses the word intellectuality in all the fulness of its true meaning and refuses to participate in the “rationalist” error, or to reject intellectual intuition, which amounts to the same thing. The source of this error as of a great many other modern errors, and likewise the root of the entire deviation of science as outlined above, can be discovered in what may be called “individualism”, an attitude of mind which is indistinguishable from the anti-traditional attitude itself and of which the numerous manifestations, apparent in every sphere, constitute one of the most important factors in the confusion of our time.

René Guénon in *The Crisis of the Modern World*, p. 50

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Individualism

Individualism implies, in the first place, the denial of intellectual intuition, in as much as this is essentially a supra-individual faculty, and the repudiation therefore of the order of knowledge which constitutes the true province of that intuition, that is to say of metaphysic understood in its real sense. This explains why everything that modern philosophers describe by this same word metaphysic — when they admit the existence of anything at all to be called by that name — possesses absolutely nothing in common with real metaphysic: it consists simply of rational structures or imaginative hypotheses, purely individual conceptions therefore, most of which refer merely to the “physical” sphere, or in other words to nature. Even if some question or other does arise which could be effectively linked up with the metaphysical order, the way in which it is envisaged and treated still restricts it to the category of “pseudo-metaphysic” and thus precludes any real or valid solution: it would even seem as if for the philosophers it is more important to set “problems”, however artificial or illusory, than to solve them, and this is yet another aspect of the confused passion for research for its own sake, for the most pointless agitation, that is to say, in the mental as well as in the corporeal sphere. It is also an important consideration for these same philosophers to be able to attach their name to a “system”, that is to say to a strictly limited and circumscribed set of theories which shall belong definitely to themselves and be considered exclusively as their own creation; hence the desire to be original at all costs, even if truth has to be sacrificed to originality: for a philosopher’s

reputation it may often be better to invent a new error than to repeat a truth already observed by others. This form of individualism, the begetter of so many "systems" that are mutually contradictory even when they are not intrinsically so, is to be found just as commonly among modern scholars and artists; but the intellectual anarchy which inevitably results from it is perhaps to be observed most plainly among philosophers.

In a traditional civilization it is almost inconceivable that a man should lay claim to the possession of idea, and, in any case, if he were to do so he would thereby be depriving himself of all credit and authority, since he would be reducing the idea to no more than a kind of baseless fantasy: if an idea is true it belongs equally to all those who are capable of understanding it; if it is false there is no reason to be proud of having thought of it. A true idea cannot be "new", since truth is not a product of the human mind; the truth exists independently of ourselves, and it is for us simply to apprehend it; outside of this knowledge there can be nothing but error; but do the moderns really attach importance to truth and have they any longer the least notion what it consists of? Here again words have lost their meaning, since there are some people, such as the contemporary pragmatists, who go so far as to apply the name of "truth" abusively to what is simply practical utility, to something, that is to say, which is completely foreign to the intellectual order; as a logical outcome of the modern deviation this amounts to the very negation of truth, as well as of the intelligence of which truth is the proper object.

René Guénon in *The Crisis of the Modern World*, pp. 52 — 53

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Individualism and Protestantism

The acceptance of individualism necessarily implies a refusal to admit any authority higher than the individual, as well as any faculty of knowledge superior to individual reason; the two things are inseparable from one another. As a consequence the modern outlook was bound to reject all spiritual authority in the true sense of the word, authority originating that is to say in the supra-human order, as well as any traditional organization based essentially upon such authority, no matter what form that organization might take, the form varying naturally from one civilization to another. This was what in fact occurred: as a substitute for the organization qualified to interpret legitimately the religious tradition of the West, Protestantism claimed to set up what it called "freedom of enquiry", that is to say, interpretation left to the private judgment of individuals, even of the ignorant and the incompetent, and based solely upon the exercise of human reason. It thus represented the analogy, in the religious sphere, of what was to happen

in philosophy with the introduction of "rationalism"; the door was thrown open to discussions, divergencies and deviations of every sort; and the result was what was to be expected: dispersion in an ever-increasing number of sects, each one standing for no more than the private opinions of a few individuals.

René Guénon in *The Crisis of the Modern World*, p. 57

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Leadership and Democracy

It will be noticed that, in the present state of things, not merely does a man fulfil his proper function in exceptional cases only and more or less by accident, whereas his not doing so should normally be the exception, but it also happens that the same man may be called upon to exercise quite different functions successively, as though he were capable of changing his aptitudes at will. This may seem paradoxical in an era of extreme "specialization", and yet it is in fact the case, especially in the political sphere; if the competence of the "specialists" is often quite illusory, and in any case limited to a very narrow field, the belief in that competence is nevertheless a fact and it may well be asked why that belief no longer comes into play in the case of a political career, where the greatest incompetence is seldom looked upon as a disqualification. A little reflection however will show that there is nothing surprising in this and that it is in fact a perfectly natural outcome of the "democratic" conception, according to which power comes from below and is based essentially upon the majority, a belief entailing as a corollary the exclusion of all genuine competence, since competence always will imply at least a relative superiority, and therefore must necessarily belong to a minority.

René Guénon in *The Crisis of the Modern World*, pp. 69 — 70

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Democracy

The most decisive argument against democracy can be summed up in a few words; the superior cannot emanate from the inferior for the simple reason that the greater cannot be derived from the less; this statement is an absolute mathematical certitude which nothing can gainsay. It should be remarked that it is precisely the same argument, applied to a different order of things, which is also valid against "materialism"; there is nothing fortuitous in this coincidence and the two things are much more closely related than might appear at first sight. It is obvious that the people cannot confer a power which they do not themselves possess; true power can only come from above and this is

why, be it said in passing, it can only be legitimized through the sanction of something superior to the social order, that is to say by a spiritual authority; where things are otherwise, one has nothing but a counterfeit of power, existing in actual fact but unjustifiable through an absence of principle, a state which can spell nothing but disorder and confusion. This reversal of hierarchical order occurs as soon as the temporal power tries to render itself independent of the spiritual authority and then to subordinate it to itself while professing to make it serve political ends; this is the initial usurpation which opens up the way to all the others. If democracy be defined as the government of the people by themselves, then it amounts to a sheer impossibility, something which cannot enjoy even a simple existence of fact, any more in the present age than in another; words should not be allowed to deceive one and it is a contradiction to say that the same persons can be at one and the same time the rulers and the ruled, since, to use Aristotelian phraseology, the same being cannot be "in act" and "in potency" at the same time and in respect of the same factors. A relationship is involved which necessarily presupposes the presence of two terms; there could not be the ruled if there were not also the rulers, even if these be illegitimate and without any entitlement to power beyond what they attribute to themselves; but the particular astuteness of those in control of the modern world consists in making the people believe that they are self-governing; and the people allow themselves to be persuaded of this all the more readily in that they feel flattered, and are moreover incapable of reflecting sufficiently to see the impossibility of such a thing. It was for the purpose of creating this illusion that "universal suffrage" came to be invented: the opinion of the majority is supposed to determine the law; but what is not noticed is the fact that opinion is something that can very easily be moulded and diverted; it is always possible, with the help of suitable suggestions, to arouse currents moving in this or that predetermined direction; we cannot recall who it was who first spoke of "manufacturing opinion", but the expression is extremely apt, although it is necessary to add that it is not always those visibly in control who really have the required means at their disposal for obtaining such a result. This last remark no doubt explains why the incompetence of politicians who are most "to the fore" seems to make comparatively little difference; but as we are not concerned here with demonstrating the works of what might be termed the "governmental machine" we will merely point out that this very want of competence itself has the advantage of fostering the illusion we were referring to: indeed it is only under these conditions that the politicians in question are able to appear like an emanation of the majority, being thus as it were its image, since the majority, on whatever subject it may be called upon to express its opinion, is always composed of the incompetent, whose

number vastly exceeds the number of those capable of pronouncing a judgment arrived at in full awareness of the issues.

René Guénon in *The Crisis of the Modern World*, pp. 70—72

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The Masses in Democracies

It is doubtless true that the masses have always been led in one way or another, and it could be said that their part in history consists primarily in allowing themselves to be led, since they represent a predominantly passive element, a *materia* in the Aristotelian sense of the word; but in order to lead them today it is sufficient to possess oneself of purely material means, taking the word matter this time in its ordinary sense, and this clearly shows to what depths the present age has sunk; and at the same time these same masses are made to believe that they are not being led, but that they are acting spontaneously and governing themselves, and the fact that they believe this to be true gives an idea of the extent of their unintelligence.

René Guénon in *The Crisis of the Modern World*, pp. 86 — 87

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Materialism and Disintegration

This, indeed, is the most conspicuous feature of modern times; a craving for ceaseless agitation, for continuous change, for ever-increasing speed like that with which events follow one upon another. On all sides we see dispersion in multiplicity, and in a multiplicity no longer unified by consciousness of any higher principle; in daily life, as in scientific thinking, analysis is driven to extremes, resulting in an endless subdivision, a veritable disintegration of human activity in every sphere in which that activity can still be exercised, and hence the inaptitude for synthesis and the incapacity for any sort of concentration that is so striking a feature in the eyes of Orientals. These are the natural and inevitable fruits of an ever more pronounced materialization, matter being itself essentially multiplicity and division; and let it be said in passing, this also explains why everything that derives from matter can beget nothing but strife and all manner of conflict between peoples as well as between individuals. The more deeply one becomes involved in matter, the more the elements of division and opposition gain force and scope; on the other hand, the more one rises towards pure spirituality, the nearer one draws to that unity which can only be fully realized through consciousness of the universal principles.

René Guénon in *The Crisis of the Modern World*, p.33

Book Reviews:

SCIENCE & CIVILIZATION IN ISLAM. By Seyyed Hossein Nasr. The Islamic Texts Society: Cambridge, 1987. Pp. xvi + 388. ISBN 0 946621 11X.

This book, whose first edition appeared in 1968, was the first comprehensive attempt to present Islamic science as an integral aspect of the Islamic intellectual tradition, not as a chapter in the history of Western science, as it had been presented theretofore by historians of Western science. It represented a detailed documentation of a special case, in regard to Islamic science and civilization, of a general observation of René Guénon, that the traditional sciences were based on immutable principles from which they issued forth and that the aim of all the medieval and ancient sciences was to show the cosmological unity and interrelatedness of all that exists, so that in contemplating that unity man may be led to the unity of the Divine Principle, of which the unity of nature is the image.

Earlier, Danilevsky (1822—1885), and following him Spengler (1880—1936) had observed that not only religion, philosophy, the fine arts, and social and humanistic disciplines, but even sciences and technology, which are supposed to be identical for all cultures, bear the marks of a respective civilization. This character manifests itself, according to Danilevsky, in: (1) the sort of predisposition which each civilization shows to certain branches of science; (2) the point of view with which it approaches a scientific study of reality; and (3) the kind of subjective peculiarities it mixes with the objective truth. According to Spengler, each great Culture is based upon its own major premise or "prime symbol", which differs entirely for each Culture. This major premise or prime symbol determines the essential characteristic of the given Culture: the character of its science and philosophy, of its mentality, of its acts and beliefs, of its way of thinking, living and acting. There is no one concept of numbers or mathematics nor one concept of the soul or scientific psychology, not one pattern of philosophy or religion, or of the fine arts, but instead many, and exactly as many as there are different Cultures with their different prime symbols. Both Danilevsky and Spengler, like Guénon, rejected the view that the total history of

mankind is a linear movement following one trend and one direction.

Guénon's view appears to be an application of Spengler's, in that he classifies the 'major premises' of civilizations into two classes, sacred and profane, depending on their ontological, cosmological and eschatological creeds. There is an underlying assumption that all traditional cultures rest on an equal standing and that the major premises on which they rest stand on an equal level of verity.

Dr. Nasr's work, more than being a history of Islamic science, is an attempt to expound its meaning and goals. The author's mystical inclinations colour his entire account of the scientific endeavour of Muslims, and since this colour has been more or less dominant in the Muslim intellect since al-Ghazzālī, it appears that he was well suited for the task, for sympathetic description is a prerequisite of any valid criticism.

After explaining some salient features of the traditional Islamic approach to the study of nature in the "Introduction", the author goes on to describe briefly some of the outstanding universal figures of Islamic science, in Chapter 1: Jābir ibn Ḥayyān, Ya'qūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindī, Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq, Thābit ibn Qurrah, Muḥammad ibn Mūsā al-Khwārazmī, Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyā al-Rāzī, Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Mas'ūdī, Ibn Sinā, Ibn al-Haytham, Abū Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī, al-Majrīṭī, al-Ghazzālī, 'Umar Khayyām, Ibn Rushd, Naṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shirāzī, Ibn Khaldūn, and lastly, Bahā' al-Dīn al-'Āmilī.

Chapter 2 describes the Islamic classification of the sciences and cites the classifications offered by al-Fārābī and Ibn Khaldūn. Then it describes the traditional educational institutions, the mosque-school, the *madrasah* and the *khānaqah*, which together with the observatory and the hospital were responsible for the somewhat sporadic cultivation and propagation of the sciences in Islam.

Chapter 3, "Cosmology, Cosmography, Geography and Natural History", briefly describes the characteristics of the forms of cosmology developed by various Islamic schools. Then it goes on to describe the work of some outstanding Muslim geographers and natural historians, while quoting samples from their writings to elucidate the traditional Muslim approach.

Chapter 4, "Physics", briefly discusses the work of Ibn al-Haytham, al-Bīrūnī and al-Khāzini. The author remarks that if Ibn al-Haytham or al-Bīrūnī could be brought into the twentieth century, they would be surprised at the position that quantitative science has come to occupy today. Their surprise would arise not from the progress of ideas which they had begun, but from seeing the complete reversal of relations, from learning that the "progressive" science, which in the Islamic world has always remained secondary, has now in the West become nearly everything, while the immutable wisdom which was then primary has now

been reduced to almost nothing.

In Chapter 5, on mathematics, the author, with the help of quotations, elucidates the main characteristics of the writings of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā , al-Khwārazmī and 'Umar Khayyām. The next chapter is devoted to the work of Muslim astronomers. In Chapter 7, on medicine, the author, while describing the origin and development of Islamic medicine, shows how in its attempt to view man as a whole, as a single entity in whom body and soul are united, and in seeking to relate man to the total cosmic environment in which he lives, Islamic medicine has remained faithful to the unifying spirit of Islam. Chapter 8, "The Sciences of Man", briefly offers a flavour of Muslim writings on anthropological subjects, through citations from al-Bīrūnī and Ibn Baṭṭūṭah.

However, the author shows surprising zest in describing the alchemical extravaganza in Chapter 9 on the Islamic alchemical tradition. It is true, as he points out, that it is the "belief in the multiple states of being, their interrelationships, and the possibility of moving from one level to another, that comprises the general matrix of the long tradition of the alchemy whose origins extend back to prehistoric times." But that which is at least as important — if not more — as the cosmological matrix of a science is the veracity of its principles and the credibility of its methods. It is not grandeur and richness but verity which is the ultimate criterion of science. It seems that the admirers of alchemy overlook the difference between art and literature and science. No science, ancient or modern, holy or profane, Western or Eastern can avoid what is the ultimate criterion of all knowledge: truth. Pious superstitions do not acquire worth merely because they are inspired by a 'sacred' cosmology. Superstition is superstition and extravagance is extravagance, regardless of their sacred or secular cosmological credentials. Superstition and falsehood are *ẓulm*, because they cover up the truth, and a word of truth even from an ungodly man is more precious than a thousand extravagant superstitions of the pious. The Prophet (S) is reported to have said:

المُلْكُ يَبْقَى مَعَ الْكُفْرِ وَلَا يَبْقَى مَعَ الظُّلْمِ

The kingdom lasts with apostasy, but it does not last with injustice. (*ẓulm*)

(*Ẓulm*) is as unacceptable in science as it is in politics. In the light of this, we should welcome and not deplore the rise of chemistry and the fall of alchemy with all its magnificent pretensions to wisdom and spiritual symbolism. It were the pious superstitions such as that of alchemy and astrology and unwarranted, unrestrained professions in the name of *shuhūd* and *sapientia* that ultimately brought discredit to

sapientia itself. Did not the extravagant dogmas of alchemy and astrology overlook the following explicit warning of the Qur'an?

وَلَا تَقْفُ مَا لَيْسَ لَكَ بِهِ عِلْمٌ إِنَّ السَّمْعَ وَالْبَصَرَ وَالْفُؤَادَ كُلُّ أُولَٰئِكَ كَانَ عَنْهُ مَسْئُولًا ﴿٣٦﴾

Pursue not that thereof thou hast no knowledge. Lo! the hearing and the sight and heart — of each of these it will be asked. (17:36)

In regard to medieval and modern science, we must attempt to distinguish science as knowledge from science as opinion. There is nothing like profane knowledge. All knowledge is sacred in that it is a reflection of the truth, however partial. It is opinion which is sacred or profane, because men have godly or profane minds. Moreover, not all the opinions of saintly men are sacred, because only truth enjoys sanctity. It is opinion which varies from civilization to civilization, not truth, which is universal.

It is truth and knowledge that we must learn to respect, regardless of the outward labels of sanctity or profanity. Modern science is also sacred so far as it is knowledge, however partial, and it is profane so far as it comprises the viewpoints and opinions of profane minds. Quantity and utility are in themselves not despicable; it is the blind absorption in quantity to the neglect of quality and the shortsighted devotion to utility to the neglect of ultimate goals and ends that are despicable and bear wretchedness.

The Muslims inherited the sciences of the ancients as well as their pious fantasies and superstitions. This weakness for apparent holy stuff is obvious in the writings of their astronomers, chemists, mystics, even philosophers, in the form of flourishing Hermetic, Pythagorean and Judaic fables, ideas and notions. The inclination for the *tā'wīl* of the Qur'an and ḥadīth was another subversive factor. These, combined with chronic political instability and the consequent lack of continuity in scientific endeavour, did not allow Muslims to evolve the sciences in a way that was worthy of the Holy Qur'an and its followers.

On the other side, in the West, the monument of science was erected on the ruins of faith. It freed itself from the 'smaller' superstitions to fall into the greatest of all superstitions: the denial of transcendence and revelation. Today, lost and forlorn, surrounded by the ocean of its facts, it thirsts for meaning but finds it not. Meanwhile, science continues to expand with the sheer force of inertia, without gaining in meaning, profundity and depth. Having degenerated to its core, it is doubtful whether the West has retained any capacity for an active participation in the renewal of human civilization. As it is, it vehemently opposes the first signs of renewal that are so obvious in today's world. There is of course a religious response to this Eastern

renewal in the West. But if we are to believe Spengler, this "spell of second religiosity" may be no more than a sign of imminent death. That may be so, because this response lacks will, energy and the force of conviction; its motives are political rather than religious, calculated to sustain a moribund civilization that has become a burden for this planet and its people. It seeks to repair the damage done by its excesses, though impotent to break the hellward bound momentum of a civilization racing to perdition.

So long as the West is there with its "global responsibilities, commitments and interests", the tremendous potential of the Muslim East will not find any unrestricted outlet. But once these Satanic bars have been removed, the growth of the sacred civilization will take its natural course. Then, when men rediscover their wholeness, the sciences of man will find their unity and meaning, in freedom from the superstitions of the materialists as well as the alchemists and the astrologers.

— *Shāhid Naqawī*

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